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Abstract 
The Metaphysics of Sex and Gender:   
Human Embodiment, Multiplicity, and Contingency 
 
Lauren Elizabeth Weis 
Advisor:  Prof. Patrick H. Byrne 
This dissertation assesses the relevance and significance of Lonergan’s work to 
feminist philosophy.1  In particular, this work examines the debate between several 
contemporary feminist philosophers regarding the question of the relation between sex 
and gender, as well as their critiques of the Western metaphysical tradition.  Ultimately, 
the trajectory of the work argues that Lonergan’s philosophy, in particular his re-
envisioning of the meaning of what it is to do metaphysics, provides a unique and 
compelling response to the critiques made by feminist philosophers, despite the 
appearance of overt sexism in his writing.  In fact, Lonergan’s approach clarifies the 
relevance of metaphysical thinking to feminist philosophical analysis. 
The first chapter examines likely feminist criticisms of Lonergan’s philosophy, as 
well as points of commonality, particularly between Lonergan’s cognitional theory and 
various feminist epistemologies.  In particular, this chapter undertakes an analysis of 
Lonergan’s notion of “the pure desire to know” which he claims is a primordial, 
normative human response to our experience of the universe of being.    
Chapter Two focuses on the feminist debate regarding the “sex/gender” 
distinction.  This chapter examines the analyses of sex and gender by four prominent 
                                                 
1 Demonstrated by the contributors of essays to the volume on Lonergan and Feminism, including Cynthia 
Crysdale, Paulette Kidder, Michael Vertin, Elizabeth A. Morelli, and many others. 
    
 
    
 
feminist philosophers, Luce Irigaray, Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens, and Judith Butler, 
and their critiques of the Western metaphysical tradition. 
Chapter Three explicates Lonergan’s cognitional theory, as well as his analysis of 
four patterns of experience – the biological, aesthetic, intellectual and dramatic.  In 
addition, the notion of “neural demands” developed by Lonergan is discussed, as well as 
the connection between “neural demand functions” and patterns of experience. 
Chapter Four is dedicated to an exploration of the complexity of Lonergan’s 
approach to metaphysics.  The chapter begins with Lonergan’s notion of being, and 
moves on to explore his notions of finality, emergent probability and objectivity.  I turn 
next to a discussion of Lonergan’s revision of the traditional metaphysical vocabulary of 
potency, form, and act.  This is followed by an examination of Lonergan’s understanding 
of the relationship between metaphysics and development, as well as dialectic. 
 Chapter Five elaborates a dialectical exchange between Lonergan’s philosophy 
and the philosophy of Irigaray, Grosz, Butler, and Gatens.  In addition, this chapter 
articulates Lonergan’s notion of anti-essentialism, and argues that his unmistakably clear 
rejection of essentialism supports the repudiation of the idea that human natures are fixed 
and determined by biological sex.  In addition, Chapter Five explores the metaphysical 
and ethical significance of classical and statistical law, as well as the relationship between 
metaphysics and ethics as it pertains to feminist philosophy.  
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 Why have there been no major treatises concerning feminist metaphysics?  It 
appears that many feminist philosophers have given up on metaphysics.  Have they 
assumed that metaphysics is a fruitless and outmoded philosophical approach to 
forwarding feminist aims?  If so, then their conclusions would seem justified considering 
that the female sex has been discounted by Western metaphysics.  The contributions of 
the relatively few women who braved the halls of philosophical discourse prior to the 
twentieth century remain, for the most part, extra-canonical.  Why is this? 
Feminists have argued persuasively that the history of the subordination of the 
female sex, created through the enculturation of the practice of sexism and patriarchal 
dominance, predates the history of Western metaphysics.  In The Creation of Patriarchy, 
historian Gerda Lerner argues that patriarchal systems emerged over the course of several 
millennia.  Lerner claims “The period of the ‘establishment of patriarchy’ was not one 
‘event’ but a process developing over a period of nearly 2500 years, from app. 3100 to 
600 B.C.  It occurred, even within the Ancient Near East, at a different pace and at 
different times in several distinct societies.”2   
Significantly, the emergence of Western philosophy and metaphysics can be 
traced to the period from the fourth through sixth centuries B.C., at which time Lerner 
claims patriarchal systems had been fully established, according to Lerner.  While the 
pre-Socratic schools such as the Ionian and Eliatic begin in the sixth century B.C., Plato 
                                                 
2 Lerner, Gerda.  The Creation of Patriarchy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 8. 
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and Aristotle, the patriarchs of Western metaphysics, were born in 4283 and 384 B.C., 
respectively.4    
 By comparison, in the twenty-first century, the history of feminist philosophy is 
barely in its infancy.  The stimulus for feminist philosophy is largely the insight that 
Western philosophy, in particular,5 developed within a civilization shaped through the 
deep and abiding group bias of sexism.  Feminist philosophers, therefore, criticize the 
overtly sexist comments made by male philosophers through the ages, for example 
Aristotle’s claim “the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior,”6 and Aquinas’ 
assertion, “For good order would have been wanting in the family if some were not 
governed by others wiser than themselves.  So by such a kind of subjection woman is 
naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.”7  More 
deeply, feminist philosophers are concerned that claims about the possibility of objective 
and universal analysis exclude women altogether.  In particular, feminist philosophers 
argue that claims about truth, justice, reason, and beauty, as well as about the universality 
                                                 
3 The exact date of Plato’s birth is debated, but is thought to have been between 428 or 427 B.C. (the 
historical record is uncertain). 
4 For further discussion see for example, Roger Hancock. “The History of Metaphysics” The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Volume 5 (New York:  Macmillan, 1967), 289 – 300; and William Turner “Metaphysics” 
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume X (New York:  Appleton, 1911), 226-233.  
5 While patriarchy is a world-wide phenomenon and effects Western as well as Non-Western philosophies, 
this analysis will focus exclusively on Western philosophy. 
6 Aristotle, Politics in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle:  The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Volume II, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 1254 b13, 1990. 
For a very careful reading of Aristotle’s claims about the female in his biological writings, see Robert 
Mayhew, The Female In Aristotle’s Biology:  Reason or Rationalization.  (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 2004).  Mayhew argues that a careful contextual reading of many of Aristotle’s biological claims 
about the female reveal that while Aristotle was motivated by ideological bias in some of his conclusions 
about women and their biology, especially with regards to cognitional ability, many of his claims are also 
taken out of context and oversimplified.  See in particular chapter 4 “Eunuchs and Women” for a 
fascinating reading of Aristotle’s oft-quoted claim that “the female is as it were a mutilated male.”  
Aristotle. The Generation of Animals 737 a27 as quoted and translated by Mayhew, 54. 
7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1952),  qu. 92, art. 1, ad 2, 489. 
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of the human subject, have been constructed from a male point of view, largely because 
women were excluded from the realm of rationality by male philosophers.   
 Feminist philosophers are particularly opposed to the foundational claims made 
by traditional Western philosophy.  As generally understood, “traditional” Western 
metaphysics has a 2500 year history.  It has progressed from the ancient Greeks, through 
the philosophers of the early middle ages practiced by thinkers such as Plotinus, 
Boethius, Augustine, and Anselm to the rediscovery of Aristotle’s metaphysics in the late 
middle ages that fuels the prominence of scholasticism as demonstrated by Aquinas, 
Scotus, Ockham, Suárez, and others.   
During the modern period, the methods and many of the conclusions of scholastic 
metaphysics were rejected, amid lively disagreement about the value of practicing 
metaphysics as an abstract theoretical enterprise.  Descartes argues that metaphysical 
certainty can be reached not through experience but through reason alone.  Empiricists 
such as Locke and Hume claim that human knowledge and our possession of 
metaphysical certainty is limited by empirical experience.  Kant rejects the absolutism of 
both of these points of view, proposing instead an idealism that aims to rethink the nature 
and limits of human knowledge, as well as restructure philosophical understanding about 
the kinds of metaphysical questions that can even be answered.   
Following Kant, Hegel understood reality in a monistic fashion, asserting that the 
only truly substantial entity is Spirit (Geist).  Hegel’s absolute idealism rekindled the 
tradition of speculative metaphysics in a sweepingly systematic way.  Although Hegel’s 
idealism has been attacked by scathing critics of the Western metaphysical tradition such 
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as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the legacy of the idealism of Kant and Hegel persists 
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 Feminists object to many features of Western philosophy and metaphysics, 
specifically, the dichotomy between universality and particularity (which many feminists 
argue leads to a fundamentally dualistic approach to understanding reality), varieties of 
essentialism, as well as a tendency to think in terms of hierarchy which inflames the 
problem of dualism.  All of these issues implicate the philosophers previously discussed, 
as well as their historical counterparts, to varying degrees.   
 Like feminist philosophers, many twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers 
(of all sexes) whose work is not explicitly feminist, also criticize the metaphysical 
tradition.  Even though they share this critical stance with feminist thinkers, this does not 
mean that they have been spared from feminist criticism.  Feminist criticism of the critics 
is frequently a complicated affair, for often feminists are indebted to the work of the 
canonical figures that they criticize, yet are dissatisfied with the full scope of their work.  
For example, although phenomenological analysis has proved useful for many feminist 
philosophers, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is questioned for its idealistic revival of 
Cartesianism, as well as a failure to fully investigate corporeality in all of its aspects.  
Again, Martin Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s idealism, insisting instead on a 
phenomenological method that arises out of the Destruktion8 of the Western metaphysical 
tradition to allow for a concrete revealing of the meaning of Being.  With his analysis of 
Dasein, Heidegger revolutionizes the thinking of subjectivity.  Yet he too is still criticized 
                                                 
8 Martin Heidegger.  Being and Time, Trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:  Harper 
and Rowe, 1962), 44.   
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by some feminists for his failure to account for sexual difference in his account of 
Dasein.9 
 Jacques Derrida’s work is indebted both to Husserl and Heidegger, among others.  
At times considered a feminist himself,10 Derrida develops a deconstructive approach to 
reading (inspired by Heidegger) and a notion of différance which is intriguing to many 
feminist scholars for its ability to disrupt traditional philosophical approaches.11  Yet 
many feminists are suspicious and even hostile towards the kind of ‘post-modernism’ 
found in Derrida’s writings because it is used to undermine notions of truth and value that 
are considered important to feminist work.12  A contemporary of Derrida, Emmanuel 
Levinas, critiques the phenomenological tradition, particularly Heidegger, for failing to 
recognize the danger of enveloping the subject within a veil of solipsism.  Levinas is 
praised by feminist thinkers for undertaking a serious consideration of the alterity of our 
experience of other persons, as well as the ethical dimension of that experience.  Feminist 
philosophers, Simone de Beauvoir in particular, insist on the importance of the analysis 
of alterity, and yet criticize Levinas’ failure to recognize the particularity of the feminine 
other.13  Critiquing the phenomenological tradition from a unique point of view, Michel 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Katrin Froese “Woman's Eclipse: The Silenced Feminine in Nietzsche and Heidegger” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, (2005), 31(2), 165 –184. 
10 See, for example, an interview between Christine McDonald and Jacques Derrida, “Choreographies” in 
Nancy C. Holland (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida  (University Park:  The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1997), 23-42. 
11 See, for example, Elizabeth Grosz.  “Ontology and Equivocation:  Derrida’s Politics of Sexual 
Difference” in Nancy C. Holland (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida (University Park:  The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 73-102. 
12 See, for example, Christine De Stefano.  “Dilemmas of Difference” In Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), 
Feminism/Postmodernism (London:  Routledge, 1990), 63-82.  
13 See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Trans. H. M. Parshley (New York:  Vintage Books, 1989), 
xxii. 
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Foucault’s analysis of power relations and human sexuality inspires feminist critiques of 
power and gender relations.  Yet Foucault’s masculine bias is often called to task.14     
 Indeed, while feminist philosophers often disagree about definitions of feminism 
itself, as well as appropriate goals and methodologies for feminist theory, much time has 
been devoted by feminist philosophers debating the weaknesses and merits of these major 
twentieth century thinkers.  Conversely, a significant but relatively small body of work is 
emerging relating feminist critique to the work of twentieth century philosopher and 
theologian Bernard Lonergan.15  Lonergan’s work has a broad, interdisciplinary appeal, 
so the existing corpus of feminist analysis focusing on Lonergan’s work addresses issues 
beyond exclusively philosophical concerns.   
This dissertation assesses the relevance and significance of Lonergan’s work to 
feminist philosophy.16  In particular, this work examines the debate between several 
contemporary feminist philosophers regarding the question of the relation between sex 
and gender, as well as their critiques of the Western metaphysical tradition.  Ultimately, 
this work argues that Lonergan’s philosophy, in particular his re-envisioning of the 
meaning of what it is to do metaphysics, provides a unique and compelling response to 
the critiques made by feminist philosophers, despite the appearance of overt sexism in his 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Margaret A. McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany:  
SUNY Press, 2002).   
15 See, for example, Cynthia S.W. Crysdale (ed.), Lonergan and Feminism (Toronto:  University of Toronto 
Press, 1994);  Cynthia S.W. Crysdale,  Embracing Travail:  Retrieving the Cross Today (New York:  
Continuum, 1999); as well as the work of Christine Jamieson on Lonergan and Kristeva, and Prudence 
Allen’s work on Lonergan, Aristotle, and Feminism. 
16 Demonstrated by the contributors of essays to the volume on Lonergan and Feminism, including Cynthia 
Crysdale, Paulette Kidder, Michael Vertin, Elizabeth A. Morelli, and many others. 
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writing.  In fact, Lonergan’s approach clarifies the relevance of metaphysical thinking to 
feminist philosophical analysis. 
In Chapter One I examine Lonergan’s cognitional theory in relation to various 
feminist epistemologies.  This chapter undertakes an analysis of Lonergan’s notion of 
“the pure desire to know,” which he claims is a primordial, normative human response to 
our experience of the universe of being.  I explore potential feminist criticisms of 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory, as well as points of commonality.      
Chapter Two focuses on the feminist debate regarding the “sex/gender” 
distinction.  This chapter examines the analyses of sex and gender by four prominent 
feminist philosophers, Luce Irigaray, Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens, and Judith Butler, 
and their critiques of the Western metaphysical tradition. 
In Chapter Three I further explicate Lonergan’s cognitional theory, as well as his 
analysis of four patterns of experience:  the biological, aesthetic, intellectual and 
dramatic.  In addition, I examine his notion of “neural demands,” as well as the 
connection between “neural demand functions” and patterns of experience. 
Chapter Four is dedicated to an exploration of the complexity of Lonergan’s 
approach to metaphysics.  Beginning with Lonergan’s notion of being, I then discuss his 
notions of finality, emergent probability, and objectivity.  I turn next to a discussion of 
Lonergan’s revision of the traditional metaphysical vocabulary of potency, form, and act.  
This is followed by an examination of Lonergan’s understanding of the relationship 
between metaphysics and development, as well as dialectic.  These topics are particularly 
important for this dissertation because it is Lonergan’s account of a dynamic metaphysics 
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which best articulates a philosophical position that addresses the concerns about 
traditional metaphysics raised by the feminist authors examined in Chapter Two. 
 Chapter Five elaborates a dialectical exchange between Lonergan’s philosophy 
and the philosophy of Irigaray, Grosz, Butler, and Gatens.  In addition, this chapter 
articulates Lonergan’s notion of anti-essentialism, and argues that his unmistakably clear 
rejection of essentialism supports the repudiation of the idea that human natures are fixed 
and determined by biological sex.  In addition, Chapter Five explores the metaphysical 
and ethical significance of classical and statistical laws, as well as the relationship 















Chapter One:   
Feminism, Epistemology, and Pure Question:   
Examining Lonergan’s Pure Desire to Know 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Bernard Lonergan’s masterwork Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding 
attempts to reveal the inner workings of human conscious-intentionality.  At the core of 
the work is an analysis of the phenomenon of insight, which Lonergan describes as a 
“supervening act of understanding.”17  Lonergan’s approach is systematic, and his modest 
attempt to convey an insight into insight rolls along like a snowball gathering mass.  
According to Lonergan’s own preface to his work, this yields “a philosophy that is at 
once methodical, critical and comprehensive,”18 which implies a verifiable metaphysics, 
as well as “insight into the principal devices of the flight from understanding.”19  He 
claims this philosophy pertains to everyone, from the simplest mind to the most brilliant 
philosophical genius.  This is only the beginning of what Lonergan claims to accomplish. 
Many feminist philosophers are suspicious of systematic philosophizing.20  They 
suspect that sweeping claims about the universality and neutrality of “human” reason, are 
in fact false and only representative of male views about masculine capabilities.  Susan 
Bordo, for example, comments on philosophical  
metanarratives arising out of the propertied, white, male, Western intellectual 
tradition.  That tradition, we should remember, reigned for thousands of years  
                                                 
17 Bernard Lonergan.  Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding.  (San Francisco:  Harper Collins, 1978), 
x.  Hereafter referred to as Insight. 
18 Ibid., xiii. 
19 Ibid., xii. 
20 For Lonergan, systematic thinking must express the emerging dynamism of the universe of being – he 
speaks of system as “system on the move,” while the sort of systematic thinking that feminists fear is static, 
monolithic, totalitarian.   
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and was able to produce powerful works of philosophy, literature, art, and  
religion before its hegemony began to be dismantled under great protest.21   
 
Feminists such as Bordo would likely doubt that there would be much of value in 
Lonergan’s overarchingly systematic work that could further feminist aims.   
However, close examination of Lonergan’s philosophy reveals that his approach 
is surprisingly compatible with feminist goals and methodology.  In fact, Lonergan’s 
reflections on method could be applied profitably to feminist philosophy and make 
feminist methods more able.   
In particular, Lonergan thinks about understanding in a unique manner, beginning 
with a concrete examination of cognitional process which yields insight into the process 
of experiencing and inquiring about data, and eventually into the phenomenon of the 
experience of insight itself – the “aha!” moment that we associate with understanding.  
Lonergan begins his philosophical enterprise with these concrete questions about 
knowing, which he claims arise from our “pure desire” to know and understand the full 
universe of being.  He argues that this pure desire is normative for human experience.  
 
II.  Feminist Epistemologies 
 One strand of philosophical thinking that examines similar questions is the fairly 
new field of feminist epistemology.  While feminist theorists resist any singular 
universalizing of the field – a recent text edited by Linda Alcoff and Linda Potter 
                                                 
21 Susan Bordo.  “Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender Scepticism” in Linda J. Nicholson, ed. 
Feminism/Postmodernism (New York:  Routledge, 1990), 141. 
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addresses “Feminist Epistemologies”22 – it is fair to say that, generally, approaches to 
feminist epistemology question the assumption that “a general account of knowledge, one 
that uncovers justificatory standards a priori, is possible.”23  Feminist critiques focus on 
the context of epistemological theories, with a healthy skepticism about any general or 
universal account of knowledge that “ignores the social context and status of knowers.”24 
 While not all feminists agree on a singular epistemological critique, they share as 
a source of motivation the belief that traditional philosophy has long held commitments 
that challenge and undermine the knowledge claims made by women.25   As a result, 
feminists offer varying epistemological analyses, but share a “determination to 
reconstruct epistemology on a newer, more self-conscious ground.”26 
 Many feminists resist the notion of privileging a woman-centered knowledge, 
often described as ‘women’s ways of knowing,’ ‘women’s intuition,’ or knowledge based 
in ‘women’s experience’.  These approaches are regarded as problematic because they 
universalize real and significant differences between women, such as those of class, race, 
ethnicity, or culture, and lead to an essentializing of women’s experience.27  Alcoff and 
Potter note, however, that “If the concept ‘woman’ has lost its analytical credibility, the 
concept of a universal human nature is even less credible.  Yet it is the latter concept that 
                                                 
22 My emphasis. 
23 Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, ed.  Feminist Epistemologies  (London:  Routledge, 1993), 1. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 2. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 For a discussion of this issue, see Marnia Lazreg, “Women’s Experience and Feminist Epistemology:  A 
Critical neo-rational approach” in Lennon, Kathleen and Margaret Whitford, ed.  Knowing the Difference:  
Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (London:  Routledge, 1994), 45-62. 
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allows mainstream epistemologies to ignore the specificity of the knowing subject.”28  
Feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code argues that the subjectivity of the knower is 
significant and must be taken into account.  She “argues that mainstream epistemology 
creates the illusion of a universal subject through the excision of ‘unacceptable’ points of 
view.”29  
Alcoff and Potter claim that the alliance between feminism and philosophy is an 
uneasy one, because of a “contradictory pull between the concrete and the universal.”30  
Feminists have long embraced the notion that “the personal is political”31 and feminist 
epistemology generally “supports the hypothesis that politics intersect traditional 
epistemology.”32  Feminist epistemology does not attempt to reduce epistemology to 
politics, but to argue that that there are political elements to knowledge which reflect the 
concerns of real, concrete human living.  From this claim follows the notion that in order 
“to be adequate, an epistemology must attend to the complex ways in which social values 
influence knowledge, including the discernible social and political implications of its own 
analysis.”33 
 This work argues that Lonergan’s account of cognitional theory and metaphysics, 
which is reflective of his claims about the pure desire to know, is in accord with feminist 
                                                 
28 Alcoff and Potter, Feminist Epistemologies, 4. 
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Ibid., 1. 
31 The origin of this phrase is contested among scholars of women’s studies.  Specifically, the question of 
whether the phrase arose out of an earlier movement or text and was later adopted by feminists is debated.   
There does seem to be agreement, however, that the phrase was popularized within the feminist movement 
by Carol Hanisch in her essay titled “The Personal is Political” in Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt, 
eds.  Notes from the Second Year:  Women’s Liberation, Major Writings of the Radical Feminists  (New 
York:  Self-published by the Editors, 1970). 
32 Alcoff and Potter, Feminist Epistemologies, 13. 
33 Ibid. 
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insights about the social aspects of knowing.  Indeed, it will be shown that Lonergan 
gives an account of human knowing that does not commit the error of falsely 
universalizing a limited, biased, masculinist (or feminist) account of knowledge.  Rather, 
Lonergan’s examination of the notion of the pure desire to know takes seriously the 
question of the context of the act of knowing, as well as the meaning of difference that is 
so essential to feminist theorizing.  For Lonergan, the pure desire to know is always 
manifest in a particular person under particular social, historical, and material conditions.  
As a result, there is an important distinction to be made between the universal 
unrestrictedness of the desire to know and its universal structural pattern, versus the 
highly particularized manifestation of what it is doing right now, and how it unfolds in a 
particular knower’s questions about the meaning of being.   
 
III.  Pure Question 
According to Lonergan’s philosophy, being is not manifest but rather is only 
anticipated in concrete questions for intelligence and reflection.  This means that being is 
hidden.  Being is not manifest, it is not given, it is not a phenomenon.  Its hiddenness is 
what makes possible a desire for being.  As Lonergan puts it,  
Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know. 
By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in 
questions for intelligence and for reflection.  It is not the verbal utterance of 
questions.  It is not the conceptual formulation of questions.  It is not any insight 
or thought.  It is not any reflective grasp or judgment.  It is the prior and 
enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to 
understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete 
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context of correct judgments that is named knowledge.  The desire to know, then, 
is simply the inquiring critical spirit of man.34 
 
It is not only Lonergan’s approach to being that is indirect; even his approach to 
the pure desire is indirect.  The desire to know is neither immediate nor implicit.  Rather, 
it is the horizon that makes it possible for questions to appear or emerge.  The pure desire 
is not manifest, it is not a phenomenon.  The phenomenon is instead the question. 
In order to explore this possibility, this work will examine Lonergan’s underlying 
claims about the nature of human knowledge.  These claims are grounded in an 
understanding of the drive or desire for understanding that Lonergan contends is 
normative for all human rationality.  Further, I will consider whether feminists might be 
correct in criticizing Lonergan’s account of the human desire for understanding, or the 
“pure desire to know,” as pervasively masculine and representative of a patriarchal 
viewpoint.   
Lonergan describes the experience of the pure desire to know: 
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a 
drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, 
to explain.  Just what is wanted has many names.  In what precisely it consists, is 
a matter of dispute.  But the fact of inquiry is beyond all doubt.  It can absorb a 
man.  It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow 
prison of his study or laboratory.  It can send him on dangerous voyages of 
exploration.  It can withdraw him from other interests, other pursuits, other 
pleasures, other achievements.  It can fill his waking thoughts, hide him from the 
world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his dreams.  It can demand 
endless sacrifices that are made without regret though there is only the hope, 
never a certain promise, of success.35 
 
                                                 
34 Lonergan, Insight, 348. 
35 Lonergan, Insight, 4. 
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While writing Insight in the 1940’s and 50’s, Lonergan used what today is considered 
sexist, masculine language to describe the human subject.  Through the efforts of feminist 
scholarship, this language is now rightly considered unacceptable as grammatical 
standard, but in this case there are compelling philosophical reasons to look beyond it.  I 
have found that his description does ring true and provides a genuine account of my own 
experience of knowing.  In addition, Lonergan’s account has also been discussed by other 
female scholars, notably Cynthia Crysdale, Elizabeth A. Morelli and Beth Beshear.   
 
IV.  Lonergan and Notions of Desire 
 Cynthia Crysdale, a feminist theologian and scholar of Lonergan’s work, finds 
Lonergan’s notion of desire to resonate with feminist concerns.  In her book Embracing 
Travail she examines the damaging effects of patriarchy, colonialism, and racism, the 
role of the Christian tradition in perpetuating these social systems, and the possibility of 
the authentic transformation of these and other modes of oppression and victimization.  
Despite the human manufacture of such systems of inequality, she claims, “As humans 
we are oriented to the ultimate, the reach of our questions and desires is unfathomable.”36  
According to Crysdale this orientation is shaped by a deep desire shared by human 
beings, male and female alike.  She notes  
Earlier I discussed the touching of our deepest Desire, a Desire and a touch that 
can carry us beyond ourselves, to horizons we would never have otherwise 
imagined.  This grace can occur with regard to specific choices in concrete 
circumstances.  It can also involve the general stirring up of Desire that grants us 
antecedent willingness.  In this case we are moved in a deep and perduring way.37   
                                                 
36 Crysdale.  Embracing Travail, 133. 
37 Ibid., 132. 
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For Crysdale there is nothing masculine or distorted about this experience of desire.  
Rather, this deep experience of desire, when fulfilled through a process of inquiry and 
understanding, orients us away from the bias and narrow-mindedness that drives systems 
of oppression, such as sexism and racism.  She notes “The deep longing to be a whole 
human person … is often truncated, both by our own sabotage and by the actions of 
others.  Our socialization into fear of others and accommodation to their needs damage 
this deepest desire, which is a yearning to be a whole Self,” and yet “A taste of 
fulfillment of this deep Desire stirs up power, courage, deeper yearnings, willingness to 
pursue fulfillment of Self at all costs.  Hunger overtakes fear.”38  It is this phenomenon of 
desire, explored by Lonergan and Crysdale, that we must attempt to understand. 
In her article, “The Problem of Desire in Human Knowing and Living,”39 Beshear 
examines the notion of desire in Lonergan’s philosophy.  She contrasts this with other 
philosophical and theological accounts of desire.  She argues that Lonergan’s positions 
on desire seem at first glance to be contradictory, for desire seems to be “both requisite 
for and inimical to ethical living.”40  She resolves this seeming contradiction by noting 
that Lonergan differentiates between several different types of desire that shape the 
human cognitional process.  Beshear notes that the primary form of desire, the ‘pure 
desire to know,’ “orders the other kinds of desire to ethical ends, unless ‘spontaneous 
desires and fears’ intervene.”41   
                                                 
38 Ibid., 35. 
39 Elizabeth Beshear.  “The Problem of Desire in Human Knowing and Living”  Method:  Journal of 
Lonergan Studies, (2002), 20(2), 155-173.  
40 Ibid., 155. 
41 Ibid., 156. 
 16
 Beshear argues that Lonergan’s approach to desire is somewhat Platonic, with the 
aim of bringing the passions under the control of reason.  Lonergan differs from Plato, 
however, in his account of reason.  She claims that for Lonergan, “reason itself is the 
unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know.”42  Beshear points out that 
this association of desire with disinterestedness seems paradoxical, yet for Lonergan both 
desire and disinterest are associated with the questions that emerge from the dynamic 
orientation of human consciousness.  These questions emerge “when the noise of other 
appetites are stilled.”43  The disinterestedness of Lonergan’s pure desire to know seems 
less paradoxical when one recognizes that the pure desire is a special kind of desire.  As 
Lonergan notes “For the pure desire not only desires; it desires intelligently and 
reasonably; it desires to understand because it is intelligent and it desires to grasp the 
unconditioned because it desires to be reasonable.”44  As such, the pure desire to know 
“pulls man out of the solid routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, doing 
and enjoying”.45  Rather than accommodating the other to one’s own interests, settled 
positions, and habits, the pure desire to know draws the subject out toward the otherness 
of the not yet known.  In light of this orientation toward reason and away from routine, it 
is not incomprehensible that the pure desire acts in a disinterested fashion.46   
 While the pure desire differs from other desires, it is similar in that it demands 
satisfaction of its aims.  The aim of the pure desire to know is to answer the basic 
question ‘is it so?’  Or, to ask the question differently, are the conditions fulfilled that 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., as quoting Lonergan. 
44 Insight, 380. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Beshear, 156-157, paraphrasing Lonergan 
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were sought after by the original question or inquiry made by the knower?  The pure 
desire to know draws the inquirer toward what Lonergan calls the “virtually 
unconditioned.”47  He states that “To grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective 
judgment is to grasp the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned.”48    Beshear 
points out that, for Lonergan, the virtually unconditioned is “independent of the 
individual’s likes and dislikes, of his wishful and anxious thinking.”49  Rather, reaching 
the unconditioned is a product of the detached and disinterested orientation of the pure 
desire to know. 
 Beshear emphasizes that the nature of the pure desire to know is unrestricted.  
This unrestrictedness is derived not from the knower herself, but from the unrestricted 
nature of the totality of being.  According to Beshear, “the pure desire to know 
anticipates the all-inclusive nature of being … the pure desire … does not cease upon the 
answering of a single question, but rather [anticipates] that one answer may give rise to a 
whole new set of questions of equal or greater urgency.”50  In addition to having an 
unrestricted orientation, the pure desire differs from other desires because it lacks a 
specific content.  Rather than seek some singular fulfillment, the pure desire is an 
anticipatory orientation lacking content.  Beshear comments “it does not know what that 
content [toward which it aims] will be, but only the form of that content, which is the 
virtually unconditioned.”51  The method for achieving a virtually unconditioned judgment 
involves following the cognitional process through experiencing, asking questions, 
                                                 
47 Insight, 280. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Beshear, 157, as quoting Lonergan. 
50 Beshear, 157. 
51 Ibid., 158. 
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enjoying the “Eureka!” of understanding only to give way once again to asking if that 
understanding is really so, reaching the virtually unconditioned, and finally affirming or 
denying the concreteness of one’s understanding.   
 Beshear mentions, however, that we might inquire about the norms for objectivity 
that allow the knower to affirm or deny the truth of a judgment.  She notes that Lonergan 
is strongly anti-empiricist insofar as he “locates the norms for objectivity in the pure 
desire to know – in authentic subjectivity.”52  But what does this mean, to locate such 
norms within the pure desire to know?  She claims that Lonergan draws a sharp 
distinction between the empiricist tendency to reduce the object of knowing to the object 
of experience, and the pure desire’s search for “an object not found in experience but 
reached through the grasping of a virtually unconditioned by the answering of all further 
relevant questions.”53  Yet the very notion that normativity comes from a pure desire 
rather than from empiricist solidity is a source of anxiety.  Humans suppress this anxiety 
by recoiling from the pure desire.  Lonergan comments that there is a tension 
natural to man, between extroversion and objectivity.  For man observes, 
understands, and judges, but he fancies that what he knows in judgment is not 
known in judgment and does not suppose an exercise of understanding but simply 
is attained by taking a good look at the ‘real’ that is ‘already out there now’…  
empiricism as a method rests on an elementary confusion.  What is obvious in 
knowing is, indeed, looking.  Compared to looking, insight is obscure, and grasp 
of the unconditioned is doubly obscure.  But empiricism amounts to the 
assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is.  This 
assumption is false.54 
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54 Insight, 412-416. 
 19
Indeed, the pure desire to know counters such empiricist assumptions by providing the 
knower with an unrestricted orientation, and by unbalancing our competing desires by 
asserting a detached and disinterested focus on questions for reflection and intelligence.  
As Beshear notes, “The pure desire to know sets up even the norms for questioning, so 
that no part of the cognitional process escapes its demands.”55  
 While the pure desire unbalances our competing desires, it does not quash those 
other desires.  Beshear argues that Lonergan’s account “lends clarity” to the 
“philosophical and ascetic traditions that call for the rule of reason over the passions.”56   
Lonergan’s aim is not to denigrate or cast suspicion upon bodily, sensible or psychic 
desires.  Lonergan’s approach is unlike Plato’s tendency to denigrate physical hungers, or 
Descartes’ need to validate his rational affirmation, “cogito, ergo sum,” apart from any 
sensate, bodily experience.  Instead, Lonergan takes pains to develop an account of ways 
that passionate attachment can manifest in psycho-social bias, which “impairs cognitional 
process by interfering with the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire 
to know.”57  Thus, for Lonergan, the source of rational impairment is not physical, or 
neural, but rather psychic and intellectual – at least insofar as psychic and intellectual 
realities cause intellectual failure through the dominance of biased self-interest over the 
engagement of the pure desire to know.  Beshear observes that “individual bias limits the 
detachment and disinterestedness of cognitional process to personal problem solving and 
excludes further relevant questions.”58  The goal for cognitional liberation would then be 
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to free the pure desire from the effects of bias in order to allow it to guide our orientation, 
rather than the self-serving egoism which cuts us off from the unrestrictedness of being 
toward which the pure desire aims.   
 Rather than denigrate the material in a Platonic fashion, or uphold a Cartesian 
dualistic vision of human existence, Lonergan “affirms the unity and complementarity of 
the material and spiritual elements in the human.”59  He argues that spiritual intelligibility 
corresponds with the act of understanding sought by the pure desire, while material 
intelligibility corresponds with what is understood by intelligence.  While the material is 
constituted by prime potency, the spiritual is neither constituted nor conditioned by prime 
potency.  In fact, Lonergan concludes that “man’s central form seems to be the point of 
transition from the material to the spiritual.”60  This is a significant claim, because it 
means that the spiritual, intelligent existence of the human being is intrinsically joined to, 
and therefore in no way denigrates, the material reality of human existence.  This does 
not mean that material and spiritual reality are equivalent.  Lonergan claims that 
“material reality cannot perform the role or function of spiritual reality, but spiritual 
reality can perform the role and function of material reality.”61  This is because spiritual 
reality is comprehensive, insofar as the pure desire is drawn towards the entire universe 
of being through the act of knowing.  Thus, it can “provide the center and ground of unity 
in the material conjugates”62 of a single human being.  
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 Beshear concludes that while the pure desire to know directs the cognitional 
process, this does not equate to a dualistic assertion of “mind over body, or spirit over 
matter, for matter and spirit coexist in an intelligible unity.”63  She also rejects any 
“postmodern” interpretation of Lonergan’s call for the pure desire to know to direct 
human living that would regard it as a manifestation of “the calculating, willful reason of 
modernity.”64   She says that such an exercise of reason would instead be a manifestation 
of bias interfering with the pure desire to know, not the orientation of the pure desire 
itself.  Rather than calculating or willful, the pure desire is spontaneous.  However, 
human beings must freely choose to live in accord with this spontaneity, and accept a 
“form of willingness that aids and supports and reinforces the pure desire.”65  It is 
important to emphasize, however, that the contrary choice is equally free and possible, 
for one can freely choose to refuse this open orientation. 
 While the pure desire is spontaneous, detached, and disinterested it is not in any 
way disconnected from human living.  Indeed, the pure desire is intimately connected to 
human affairs through the human will.  As Beshear observes “The will is … an extension 
of the detached and disinterested desire into the realm of possibility” and through the will 
the pure desire “explores concrete possibilities for human living.”66  The will and the 
intellect are also connected through Lonergan’s tripartite analysis of the human good.67  
Beshear nicely summarizes the relationship between the pure desire to know and the 
structure of the good, “The detached and disinterested desire, then, has everything to do 
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with human living, for it brings humans to an awareness of particular needs and wants, to 
a recognition of a possible ordering of those wants, and an identification of differing 
values among orders.”68  It is this relationship that constitutes for Lonergan a moral 
imperative that is an extension of the pure desire to know. 
 The pure desire is related to the will, but remains detached insofar as it maintains 
an unrelenting pursuit of the virtually unconditioned so long as it is not misdirected and 
crippled by bias.  As Beshear notes, “the word ‘pure’ connotes this aspect of intellectual 
eros, because of which [the pure desire] seeks not just universals, but a concrete content, 
and not just any content, but a correct content.”69  The pure desire orients both human 
knowing and human choosing, and demands correct understanding and wise judgment in 
both.   
 This does not mean, however, that every human being actually lives up to those 
demands.  Lonergan notes that 
Against the self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, 
intellectual, and rational, there stands the native bewilderment of the existential 
subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of 
philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an 
unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease 
and even insanity.70 
 
While this description of human existence may appear hopeless, it is not intended as 
such, for it is merely an illustration of the ‘concrete unity-in-tension’ which is the human 
person.  Lonergan names this tension the problem of the ‘polymorphism of human 
consciousness’ which means that “The pattern in which [consciousness] flows may be 
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biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical.”71  To the 
extent that these conflicting patterns are at odds with the orientation of the pure desire, 
human beings fail to live in accordance with the orientation that the pure desire provides.  
Consequently, the normative structure of cognitional process becomes distorted and we 
fail to achieve fully rational self-consciousness.  We can, however, fight against the alien 
desires that misdirect the pure desire to know through the process of appropriating our 
pure, intellectual desire.  According to Beshear, “This process involves a significant shift 
in the subject’s pattern of experience and may result in the reordering of many desires 
according to the judgments of the detached and disinterested desire.”72   This reordering 
stems from a conscious decision to attempt live in accord with the demands of the pure 
desire to know.    
 Beshear explains, however, that there are obstacles to our attempts to live in 
accord with the pure desire, such as bias and despair.  Despair cripples our original sense 
of wonder, while bias interferes with our ability to follow whatever sense of wonder may 
be preserved within us, preventing us from asking and answering all of the relevant 
questions that fulfill our original inquiry.  This ability to openly follow the paths of our 
questions is what for Lonergan constitutes human reason or rationality.  This rationality 
arises from the pure desire to know, which Beshear describes as “a desire that carries 
human beings beyond the boundaries of self-interest to an apprehension of their desires 
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as merely one component in a vast universe.”73   Bias, however, interferes directly with 
our ability to be rational.   
 Beshear argues that the self-concerned realm of human ego is always in tension 
with the intellectual pattern of experience, and yet as human beings develop morally and 
intellectually it becomes possible to undertake a sometimes difficult and painful 
dialectical process through which we are reoriented away from our self-concern and 
toward the universe of being.  She notes that “the pure desire is the chief ‘operator’ in 
human development, so that human development progresses inasmuch as humans orient 
themselves toward detached desire.”74  This process requires a conversion of our intellect 
and our will, which is made possible through a commitment to the pure desire.  This 
desire can orient human living, but is always in tension with full human existence, which 
shares organic and psychic, as well as intellectual elements.  These organic and psychic 
components of human existence provide the potency from which the pure desire 
emerges.75  While this tension is a constant for human existence, we have the capacity to 
consciously recognize and address our own situation.  This capacity is unique to the 
rational knower and is itself made possible by the existence of the pure desire to know.  
This mediation of the tension that is at the core of human existence becomes possible 
through the realization of the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to 
know.  This detachment does not require one to embrace an asceticism or reject the 
material world and its concomitant desires, but rather to be willing to follow the guidance 
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of the pure desire as it leads us through a discovery of the universe of being, in all of its 
elements. 
 
V.  Desire and ‘Ultimate Reality’                                                                                                                
 Elizabeth A. Morelli also analyzes Lonergan’s approach to desire.76  Beshear’s 
interest is a comparison of Lonergan’s account with diverse philosophical and theological 
positions.  Morelli on the other hand proposes that her own discussion will address 
Lonergan’s notion of “our access, our means of approaching ultimate reality” while 
simultaneously discussing potential philosophical objections to Lonergan’s approach.77  
Morelli begins by noting two important points about Lonergan’s philosophical method.  
First, Lonergan “writes in the Cartesian tradition of the modern philosophic shift to the 
subject.”  Second, “his method is phenomenological in the traditional Husserlian sense 
insofar as its starting point in the subject is the data of conscious-intentionality.”78  These 
methodological approaches lead Lonergan to discover that there is “an indubitable and 
existentially ineluctable desire, an immanent intentionality” within human consciousness 
that Lonergan calls the “pure desire to know.”79  
Morelli argues that “as the ‘immanent source’ of transcendence this desire is the 
operator at every increment in cognitional process, and it is finally the bridge to the 
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ultimate.”80  Morelli examines Lonergan’s argument critically, raising questions such as 
whether such a desire exists.  If it does exist, are the adjectives that Lonergan uses to 
describe it (such as pure, immanent, unrestricted, cognitive, transcending, conscious, 
indubitable, etc.) accurate?  What would serve as sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
existence of such a pure desire to know?   
In her examination of Lonergan’s account of the pure desire to know, Morelli 
considers the terms ‘pure’, ‘desire,’ and ‘know’.  She claims that for Lonergan “There is 
a human dynamism which is simply a reaching out, a stretching forth, a seeking, an 
intending of knowledge and truth.”81  This desire is both prior to the attainment of 
knowledge, and to the asking of concrete questions in the first place.  Morelli illustrates 
this claim with Lonergan’s statement in Insight that this pure desire “is not the verbal 
utterance of questions…It is the prior and enveloping drive” that manifests itself in 
questions.82   
 Morelli argues that the term ‘pure’ is related to the priority of the desire.  She 
asserts that Lonergan’s use of the term ‘pure’ is analogous to ‘a priori’, and notes that  
“As pure and a priori this desire is understood to be universal, though not necessary.”83  
Still, the fact that this desire is dynamic within human consciousness does not mean that 
it is always respected by human knowers.  As Morelli observes, the fact that people do 
stupid things is not a legitimate argument against universal presence of such a desire.  In 
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fact, we recognize certain decisions and behaviors as unintelligent precisely because they 
violate the universally operative desire to know.  
Morelli continues:  “In addition to universal, Lonergan also means by ‘pure’ both 
immanent and spontaneous.”84  And, “By pure desire, then, Lonergan means a 
primordial, pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual, spontaneous, immanent, universal dynamism 
… it is a conscious intending oriented toward an objective.”85     This desire is 
intelligently conscious, in that it seeks understanding and explanation.  It is rationally 
conscious in that it seeks objectivity, truth, knowledge; it aims to know truth, to know 
what is in fact so, and to know being.   
 The pure desire is “conscious and intentional.  But for Lonergan there is a 
hierarchy of levels of conscious-intentionality.”86  The desire changes on each level, “the 
quality of consciousness undergoes a change on each higher level, and so does the nature 
of the primordial dynamism.”87  The pure desire manifests differently on the various 
levels of consciousness, and also serves as the operator that moves us from one level of 
consciousness to the next.  Hence, Morelli notes, the pure desire is “the ‘immanent source 
of transcendence’,”88 as Lonergan claims.  
The pure desire is rational, and thus functions as both critical and normative.  It is 
critical in its desire for sufficient evidence.  It functions as normative insofar as the 
relentless drive for questioning which manifests the pure desire to know serves as the 
criterion for the validity of insights, and thus provides the ground for normative 
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objectivity.  As Lonergan points out, only when we have exhausted all further questions 
can we be confident about making a judgment that is virtually unconditioned.89 
The pure desire is infinite, relentless, unquenchable, hence it is detached and 
disinterested.  If it weren’t detached, it might be swayed by our internal fears, biases, 
wants, etc.  If it weren’t disinterested, our intellectual orientation might be swayed by our 
interests.  Morelli claims that “Detachment and disinterestedness are, then, modes of 
unrestrictedness.  They specifically counter self-imposed limitations of the pure desire.”90   
Lonergan makes a controversial claim about this unrestricted pure desire, arguing  
that its existence is indubitable.91  Morelli proceeds to evaluate Lonergan’s arguments to 
support this controversial claim, as well as to examine potential criticisms of Lonergan’s 
position.  She argues that post-modern thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Richard 
Rorty, offer repudiations of philosophical eros that are anti-metaphysical as well as anti-
epistemological.  Specifically, she claims that “The notion of objective truth is taken to 
be an outmoded fiction of classical philosophy.  If there is no truth, it follows that the 
pure desire to know or the will to truth is either a futile, infantile yearning, or a mask for 
some ‘real’ underlying drive, or both.”92  Rorty denies objective truth, instead promoting 
a view of the “‘edifying philosopher’ [who] is not a lover of wisdom, sophia, but a 
promoter of a kind of practical wisdom…the ever-unfolding, aimless course of 
discourse.”  In his essay, “Feminism, Ideology, and Deconstruction:  A Pragmatist 
View,” Rorty argues against the notion of truth, claiming 
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Pragmatists and deconstructionists agree that everything is a social construct and 
that there is no point in trying to distinguish between the “natural” and the 
“merely” cultural.  They agree that the question is which social constructs to 
discard and which to keep, and that there is no point in appealing to “the way 
things really are” in the course of struggles over who gets to construct what.93 
 
In fact, Rorty embraces an “anti-metaphysical polemic” that he claims is shared by “post-
Nietzscheans” such as the above detailed Pragmatists, such as Rorty himself, and 
Deconstructionists, such as Jacques Derrida.  He urges feminists to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to producing social change, arguing “all that matters is what we can do to 
persuade people to act differently than in the past.  The question of what ultimately, deep 
down, determines whether they will or will not change their ways is the sort of 
metaphysical topic feminists can safely neglect.”94 
 Susan Bickford, in her essay, “Why We Listen to Lunatics,” is interested in a 
feminist debate surrounding antifoundationalist theories of knowledge.  She notes that 
“by antifoundational, I mean theories that reject an ahistorical, absolute foundation for 
knowledge, and relatedly, for the human self … Pragmatism is a powerful contemporary 
example of such theories (post-modernism is another).”95  Bickford is ultimately critical 
of Rorty’s approach, arguing that his approach “misunderstands the nature of power and 
the relation between theory and practice.”96   
 Bickford also examines the work of Foucault.  Foucault, unlike Rorty, does not 
reject the notion of a drive or desire for human inquiry.  Rather, he attempts to construe 
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this desire as “a libidinal drive for power and dominance.”  Morelli asserts that “For 
Foucault the desire to know is destructive.”97  Many feminists are interested in engaging 
with Foucault’s work, but not uncritically.  Bickford, for example, claims that “an 
antifoundationalist thinker like Foucault, who is explicitly concerned with ‘how human 
beings are made subjects,’ might prove more useful [than a pragmatist like Rorty] for 
feminists and others concerned with subjugation and transformation.”98  Margaret 
McClaren concurs, commenting on the relationship between feminism and Foucault in 
her article, “Foucault and the Subject of Feminism.”99  McClaren notes that “many 
feminists have been engaged in applying and extending Foucault’s work as well as 
criticizing it.  Those who think Foucault and feminism can be allies site his rejection of 
metanarratives, his emphasis on the body and sexuality, and his deconstruction of the 
subject.”100  Feminists do not embrace all of Foucault’s work positively, however.  For 
example, McClaren cites concerns about Foucault’s treatment of the subject, as well as 
his failure to consider seriously the role of gender which leads to a bias toward a 
masculine notion of the ethical subject.101  Feminist critiques of Foucault, however, pale 
in comparison to their concerns about the antifoundationalist philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. 
Feminist scholars are disturbed not only by the antifoundationalism and violence 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but also Nietzsche’s treatment of woman and the feminine.  
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Jean Graybeal argues that Nietzsche’s treatment of women is complex, and at times very 
troubling.  Among other passages, she cites section 59 from The Gay Science in which 
Nietzsche claims, “When we love a woman, we easily conceive a hatred for nature on 
account of all the repulsive natural functions to which every woman is subject.”102  
Graybeal comments, “Nietzsche is implicitly referring here to menstruation, pregnancy, 
and childbirth … [his] language conveys a sense of abjection and horror in the face of the 
physical, natural, and perhaps explicitly sexual existence of a beloved, idealized, almost 
sacred image of ‘woman’.”103  In her book, Womanizing Nietzsche, Kelly Oliver argues 
“Nietzsche makes woman and the feminine into an object for a masculine subject … 
while Nietzsche opens philosophy onto the other, the body, he closes off the possibility of 
a specifically feminine other and there by eliminates the possibility of sexual 
difference.”104   
 While Morelli’s own concerns about Nietzsche are not explicitly feminist, she is 
nevertheless concerned with themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy which are relevant for 
feminist discourse.  In particular, Morelli cites Nietzsche as the staunchest critic of the 
notion of a pure desire to know.  Nietzsche is suspicious of the desire to know and files it 
under a ‘will to truth’.  This “will to truth is the guise assumed by the will to power under 
the corrupting influence of the ascetic ideal.”105  For Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal is the 
“most twisted manifestation of the will to power” which arises from “weakness and 
                                                 
102 Friedrich Nietzsche.  The Gay Science, Trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York:  Vintage Books, 1974), 
122. 
103 Jean Graybeal.  Language and “The Feminine” in Nietzsche and Heidegger.  (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis:  Indiana University Press, 1990), 28. 
104 Kelly Oliver.  Womanizing Nietzsche:  Philosophy’s Relation to the Feminine.  (New York:  Routledge,  
1995), 25. 
105 Morelli, 55-56. 
 32
decadence.”106  Morelli cites a particularly damning passage from the Genealogy of 
Morals in which Nietzsche accuses most of the philosophers who came before him of 
being dominated by the ascetic ideal.  As a result, Nietzsche contends that philosophers 
have been caught up in an attempt to justify the will to truth, and fail to realize that the 
will to truth is merely a twisting of the will to power which is destructive of the creative 
will.   
 Morelli points out, however, that within Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth 
lies a self-reflective recognition of his own need to avoid being deceived, as well as 
deceiving others.  Nietzsche rejects the ascetic ideal primarily because those who fall 
under it practice the most abhorrent form of self-deception.  Notes Morelli, “When a 
hunger for power and self-aggrandizement masquerades as detached, cool inquiry, we 
despise most of all the masquerade.”107    She argues in effect that Nietzsche’s position 
ultimately bolsters Lonergan’s argument, because the abhorrence of deception voiced by 
Nietzsche in fact exemplifies the critical spirit reflected in Lonergan’s notion of the pure 
desire to know.  Morelli asks, “Is the critical spirit, which questions, doubts, even denies 
a pure desire to know, not itself the reflective transformation of this pure desire?”108  She 
answers this question in the affirmative.   
 Morelli suggests that a dialectic approach might be best in comparing Lonergan’s 
position to that of his critics.  For example, a comparison of Lonergan’s position with that 
of Nietzsche would require a “dialectic of fundamental dynamisms [that] would examine 
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the will to power and the pure desire to know as inextricably linked, as in competition, 
and as effecting change.”109  She asserts that this possibility of dialectical comparison is 
important because in undertaking such an examination of Lonergan’s notion of the pure 
desire to know, one realizes that “The possibility of the existence and operation of such a 
desire draws attention to the nature of the radical thrust of the present age, to the critical 
spirit that would deny the possibility of objectivity and truth, for the sake of truth.”110   
However, before such a dialectical encounter between Lonergan and feminist 
philosophy is undertaken, we must first examine Lonergan’s analysis of what it means to 
approach one’s own questioning in a self-reflective manner.  In addition, we must 
examine in further detail aspects of feminist criticism that pertain to the cognitional and 
metaphysical issues addressed by Lonergan’s philosophy.  In particular, we will examine 
carefully the debate concerning the metaphysical status regarding what feminists have 
named the “sex/gender distinction”.  While the epistemological questions raised by 
feminist theorists are indeed pressing, my claim is that in order to address them seriously, 
we must first examine the underlying metaphysical challenges and assumptions 
surrounding the interpretation of the fact that the human race is divided into (at least) two 





                                                 




Sex, Gender, and Metaphysics:   
Feminist Theorists Debate the Sex/Gender Distinction 
 
I.  Introduction 
This chapter aims to articulate some of the most pressing questions addressed 
today by feminist theorists and theorists of gender studies about the relationship between 
sex and gender.  The problem I will address here is that of the “sex/gender” distinction.  
Succinctly put, I will examine several major positions regarding the relation between sex 
and gender.  The main divide in this debate regards the question of whether biological sex 
is in any way determinative of gender characteristics.  There are attempts to address this 
question by three main differing schools of thought, but the question that emerges in each 
of these approaches is: How are we to interpret embodiment?  More specifically, what is 
the relationship between embodiment and what are commonly referred to as “gender 
characteristics,” i.e. femininity, masculinity and anything in between?   
One answer to this question is that feminine and masculine characteristics are 
directly determined by biology.  This view holds that it is natural and/or essential for a 
person who is biologically male to exhibit conventionally masculine characteristics, and 
for a person who is biologically female to exhibit conventionally feminine characteristics.  
This view, often called “essentialism” or “naturalism,” has been expressed in a variety of 
ways.  For example, in the “one sex”111 model, male biology is understood as the 
standard for human existence, while female biology is understood as the inversion of 
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male biology.112  This model is expressed, for example, by second century physician 
Claudius Galenus:  “Turn outward the woman’s, turn inward, so to speak, and fold 
double the man’s, and you will find the same in both in every respect.”113  Following 
from this, masculine characteristics, understood as the essential correlate of male biology, 
are asserted as the standard or universal expression of human life, while feminine 
characteristics and biology are understood as secondary, or even as abnormal and 
grotesque biological error.   
Another version of the essentialist or naturalist viewpoint, the “two-sex” model, 
argues for complementarity between the sexes rather than asserting that “woman is but 
man turned outside in” as in the “one-sex” model.  In the “two-sex” model female 
biology and feminine characteristics are understood in relation to male biology and 
masculine characteristics, rather than as opposed. In both models, male and female are 
understood as two stable, incommensurable sexes, and gender roles are understood as 
based in these “natural facts.” 
With the development of the human sciences, as well as “postmodern” theory, 
feminists begin to vigorously debate the question of whether a binary gender system 
based in “natural fact” has any ontological necessity.   Over the past several decades, 
theories of social constructionism emerged out of an emphasis on interpreting sexual 
biology as androgynous, in opposition to an essentialist account.  The typical 
understanding of a social constructionist view of gender holds that the differences 
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between male and female biology are completely insignificant with regard to gender 
characteristics.  Thus, a common conception is that if biology has no direct effect upon 
gender, then gender must be nothing more than a social or cultural construction.114   
 In reality, the story is more complicated.  By the early 1970’s, accounts of the 
relation between sex and gender had become divided into what can be broadly construed 
as two opposing points of view, one maintaining the traditional view that gender 
characteristics are determined by biology, the other arguing that gender is socially 
constructed, with no essential connection to biology.115  Over the past several decades of 
feminist thought, the dominant strains of social constructionism aimed to free women 
from the social ramifications of thousands of years of oppression derived from an 
essentialist view of the relationship between sex and gender.  In theorizing gender,116 
Alsop, Fitzsimons, and Lennon argue that “Theories stressing the social construction of 
gender can be (crudely) divided into two main types.”117  The first type are theories that 
take a generally materialist bent, stressing the “structural features of the social world” 
which divide the roles of men and women within a society as well as emphasizing “the 
concrete social relations, or work, the family, sexuality, etc.   The second type are 
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“discursive theories” which focus on the “meanings which are attached to being male or 
female within society, emphasizing the role of language and culture.”118  
 Alsop, et. Al. argue that these varying positions on the social construction of 
gender owe a common intellectual debt to feminist work which made the theoretical leap 
to distinguish between sex and gender.  In particular, sociologist Ann Oakley, in her work 
Sex, Gender, and Society “argued that gender was distinct from sex, that gender referred 
to the social characteristics, masculinity and femininity, and [was] variable, whereas sex 
related to biological sex and was more fixed.”119  In addition, feminist anthropologist 
Gayle Rubin is often credited with forwarding the distinction between sex and gender, 
particularly in her 1975 essay, “The Traffic in Women,”120 in which she discussed the 
notion of a universal “sex/gender system.”  Rubin’s writings proved very influential in 
the later work of feminist and queer theorist Judith Butler.  Butler traces the theoretical 
lineage of the sex/gender divide back even further than 1975, to the 1952 work of Simone 
de Beauvior.  Beauvoir noted in her weighty 1952 philosophical tome, The Second Sex, 
that “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”121  Butler argues that “Simone de 
Beauvoir’s formulation distinguishes sex from gender.”122 
In addition to these works that forward the theoretical distinction between sex and 
gender, during the 1970’s and 1980’s theoretical viewpoints began to emerge that aimed 
to focus on the meaning of the body, specifically the fact that humans are born into 
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different bodies.  These views result from attempts to rethink embodiment as an 
expression of a complicated matrix of multiple factors.  These so called “sexual 
difference” theorists attempted to consider seriously the relationship between the body 
and the emergence of gender characteristics, without reducing gender to something 
essentially determined by sex.   This questioning of the meaning of sexually 
differentiated embodiment undertaken by theorists of sexual difference proved 
controversial, sparking a debate over whether such theories are biologist and 
essentialist.123       
 “Sexual difference” theorists include Luce Irigaray, Elizabeth Grosz, Moira 
Gatens, and Judith Butler.  These theorists work out of both postmodernism and 
psychoanalysis, and criticize the Western metaphysical tradition and its tendency to 
construct and support hierarchies that bolster patriarchy.  Irigaray (and Grosz and Gatens 
following her) uses the insights of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism to rethink both 
the metaphysical groundings and symbolic iterations of embodiment and thus consider 
the notion of sexual difference seriously.  This Irigarayan approach to sexual difference 
finds meaning in creating a discourse of female symbolism.  This new discourse serves as 
an alternative to the symbols and discourse employed by patriarchal culture to restrict the 
lives and freedoms of women.    
 Butler’s position has a strongly constructionist slant.  She takes a different path, 
however, relying on Foucault’s insights as well as the tools of psychoanalysis and post-
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structuralism to avoid an oversimplified, behaviorist account of the effect of culture on 
our attitudes toward sex and gender.  She instead devises an innovative and controversial 
theory of the construction of the gendered subject.  Butler not only questions the claim 
that there is an essential connection between sex and gender, but argues that sex itself, 
usually understood as a natural, biological substrate, is socially constructed every bit as 
much as gender.  All of these thinkers ultimately aim to construct theoretical positions 
which critique traditional metaphysical points of view in order to avoid falling into 
“essentialist” biological reductionism.  Perhaps the most original and influential of these 
various theoretical positions is devised by Irigaray. 
 
II. Sexual Difference:  The Irigarayan Perspective  
 
Luce Irigaray, perhaps the most widely known and influential theorist of sexual 
difference, critiques feminist equality theorists for their tendency to assume 
maleness/masculinity (among other things) as a universal standard that women strive to 
become “equal to.” This is a tendency so deeply rooted that even Simone De Beauvoir 
has been accused of harboring it.  Influenced by her reading of Irigaray, Tina Chanter 
points out that in The Second Sex, the 
answer to women’s situation is to ignore the fact that the female sex is 
different from the male sex, and to encourage women to transcend the 
adversity of their situations (following Sartre’s dictum to realize one’s true 
potential as a free human being) and become to all intents and purposes 
like men.  This means ... that sexual difference is seen as irrelevant to 
feminism.124   
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Irigaray is opposed to this notion of universal subjectivity.  She claims that the focus on 
universal subjectivity taken up in women’s struggle for equality has the effect of an 
erasure of sexual difference.  In Irigaray’s view, this is a dangerous proposal, because we 
cannot ignore the fact that human beings (at least for now) are dependent upon sexual 
reproduction for the survival of their race.  Hence to erase sexual difference is flirting 
with the possible genocide of humanity.  Instead she emphasizes difference, noting that 
the “human species is divided into two genders which ensure its production and 
reproduction.”125 
Irigaray, and theorists who follow her thought closely like Rosi Braidotti and 
Elizabeth Grosz, endeavors to establish the notion of sexual difference as ontologically 
fundamental, insisting that we must consider seriously the sexual specificity of women. 
However, Irigaray herself does not limit her scope to the problem of sexual difference.  In 
fact, her project of developing what she calls an “ethic of sexual difference” focuses on 
social as well as ontological considerations.  Irigaray poses the question, “Has a 
worldwide erosion of the gains won in women’s struggles occurred because of the failure 
to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed?”126  
Chanter brings out the importance of the wider considerations: 
The possibility of articulating an ethic of sexual difference is bound up with the 
need to insist on recognizing the validity of the specific rights and duties of 
specific groups distinct from their identity as defined by the social whole.  Insofar 
as this project appeals to the importance of specifying multiple ways of existing in 
a society, it opens the way for an ethics that extends beyond sexual difference.127 
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This attempt to make space for multiple ways of existing within a society begins for 
Irigaray with the need to make space for women128 to speak in their own voice, on their 
own terms.  Elizabeth Grosz describes this as a project of “challenging and 
deconstructing the cultural representations of femininity so that it may be capable of 
representation and recognition, in its own self-defined terms.”129   
Irigaray takes up this project of developing sexual difference by using the tools of 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis to critically engage philosophy, culture, and, 
ironically, psychoanalytic theory itself, particularly as it is articulated by Freud and 
Lacan.  She uses the Derridean notion of différance to critique the hierarchical binaries 
typical of the “phallocentric” tradition of western metaphysics.  Derrida notes that he 
“will designate as différance the movement according to which language, or any code, 
any system of referral in general, is constituted ‘historically’ as a weave of 
differences.”130  Derrida uses this neologism (or neographism, as he calls it) to make an 
argument against a ‘metaphysics of presence’ which he associates with a solipsistic 
notion of consciousness.  He asks, “... can one not conceive of a presence, and of a 
presence to itself of the subject before speech or signs, a presence to itself of the subject 
in a silent and intuitive consciousness?”131  Derrida’s claim is that this solipsism is 
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reflective of the ‘logocentric’ order of Western metaphysics.  His response to this 
problem, through the notion of différance, is:  
 Thus one comes to posit presence – and specifically consciousness – no longer as 
 the absolutely central form of Being but as a 'determination' and as an 'effect' 
 ... within a system which is no longer that of presence, but of différance, a  system 
 that no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, not that of  cause 
 and effect, or of indetermination and determination, etc.132 
 
In comparison with Derrida, Irigaray is more concerned with the dichotomy between the 
privileged poles of ‘mind, reason, man, truth, vision,’ valued over ‘body, appetite, 
women, falsity, touch.’  Feminists assert that the association of maleness and masculinity 
with the former, these privileged poles, creates and constantly reinscribes the notion of 
man as universal subject, a claim which Irigaray calls into question.  Instead of 
subsuming both sexes under this notion of universality, Irigaray hopes to break down 
such dualistic hierarchies, employing the Derridean notion of différance to open a space 
where philosophy can explore the differences between the sexes.  Grosz notes that this 
would in effect “clear a space in which women’s self-description in terms other than 
those which define men’s self-sameness becomes possible.”133  Thus, Irigaray is 
exploring an alternative female symbolic that is contingent, as opposed to universal, in 
order to free us from masculine concepts that parade as universal.   
One area where women have been unable to define themselves is their experience 
and description of desire.  Philosophers’ understandings of the western conception of 
desire have in many ways shaped and been shaped by western metaphysics.134  More 
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importantly, the western conception of desire is not neutral.  According to Irigaray, the 
western conception of desire is a male conception, formed out of the male lived 
experience.  Irigaray is focusing here not on the fact of male anatomy, but on the male 
body interpreted as an inherently social “[bearer] of meanings and social values.”135  This 
socially situated reading of the body gives rise to Irigaray’s interest in the morphology of 
the body - the body as imagined and experienced by a person, as opposed to the 
anatomical facts about the body literally interpreted in a scientific manner.  Grosz notes 
that Irigaray’s “emphasis on morphology in place of anatomy indicates that she has 
stepped from the register of nature into that of social signification.”136  According to 
Irigaray, the male experience of desire is tellic.    That is to say, the male desire seeks a 
telos, it seeks completeness, fulfillment - an ordered universe in which everything is 
categorized and put into its place.137    Hence this experience of desire is the ground of 
masculine philosophy. 
She finds evidence of this formulation of desire in Plato’s theory of the forms (the 
soul yearning to completeness in a return to the One), Aristotle’s hierarchy of being, and 
phenomenology's notion of eidetic intuition.  In her readings of Plato and Aristotle, 
Irigaray draws out some of the morphological differences between the male and female 
lived experience - the solid, containing, tellic morphology of male experience, versus the 
fluid, contained, daimonic form of desire expressive of female morphology.  For Irigaray 
it is these morphological differences that constitute the differences in our approaches to 
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philosophizing.  She concludes that the female subject has been all but excluded from the 
discourse of philosophy by this masculine desire for completeness.   
According to Irigaray this “phallocentric” exclusion of the female subject 
invalidates any claim of completeness on the part of western philosophy, both ancient and 
contemporary.  She asserts that “Eidetic intuition does away with the interposition, the 
intervention, the mediation of any kind of path or trail ... Eidetic intuition is produced, 
whole and entire, in the immediacy of the noesis.”138  She claims that this view grows out 
of a metaphysical vision of the relationship between God and Being.  She claims, “Points 
of view that are, it seems, determined once and for all in the perfection of their rectitude, 
of/upon Being that assigns self-identity to each thing and fixes its nature, freed from the 
metamorphoses of existence.  Soul, specular screen, mirroring an infinite number of 
eyes:  God.”139  She takes this ‘God's eye view’ to the be ultimate goal of the eidetic 
intuition practiced by phenomenologists such as Husserl,  
What giddy joy in turning round imperceptibly in the universal orb of the Father's 
field of vision, constellated with points of view that are always absolutely the 
same.  The ideal morphology of the Father's vision excludes all change, all 
alteration or modification – optical, directional, or semantic.  And thus it 
authorizes the perfect equivalence to his logos, the appropriation to/of his word.140 
 
Irigaray also extends this morphological critique to Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, as their notions of sexuality and drives can be characterized as 
overwhelmingly masculine.   She claims that in Freud's approach (and in Lacan following 
him) “the desire for the same, for the self-identical, the self (as) same, and again of the 
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similar, the alter ego, and to put it in a nutshell, the desire for the auto … the homo … the 
male, dominates the representational economy" and thus, “‘Sexual difference’ is a 
derivation of the problematics of sameness.”141  Grosz notes that according to Irigaray, 
Freud and Lacan attribute “an a priori privilege to masculinity and its qualities.”142 This 
is evidenced in Irigaray's claim that Freud uncritically accepts an economy of 
representation which is an “organized system whose meaning is regulated by paradigms 
and units of value that are in turn determined by male subjects.”143   Irigaray criticizes 
psychoanalytic theory, but nevertheless she also uses a transformed psychoanalytic 
analysis (informed by her attempt to create a feminine symbolics) to “articulate a 
culturally (rather than psychically) produced unconscious, a repression in texts, 
knowledges and institutionally regulated practices.” 144  Her use of these psychoanalytic 
techniques is largely metaphorical, in an attempt to lay bare the unacknowledged and 
undeveloped themes and symbols underpinning western, phallocentric theory.  For 
Irigaray, psychoanalytic technique is not wedded to the phallocentric economy out of 
which it was born.  She finds psychoanalysis useful for its ability to help the theorist to 
uncover the symbolic currents that underlie the seeming solidity of Western metaphysics.  
Grosz notes that “Irigaray uses psychoanalysis without being committed to its 
fundamental presuppositions ... For psychoanalytic theory can itself be read as a symptom 
of a broader, underlying cultural and intellectual misogyny.”145               
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 According to Irigaray, such misogyny also flourishes in the realm of philosophy.  
For Irigaray, women have long been relegated by philosophers within the ontological 
category of place. First and foremost, within the phallocentric economy, woman 
constitutes place through the maternal body, by the gestating and bearing of children, and 
secondarily through the home, in the rearing of children and maintenance of the private 
sphere of the domicile. She notes that the problem for woman with respect to place is an 
inability to achieve “passage from one place to another.”146  Women have been fixated 
(metaphorically) within one ‘place’ or realm within human existence.  Therefore women 
have been denied the literal and symbolic mobility that is essential in order to understand 
place ontologically, as Irigaray hopes, as the intermediary between form and matter.  This 
view of place would take seriously the fluid, amorphous symbols that evoke the feminine 
imaginary that has been erased out of Western metaphysical language.  Thus Irigaray 
posits place, like sexual difference, as an ontological question.   
Irigaray argues that philosophy has been constructed as a male discourse.  
Accordingly, philosophy is regarded as the solid, stable, contemplative male realm.  The 
fluid, bodily realm of woman is thought in opposition to the solid, stable contemplative 
realm of the male.  This fluid realm of woman differs not only in form, but in the 
structure of female desire as well.   
Women’s desire is not structured in terms of a tellic, stable goal.  Rather, as 
Irigaray illustrates in her reading of the character of Diotima in Plato’s Symposium,147 a 
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woman’s desire is fluid, it is constantly in motion, a motion that stems from the 
morphology of the female body.  This fluidity threatens to undermine what is understood 
as the solid, complete stability of metaphysics as constructed through a male morphology.  
Irigaray argues that as men cannot get a grasp on this fluidity it is frustrating to their tellic 
orientation and so they attempt to contain it within the realm of place.  Philosophy, 
therefore, has conceived of woman as body, one who contains matter, giving birth to 
children.  Woman is weighed down by her motherly duties, and therefore is unable to 
enter the sphere where discourse is allowed to flourish.   
According to Irigaray, this female fluidity threatens stability and therefore makes 
men uncomfortable.  As a result, women are ironically relegated to the place of 
comforter, in order to suppress this discomfort which men experience.  If man could only 
contain woman, put her in her place, he would not be threatened by her any longer.  Yet 
man cannot contain woman, for she is “the other who is forever unknowable ... the one 
who differs from [him] sexually,”148 and so his efforts will always be thwarted.  
However, as Irigaray points out, even in its discomfort with the female body, the 
masculine is drawn to the maternal-feminine as place.149  Man desires woman to bear his 
children, to make a home that serves as a refuge from the world.  This desire for the 
maternal-feminine is not simply a desire for fusion.  Rather it is a desire for place.  Man 
does not wish to fill the container of the maternal-feminine, he wishes for the maternal-
feminine to constitute a place for him.   
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Yet how is this constituting of place possible if woman already has been rendered 
as place, as a vessel that passively contains?  How then can she actively constitute a place 
for man?  This seems impossible if woman is simply a vessel.  Irigaray suggests that the 
notion of place be oriented toward movement, toward creation of place, rather than as a 
static category of containment, for only as an intermediary can place offer the possibility 
of a genuine relation between man and woman.   
But, if there is to be a place for a genuine meeting of the sexes, it cannot be 
simply constituted by woman as container.  Rather, man must make a place for woman 
too. Yet by the limitations of his very morphology man cannot become a vessel or 
container for woman, unless it was in some way constituted as a woman’s return to 
herself through man.  Male morphology, and as a result phallocentric philosophy, is 
focused on containing all that is vague, ambiguous, fluid.  Thus, woman serves as the 
container that is necessary, but necessarily outside the neat realm of the phallocentric, 
logocentric discourse of Western metaphysics.  Irigaray questions whether such a return 
to the self, of the woman's return to herself through her relation with a man, would 
constitute a genuine relation.  If so, man would (symbolically) need to be open to 
woman’s desiring in order to make a place for woman’s fluidity and mobility.  If there is 
to be a genuine relation between man and woman it must be constituted in and through 
motion, not through a static conception of desire.  This would be a way to free woman 
from her inability to pass from one place to another.  However this would require that 
man be open to the discomfort that occurs with the breakage of boundaries, with which 
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the mother (for example) is always already intimately familiar through her bodily 
experience of childbearing.   
Philosophically, this would require a radical rethinking of the issue of place, one 
which takes seriously the question of sexual difference so that the notion of place could 
reside in its ‘proper place,’ in the between, in the gap between the sexes which, Irigaray 
insists, can never be fused.  Perhaps then woman and man could enter into a genuine 
cohabitation, in which each creates a place for the other, in which desire is constituted 
through an economy of generosity on the part of both sexes.  An economy based on 
generosity would perhaps make possible Irigaray’s suggestion that “the sex act would 
turn into the act whereby the other gives new form, birth, incarnation to the self.  Instead 
of implying the downfall of the body, it takes part in the body’s renaissance.”150 This 
would not require a relationship of reciprocity in which one owes or expects something 
from the other, rather of utter generosity where each person gives of themself as they 
would a gift.  In constituting an economy of desire as a gift economy, desire could no 
longer be conceived of as tellic.  Rather, desire would be inexhaustible, as it would 
continuously renew itself in and through its generous spirit.   
 
III.  Elizabeth Grosz:  Rethinking Corporeality 
Elizabeth Grosz, in Volatile Bodies:  Toward a Corporeal Feminism, works out of 
an Irigarayan framework.  Grosz understands Irigaray’s project as one of “rewriting the 
female body as a positivity rather than as a lack,” a project which involves two parts: 
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first, “reorganizing and reframing the terms by which the body has been socially 
represented” and second, “challenging the discourses which claim to analyze and explain 
the body and subject scientifically – biology, psychology, sociology – to develop 
different perspectives that may be able to better represent women’s interests.”151  
 Grosz analyzes various approaches to thinking the body:  the psychoanalytic 
approach, represented by Freud, Lacan, et.al., that analyzes the body in terms of 
psychical depth; the phenomenological approach, represented by Merleau-Ponty, which 
analyzes the body in terms of intentionality; and the approach she summarizes as 
interpreting the “body as social object,” represented by thinkers such as Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, all of whose thinking about the body is marked by the 
treatment of corporeality as a series of surfaces, energies, flows and forces.  In this third 
approach, it is assumed that “the body does not hide or reveal an otherwise unrepresented 
latency or depth, but is a set of operational linkages and connections with other things, 
other bodies.  The body is not simply a sign to be read, a symptom to be deciphered, but 
also a force to be reckoned with.”152 For example, Deleuze uses the metaphor of the 
machine to express the connections made between bodies and things, in order to 
emphasize the point that the body is not simply "an organic totality which is capable of 
the wholesale expression of subjectivity."153 
Grosz finds something useful in each these forms of analysis, but she seems 
particularly interested in the approach to rethinking traditional ontological and 
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metaphysical problematics taken by Deleuze and Guattari.  These thinkers develop a 
notion of the body as a “discontinuous, nontotalizable series of processes, organs, flows, 
energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events.”154  They also develop a notion of 
desire as becoming, instead of lack, which appeals to Grosz as an alternative to the 
psychoanalytic model.  While Grosz admits that Deleuze and Guattari’s approach is 
unusual and particularly difficult to interrogate, she claims that there are parts of their 
analyses that can be useful (while simultaneously presenting a particular danger) for 
feminist theorizing.  Ultimately, she finds that “Deleuze and Guattari produce a radical 
anti-humanism that renders animals, nature, atoms, even quasars as modes of radical 
alterity.”155  While Grosz does not propose to directly apply this radical anti-humanism to 
feminist analysis, she maintains that it presents a useful resource for feminists attempting 
to rethink the meaning of difference. 
 Her reflections lead up to an interrogation of the sexual specificity of the body.  
By this she means the basic biological differences that distinguish types of bodies, for 
example male, female, or hemaphrodite.  She claims:  “I hope not only to provide a 
framework with which to begin asking questions of male and female bodies in their 
irreducible specificities but also to provide a series of displacements and criticisms of the 
very (male) models that helped make these investigations possible.”156  Specifically she 
questions the “ontological status of the sexed body,”157  and reaches some preliminary 
conclusions, but no concrete determinations.   
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Like other theorists of sexual difference, Grosz insists on the significance of 
corporeal sexual difference without falling into essentialism.  She claims:   
The sexual difference I explore here cannot be understood in terms of a fixed or 
ahistorical biology, although it must clearly contain a biological dimension.  But 
biology cannot be regarded as a form whose contents are historically provided, 
not as a base on which cultural constructs are founded, nor indeed as a container 
for a mixture of culturally or individually specific ingredients.  It is an open 
materiality, a set of (possibly infinite) tendencies and potentialities which may be 
developed, yet whose development will necessarily hinder or induce other 
developments or trajectories.158   
 
Unlike Judith Butler, Grosz understands sexual differentiation as tied to sexual 
reproduction.  Grosz insists on the “irreducible specificity of women’s bodies, the bodies 
of all women, independent of class, race and history,”159 However, as noted by Alsop, 
Fitzsimons and Lennon, “this specificity is anchored in the bodily processes of 
reproduction (although Grosz accepts that the way these are experienced are in no way 
universal).”160  
Grosz seeks to “elucidate and negotiate” the aporia surrounding the question of 
the “ontological status of the sexed body.”161  She inquires as to whether the form of the 
human body, specifically with regard to sexual differentiation, is primarily given or 
produced through cultural influence.  She ultimately decides that the body is infinitely 
pliable, and yet grounded in sexual differentiation.  She claims that the “notion of sexual 
difference, a difference that is originary and constitutive … occupies a preontological – 
certainly a preepistemological - terrain insofar as it makes possible what things or 
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entities, what beings, exist … and insofar as it must condition what we know.”162  Grosz 
argues that sexual difference functions ontologically as a “framework or horizon … that 
cannot appear in its own terms but is implied in the very possibility of an entity”163 upon 
which sexual identity is constituted.   
 
IV. Moira Gatens’ Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction 
  Another thinker who considers the question of the importance of sexual difference 
is Moira Gatens.  Unlike Irigaray, Gatens does not consider sexual difference to be 
ontologically fundamental.  However she does reiterate the point that “sex and gender are 
not arbitrarily connected.”164 In her article, “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,”165 
Gatens sets out to examine the distinction between sex (interpreted as biological 
essentialism) and gender (as socially constructed), asking what is the theoretical basis for 
this distinction, whether this distinction is coherent and/or valid, and what are the ethical 
and political effects of adopting this distinction as a theoretical framework?  According to 
Gatens, many feminists (especially those she calls “Anglo-American” feminists)166 have 
a strong theoretical interest in using “gender” as a central explanatory and organizing 
category.  Gatens argues that such feminists believe that if it can be shown that there is no 
necessary connection between the categories of gender and sex, then biological 
reductionism on the basis of sex can be avoided.  
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Gatens takes issue with the idea, adopted by these theorists, of the body and 
psyche as a tabula rasa.  In this view the mind is seen as a neutral, passive entity upon 
which we inscribe social lessons, while the body is the “passive mediator” of these social 
lessons.  The basic assumption is that if we can unlearn these lessons that equate 
masculinity with males and femininity with females, we can overcome patriarchy.  In 
taking on this debate Gatens hopes to mediate between issues of sexual equality and  
sexual difference.  She claims that her attempt is to “quell, once and for all, the tired (and 
tiring, if not tiresome) charges of essentialism and biologism so often levelled [sic.] at 
theories of sexual difference,” and, in addition, to “demonstrate the practical and 
theoretical viability of the politics of difference.”167 
Gatens asserts that the theoretical framework upon which the sex/gender 
distinction rests follows insights such as those published by psychoanalyst Robert Stoller, 
in his book Sex and Gender (1968).168  In discussing the relationship between sexuality 
and socialization, Stoller claims that gender (cultural/psychological) identity can override 
sex (biology).  Stoller bases his conclusions largely on the situation of the male 
transsexual.  He argues that the development of transsexualism, specifically in males (he 
considers female transsexualism extremely rare) is determined not biologically or 
physically, but strictly through psycho-social factors.  He claims that male transsexualism 
is caused by a inability to separate from the mother, in which the male child fails to 
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develop his own identity, does not properly detach from the mother, and thus ultimately 
feels like a woman trapped in a man’s body.   
Stoller’s work was taken up by some feminists as evidence for a justification of 
“the right to equality for all independently of sex.”169  Gatens criticizes this theoretical 
appropriation, however, saying that this view assumes that “Cultural and historical 
significances or meanings receive their expression in or are made manifest by an initially 
or essentially neutral consciousness which, in turn, acts upon an initially neutral body.”  
This socialization theory is thus rationalist, a-historical, and “posits a spurious neutrality 
of both the body and consciousness.”170   
Gatens disagrees with this position, claiming instead that “there is no neutral 
body, there are at least two kinds of bodies:  the male body and the female body.”171  
Thus, the subject is always sexed, or sexually specific.  Following from this insight, 
Gatens claims that patriarchy is not strictly about gender, but about sexual difference.  
She argues that this is demonstrated by the fact that, within patriarchy, male and female 
bodies have different social value and significance.  Addressing social constructionists 
whose aim is to re-educate society about conceptions of gender, Gatens says plainly, 
“Gender is not the issue; sexual difference is ... Identical social ‘training’, attitudes, or, if 
you will, conditioning, acquire different significances when applied to male or female 
subjects.”172  Gatens thus rejects a behaviorist conception of the subject, focusing on 
bodily experiences as sites of significance rather than products of social conditioning.  In 
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Gatens’ view, the problem with socialization theory is that it ignores the process of 
signification.  In turn it therefore ignores the fact that some bodily experiences and events 
are likely to be privileged sites of significance in most cultures.     
One example of a bodily experience that is a privileged site of significance is the 
strictly female experience of menstruation.  For Gatens, menstruation evidences a 
“network of relations obtaining between femininity and femaleness, that is, between the 
female body and femininity.”173  For some cultures and religions,174 menstruation is 
considered impure and women must take part in various purification rituals as a result.  
On the other hand, the significance of menstruation is less clear in Western liberal 
culture.  Gatens notes that in Western culture, menstruation is most associated with 
shame and modesty, which she claims are characteristically feminine attributes.  She 
critiques Freud’s failure to consider the effect of menstruation on the psyche of a 
pubescent girl, noting that “the flow of blood would have profound psychical significance 
for her” and that is it likely that such significance would “centre around ideas of 
castration, sexual attack and socially reinforced shame.” Gatens uses this insight to argue 
against a strict social constructionist position, claiming that because of their 
disconnection from such culturally significant experiences “there must be a qualitative 
difference between the kind of femininity ‘lived’ by men.”175  In other words, our 
embrace and expression of traditionally gendered characteristics such as masculinity and 
femininity does not occur in a way that is neutral.  Rather, our embodied reality serves to 
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mediate the way in which we express gendered characteristics.  As a result, Gatens insists 
that gender cannot be equally inscribed on any body regardless of sex.  Echoing Simone 
de Beauvoir’s claim that “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,”176 Gatens’ 
point here is that the kind of ‘woman’ one becomes is mediated by the type of body one 
is born with and the concrete experiences that are particular to that body. 
While egalitarian theorists might charge such a claim with essentialism due to its 
focus on the “biological body,” Gatens defends herself by pointing out that the body 
which is interrogated by the theorist of sexual difference is not the physical body, but the 
situated body, the body as lived by the particular subject.  She claims that “If one wants 
to understand sex and gender or, put another way, a person’s biology and the social and 
personal significance of that biology as lived, then one needs an analysis of the imaginary 
body.”177  For this concept she is indebted to Lacan, drawing particularly from his works, 
“Mirror Stage” and “Some reflections on my ego,” in which he discusses what he calls 
“imaginary anatomy.”  Lacan claims that the imaginary anatomy or body “varies with the 
ideas (clear or confused) about bodily functions which are prevalent in a given 
culture.”178  Examples of this phenomenon include the “phantom limb” in which a person 
still experiences a limb which has been amputated; hysterical paralysis, in which the 
hysteric experiences paralysis of only a specific part of the body (for example the arm, 
but only from the elbow down); and anorexia or bulimia.  In these phenomena, which 
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Susan Bordo has claimed are the modern day equivalents to hysteria,179 the anorectic or 
bulimic experiences a body image which differs dramatically from their measurable 
physical dimensions.   
The imaginary body is the culturally influenced image that we as particular 
subjects have of our body and impose upon our body.  Gatens claims that the imaginary 
body “is socially and historically specific in that it is constructed by a shared language; 
the shared psychical significance and privileging of various zones of the body (e.g. the 
mouth, the anus, the genitals); and common institutional practices and discourses (e.g. 
medical, juridical, and educational) on and through the body.”180  For the individual, the 
imaginary body acts as a bridge between sex and gender as well as body and mind; it 
resides in ‘the between’ of these oppositions, acting as a mediator.  According to Gatens, 
the phenomenon of the imaginary body suggests that the relationship between sex and 
gender is neither conjoined nor disparate.  Rather, there is a contingent (but not arbitrary) 
relation between, for example, the male body and masculinity, and the female body and 
femininity.  She argues that the imaginary body is “the site of the historical and cultural 
specificity of masculinity and femininity.”181 While Gatens does suggest that at the level 
of the imaginary body ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ correspond to ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
biology, she does not wish to claim that this reflects some “fixed essence to ‘masculine 
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and feminine’.” 182  Instead, she argues for an historical specificity with regard to the 
development and institution of gender roles. 
For Gatens, a theory which considers seriously the imaginary body must 
recognize the existence of a complex network of signification, as well as its historical, 
psychological and cultural manifestations.  This network is manifested, for example, in 
the signification of feminine traits, insofar as they are assigned to a female body.  
According to Gatens, women have taken on these traits as modes of defensive behavior 
that utilize the “culturally shared fantasies about biology - that is, they are manifestations 
of and reactions to the (conscious and unconscious) ideas we share about our biology.”183  
On the other hand, for a person who is born with male genitalia who takes on feminine 
traits the signification would be different.  
For example, she highlights the fact that “It is not masculinity per se that is 
valorized in our culture but the masculine male.”184  This has an important ethical and 
political significance, for Gatens will claim that the issue is not really the fact that women 
are socialized to femininity and males to masculinity.  Rather, the issue is the “place of 
these behaviours [sic] in the network of social meaning and the valorizing of one (the 
male) over the other (the female) and the resultant mischaracterization of [historically 
specific, not essentially mandated] relations of difference as relations of superiority and 
inferiority.”185 Thus, the ultimate point that Gatens is trying to make is that masculinity 
and femininity differ qualitatively with regard to sex. 
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  Gatens claims that the sex/gender distinction has been irresponsibly appropriated 
by feminists who are aware of the theoretical problems it creates, but who adopt it 
because it is convenient for reaching their political agendas.  Both in the areas of Marxist 
feminism and identity politics, as well as others, the search for political equality has led 
to the use of the sex/gender distinction.  According to Gatens, ideological bias has created 
theoretical error in these areas.  Rather than aim for an ethics and politics of equality, in 
which the goal of gender neutrality actually leads to a ‘masculinization’ of women (in a 
society in which masculine men are the standard), Gatens is interested in creating an 
ethics and politics of difference.  Such a politics would, most importantly, take seriously 
the role of the repression and control of women’s bodies, as opposed to merely focusing 
on what Gatens labels “the predominantly Anglo-American crass empirical equation 
between patriarchal sex-role socialization and patriarchal consciousness.”186 
 
V.  Judith Butler:  Gender Trouble 
Judith Butler, like Moira Gatens, takes seriously the relationship between 
theorizing about the body and the political realities which women face.  While she has 
been criticized for not thinking seriously enough about the role of the body in deciphering 
the relation between sex and gender, Butler’s work certainly has made an enormous 
impact.  Her thinking on the subject can be traced to her 1990 book Gender Trouble, in 
which she outlines a critique of compulsory heterosexuality. In Gender Trouble Butler 
challenges the notion of “gender identity.” She asks, “To what extent do regulatory 
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practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coherence of 
the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person.”187   
 Butler frames her inquiry with a critique of the metaphysics of substance, a notion 
originally associated with Nietzsche.  Butler applies this critique to the problem of 
sex/gender.  She takes aim primarily at “the notion that sex appears within hegemonic 
language as a substance, as metaphysically speaking, a self-identical being.”188  She 
develops this critique out of her reading of Michael Haar.  Butler claims that according to 
Haar  
a number of philosophical ontologies have been trapped within certain illusions of 
‘Being’ and ‘Substance’ that are fostered by the belief that the grammatical 
formulation of subject and predicate reflects the prior ontological reality of 
substance and attribute.  These constructs, argues Haar, constitute the artificial 
philosophical means by which simplicity, order, and identity are effectively 
instituted.  In no sense, however, do they reveal or represent some true order of 
things.189   
 
Butler proposes to apply this criticism to what she calls the popular “psychological 
categories” used to discuss notions of gender.  Butler is primarily concerned with the 
reification of categories of identity into substance, especially with regard to notions of 
gender identity.  She claims that “Gender can denote a unity of experience, of sex, 
gender, and desire, only when sex can be understood in some sense to necessitate gender 
– where gender is a psychic and/or cultural designation of the self – and desire – where 
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desire is heterosexual and therefore differentiates itself through an oppositional relation 
to that other gender it desires.”190  She proceeds to argue vociferously against this 
understanding of the relation between sex and gender, which she understands as an 
attempt to normalize a heterosexual orientation within society. 
 She opposes this conception of gender primarily because is gives rise to certain 
assumptions, for example, “not only a causal relation among sex, gender, and desire, but 
[the suggestion that] desire reflects or expresses gender and that gender reflects or 
expresses desire.”191 This can take the form of a naturalistic/essentialist view, or what she 
calls an “authentic-expressive paradigm in which some true self is said to be revealed 
simultaneously or successively in sex, gender, and desire ...”192  Butler concludes that any 
such view that posits a binary relationship between a “masculine term” and a “feminine 
term” serves to institute a “compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality” that is not really 
“natural” at all.193 
 Opposing any natural or essential reading of the relation between sex and gender, 
Butler instead asserts that “Sexuality is culturally constructed within existing power 
relations” and that “the postulation of a normative sexuality that is ‘before’, ‘outside’ or 
‘beyond’ power is a cultural impossibility and a politically impracticable dream.”194  It is 
important to note here that Butler’s critique extends beyond gender – she asserts that both 
gender and sexuality are socially constructed.  As we can never get beyond power, we 
must instead focus on rethinking sexuality and identity within the power relations that 
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shape sexuality and identity.  This rethinking takes that form of creating subversive 
possibilities that serve to displace the current norms governing sex and gender.195  
Specifically, she suggests that “The repetition of heterosexual constructs within sexual 
cultures both gay and straight may well be the inevitable site of the denaturalization and 
mobilization of gender categories.”196 
 Having made the assumption that there is no “‘person,’ … ‘sex,’ or ... ‘sexuality’ 
that escapes the matrix of power,” Butler goes on to ask the question “What possibilities 
exist by virtue of the constructed character of sex and gender”?  She notes that “If the 
regulatory fictions of sex and gender are themselves multiply contested sites of meaning, 
then the very multiplicity of their construction holds out the possibility of a disruption of 
their univocal posturing.”197  Her project is not to outline any traditional ‘ontology’ of 
gender, which she understands as the attempt of philosophical discourse to establish the 
naturalness or fixity of being outside of culture.  Instead, her aim is to produce what she 
calls a ‘genealogy’ of gender ontology as it is currently constituted in society.  She is not 
explicit about why she shifts from a discussion of sex and gender into an analysis strictly 
of gender.  However it seems clear that she understands the construction of gender as 
having more ontological significance than the construction of sex. 
Meaning, for Butler, and in particular the meaning of gender, is constructed by an 
“ongoing discursive practice” that is “open to intervention and resignification.”  The 
“congealing” of gender into reified social roles is “an insistent and insidious practice, 
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sustained and regulated by various social means.”  She says that “Gender is the repeated 
stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that 
congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.”198  
Her aim is to uncover and deconstruct the appearance of gender as grounded in some real 
or substantial nature of the human being, and to reveal that gender is constituted by 
normative belief and the repetition of human action to fall within socially acceptable 
gender roles. 
Butler criticizes the “sex/gender distinction and the category of sex itself” as 
notions that tend to assume a body that exists prior to sex.  She claims that within these 
notions the body is understood as a “passive medium” which is granted meaning by some 
outside cultural force or influence.  Butler wants to question the validity of this view of 
the body.  She links it to Christian and Cartesian views, in which the body is understood 
as “inert matter, signifying nothing or, more specifically, signifying a profane void, the 
fallen state.”199  Butler accuses structuralism of having uncritically adopted the 
“Cartesian dualism presupposed by phenomenology” and reformulating mind/body 
dualism as the divide between nature/culture.200  She claims that we need to investigate 
the ways in which these dualisms still haunt the discourses about gender, discourses that 
“are supposed to lead us out of that binarism and its implicit hierarchy."201  
In constructing her genealogy of gender ontology, Butler examines the roots of 
what she calls the “law of patriarchy.”  In particular, she discusses how Lévi-Strauss's 
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structuralist anthropology, and its problematic distinction between nature and culture, has 
supported essentialist interpretations of the relationship between sex and gender.  Butler 
is concerned that the binary relation between culture and nature promotes a relationship 
of hierarchy in which culture freely “imposes” meaning on nature “and as a result 
“renders it into an ‘Other’ to be appropriated to its own limitless uses, safeguarding the 
ideology of the signifier and the structure of signification on the model of domination.”202  
The source of such domination is, both symbolically and materially, the “law” that 
grounds patriarchal structures within culture.  Of this “law of patriarchy” Butler claims, 
The self-justification of a repressive or subordinating law almost always grounds 
itself in a story about what it was like before the advent of the law, and how it 
came about that the law emerged in its present and necessary form.  The 
fabrication of those origins tends to describe a state of affairs before the law that 
follows a necessary and unilinear narrative that culminates in, and therefore 
justifies, the constitution of the law.  The story of origins is thus a strategic tactic 
within a narrative that, by telling a single, authoritative account about an 
irrevocable past, makes the constitution of the law appear as a historical 
inevitability.203   
 
Or, as Butler would argue, the origin of the law is in fact a historical fiction.  This 
however does not deny the power that the law has over the social construction of gender 
identities. 
Butler claims that in order for the political project of enlarging the scope of 
possible gender configurations to succeed, the contingency of gender construction must 
be revealed.  In examining this issue Butler will here interrogate the notion of the law, as 
well as the relationship of psychoanalysis and structuralism to this notion.  Like Irigaray, 
Butler both appropriates and critiques the tools of psychoanalysis.  One significant 
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critique in Gender Trouble centers around the connection between Lacan and Levi-
Strauss through Lacan’s appropriation of Levi-Strauss’s structuralist notion of the Law.  
Butler argues that for Lacan “the Law which forbids the incestuous union between boy 
and mother initiates the structures of kinship, a series of highly regulated libidinal 
displacements that take place through language.  Although the structures of language, 
collectively understood as the Symbolic, maintain an ontological integrity apart from the 
various speaking agents through whom they work, the Law reasserts and individuates 
itself within the terms of every infantile entrance into culture.”204  Butler claims that  
To ask after the very ‘being’ of gender and/or sex in Lacanian terms is to 
confound the very purpose of Lacan’s theory of language,” … [for] “Lacan 
disputes the very primacy given to ontology within the terms of Western 
metaphysics and insists upon the subordination of the question ‘What is/has 
being?’ to the prior question “How is ‘being’ instituted and allocated through the 
signifying practices of the paternal economy?205  
 
While she resists the way that Lacan supports patriarchal structures through his 
appropriation of the concept of the Law, Butler also seems to embrace the notion, 
elucidated by Lacan, that the condition of the symbolic realm is pre-ontological.  
 Butler also engages with Freud’s notion of melancholy, claiming that “there has 
been little effort to understand the melancholic denial/preservation of homosexuality in 
the production of gender within the heterosexual frame.”206  She reinterprets Freud’s 
theory of the Oedipal complex to imply that  
… the boy must choose not only between the two object choices, but the two 
sexual dispositions, masculine and feminine.  That the boy usually chooses the 
heterosexual would, then, be the result, not of the fear of castration by the father, 
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but of the fear of castration – that is, the fear of feminization associated within 
heterosexual cultures with male homosexuality.  In effect, it is not primarily the 
heterosexual lust for the mother that must be punished and sublimated, but the 
homosexual cathexis that must be subordinated to a culturally sanctioned 
heterosexuality.207   
 
She posits that according to Freud’s notion of the ego-ideal “(which regulates and 
determines masculine and feminine identification) gender identification is a kind of 
melancholia in which the sex of the prohibited object is internalized as a prohibition.  
This prohibition sanctions and regulates discrete gendered identity and the law of 
heterosexual desire.”208 
 Butler also engages in a Foucaultian critique of the Freudian logic of gender and 
identity formation.  For Foucault, the notion of the disposition of sexual desire changes 
through a change in the language of sexual desire.  We move from thinking in terms of a 
verb (to be disposed) to thinking in terms of a noun (to have a disposition).  In other 
words, instead of construing sexual activities as something that we do as already 
constituted entities, rather our sexual activities take on the power to shape our identity, 
such that what we do constitutes who we are.  The result of this shift is a “false 
foundationalism, the results of affectivity being formed or ‘fixed’ through the effects of 
the prohibition [against homosexual desire].”209  
Butler also reflects on Gayle Rubin’s 1975 article “The Traffic of Women:  The 
‘Political Economy’ of Sex.”  She claims that Rubin’s conclusion is that “gender is 
merely a function of compulsory heterosexuality ... [without which] the field of bodies 
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would no longer be marked in gendered terms.”  Butler critiques Rubin’s reading as naïve 
about the effects of power on gender, suggesting that a post-structuralist reading, using 
the work of Foucault and Derrida, would assist in revising Rubin’s “narrative of gender 
acquisition.”  Butler endeavors to “reject the postulation of an ideal sexuality prior to the 
incest taboo,” relying instead on Foucault’s critique of the “repressive-hypothesis” in the 
History of Sexuality, Volume I to argue that the psychoanalytic model fails to take 
seriously the productive and juridical effects of power on desire.210  Foucault’s view is 
that rather than a repression of sexuality, the eighteenth century onward (and especially 
the Victorian era) results in a proliferation of discourses on the “subject” of sexuality. 
Thus, “sexuality” has become an object of discourse, as well as subject to the truth of this 
discourse. 
 Butler claims that “If we extend the Foucaultian critique to the incest taboo, then 
it seems that the taboo and the original desire for mother/father can be historicized in 
ways that resist the formulaic universality of Lacan.”211  Ultimately she concludes that “If 
the incest taboo regulates the production of discrete gender identities, and if that 
production requires the prohibition [of incest] and sanction of heterosexuality, then 
homosexuality emerges as a desire which must be produced in order to remain 
repressed.”212  In other words, the incest taboo is a powerful source of what Butler argues 
is the social construction of sex itself, of our desires and pleasures.  She notes that 
“Within psychoanalysis, bisexuality and homosexuality are taken to be primary libidinal 
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dispositions, and heterosexuality is the laborious construction based upon their gradual 
repression.”213 
Butler claims that feminist theory and politics have long relied on “categories of 
true sex, discrete gender, and specific sexuality” as their starting point.214  She notes that 
“These constructs of identity serve as the points of epistemic departure from which 
theory emerges and politics itself is shaped.”215  She challenges the notion that there is a 
unified identity that represents all women.  She asks, “What circumscribes that site as 
‘the female body’?  Is ‘the body’ or ‘the sexed body’ the firm foundation on which 
gender and systems of compulsory sexuality operate?  Or is ‘the body’ itself shaped by 
political forces with strategic interests in keeping that body bounded and constituted by 
the markers of sex?”216 
 Following Foucault, Butler is concerned with the problem of “internalization” and 
its effect on our understanding of identity.  She quotes Foucault from Discipline and 
Punish, where he describes how the phenomenon of internalization effects prisoners:  
“the strategy [of the prison] has been not to enforce a repression of [the prisoner’s] 
desires, but to compel their bodies to signify the prohibitive law as their very essence, 
style, and necessity.”217  Butler interprets the problem of internalization with respect to 
sex/gender as the normalization of “an idealized and compulsory heterosexuality.”218  She 
claims that this functions as a “regulatory ideal” that ultimately is disrupted by “the 
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disorganization and disaggregation of the field of bodies.”219  Bodies that are engaged in 
non-normative bodily practices serve to expose the regulatory ideal as “a norm and a 
fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it 
purports to describe.”220   
She shifts focus here into a discussion of the notion of performativity.  She claims 
that  
Acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but 
produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences 
that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause.  
Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense 
that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications 
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.  
That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status 
apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.221 
 
So gender is real in the sense that it is produced by discourse and the repetition of acts by 
the body that in a sense mark it as gendered in a particular way.  For example, she argues 
that imitative practices, such as cross dressing and drag, help to underscore what she calls 
the “three contingent dimensions of significant corporeality:  anatomical sex, gender 
identity, and gender performance”222  She notes that “In imitating gender, drag implicitly 
reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency.”223  She 
concludes that the imitative quality of the construction of gender, both in normal gender 
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construction and in the performative sense of drag, reveals that there is no original or 
natural identity from which gender is fashioned.224 
 Indeed, Butler suggests that “gender identity might be reconceived as a 
personal/cultural history of received meanings subject to a set of imitative practices 
which refer laterally to other imitations and which, jointly, construct the illusion of a 
primary and interior gendered self.”225  In a sense, she comes to this conclusion based on 
her denial that the body has any natural meaning whatsoever, a claim that seems 
problematic in light of Irigaray’s concerns about sexual difference.  Butler’s position, 
however, does not necessarily contradict Irigaray as much as it seems on the surface.  
Both thinkers are primarily motivated by an interest in rethinking the body as an entity 
produced by a complicated matrix of social factors.  While Butler goes too far in Gender 
Trouble, in a sense denying that there is any inherent significance to the materiality of the 
body, she addresses this critique in her other work, especially Bodies that Matter.226  
There she focuses on the ways in which bodies are materialized through culture, for 
example through sexual and racial constructions.  She claims that the materiality of sex, 
and similarly of race, is forcibly produced, insofar as bodies are materialized as ‘sexed’ 
and ‘raced’.  In this later text she concludes that ‘sex’ and ‘race’ are ideal constructs, 
which are forcibly materialized through time.   
Ultimately, in both of these works, Butler raises some interesting questions and 
challenges for Irigaray that must be addressed.  For example, Butler critiques Irigaray’s 
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analysis of the “monolithic masculinist economy” of broad-reaching epistemological, 
ontological and logical structures as overly sweeping in its reach.  Butler’s concern is that 
by failing to address the concrete “cultural and historical contexts” in which sexual 
difference proliferates, Irigaray risks repeating the “self-aggrandizing gesture of 
phallogocentrism, colonizing under the sign of the same those differences that might 
otherwise call that totalizing concept into question.”227  Butler believes that Irigaray fails 
to be sufficiently self-critical about her own tendencies to over-generalize real and 
significant differences between women.  Butler seems to agree with Monique Wittig’s 
critique that Irigaray’s analysis “recirculate[s] a mythic notion of the feminine.”228 
 In addition, Butler questions the usefulness of Irigaray’s attempts to develop a 
specific feminine sexuality that exists outside of the “terms of the phallic economy.”  
Butler’s concern is that Irigaray fails to stipulate whether such a feminine sexuality is 
something that exists “‘outside’ of culture as its prehistory or as its utopian future.”229  
Butler, adopting a Foucaultian analysis, suggests that sexuality is constructed within 
power relations which make it impossible to conceptualize a sexuality, feminine or 
otherwise, that exists prior to or beyond the reach of the matrix of power. 
 Butler, as well as the other theorists whose work is outlined here, raises pressing 
questions about the relationship between the Western metaphysical tradition and the 
philosophical and social systems which support patriarchal structures.  I will reexamine 
these concerns in Chapter Five.  First, however, I turn to a further exposition of 
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Lonergan’s philosophy, in particular his accounts of human knowing, human living, and 
dynamic metaphysics.  In Chapter Five, I will show how his philosophy, in particular his 
articulation of the dynamic structure of the human mind and the universe itself, helps to 
mediate some of the concerns raised by the feminist theorists whose work is examined 



































Chapter Three:   
 
Lonergan and the Patterns of Human Living 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding, Lonergan proposes to discuss the 
nature of human knowing.  This discussion takes place in an unusual fashion, for 
Lonergan claims that his “aim is not to set forth a list of the abstract properties of human 
knowledge but to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete, 
dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional 
activities.”230  In other words, Lonergan endeavors to elucidate “insight into insight.”231  
By insight, Lonergan understands “not any act of attention or advertence or memory but 
the supervening act of understanding.”232   
 Yet as Lonergan liked to say, insights are a “dime a dozen” and the process of 
appropriating one’s own cognitional activities inevitably leads to the notion of judgment.  
Hence Lonergan also endeavors to elucidate the act of judging.  First, he notes that  
judging involves affirming or denying, an “answering yes or no to a question for 
reflection.”233  Second, judgment involves making a personal commitment, “a judgment 
is the responsibility of the one that judges.”234  As knowers we make both true and false 
judgments for which we are responsible when we answer a question for reflection.  This 
possibility of judgment – the final product of the cognitional process - occurs when we 
reach what Lonergan calls the “virtually unconditioned.”  Insights are conditioned, in 
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effect, by the questions for reflection that are driven by the inquiring mind.  As long as 
our questions remain unanswered, we cannot come to a sufficient judgment about the 
truth or falsity of our insight.  However, our judgment becomes virtually unconditioned 
when we face a concrete question, and when we pursue our inquiry until we uncover all 
further relevant questions, and we satisfactorily answer those further questions.  In this 
way, the conditions of our original insight are fulfilled, and our judgment becomes 
“virtually unconditioned.”235  
 
II.  The Activity of Insight 
 
According to Lonergan, the key moment in the human process of coming to know 
is the act of insight.  Lonergan outlines the structure of the event of insight.  Insight 
occurs, suddenly and unexpectedly “as a release to the tension of inquiry.”236  It occurs 
not as a function of outer circumstances but inner conditions; it pivots between the 
concrete and the abstract, and subsequently, passes into the habitual texture of one’s 
mind.237   
 Insight does not occur spontaneously, for it requires antecedent desire and effort 
on the part of the knower.  Even so, neither can it be transmitted by learning rules, or 
following precepts.  Insight is an act of discovery, which is something that cannot be 
taught, but must be generated by the discoverer.  Lonergan remarks “were there rules for 
discovery, then discoveries would be mere conclusions.”238  His point here is that every 
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act of intelligence is a form of discovery, one that each knower must reach by him or 
herself.   
 While insight is a particularly human activity, it is not to be confused with the 
mere act of sensation.  Lonergan wryly notes that “The occurrence and the content of 
sensation stand in some immediate correlation with outer circumstance … But … insight 
depends upon native endowment and so, with fair accuracy, one can say that insight is the 
act that occurs frequently in the intelligent and rarely in the stupid.”239  What is it that 
distinguishes the intelligent from the stupid?  The frequent occurrence of insight, which 
“depends upon a habitual orientation, upon a perpetual alertness ever asking the little 
question ‘Why?’”240 
Intelligence is displayed in our orientation, in what some might call ‘intellectual 
curiosity’.  Within those persons for whom insight is a frequent occurrence, there burns a 
strong curiosity, a basic dissatisfaction with the state of ignorance.  For Lonergan, as for 
Aristotle before him, this type of orientation is the result of the deep and particularly 
human experience of wondering.  Wonder alone, however, won’t necessarily result in an 
insight.  The occurrence of insight also “depends on the accurate presentation of definite 
problems.”241  This means that in order for curiosity to become understanding, our 
wondering must be expressed in a concrete manner.   
 Lonergan understands wonder as a primordial drive, a desire to understand that 
typifies human experience and acts as a dynamic force to push us towards discovery.  
                                                 




Lonergan refers to this primordial drive as ‘pure question’.  What makes the question 
pure is that it is prior to any insights, concepts, or words.  As Lonergan notes, “insights, 
concepts, words, have to do with answers; and before we look for answers we want them; 
such wanting is the pure question.”242  Pure question is not abstract, however, because 
when we wonder it is always about some particular thing, perhaps concrete data 
encountered through sense experience, or even the concrete wanderings of our 
imagination.  So, while insights are grounded in the concrete, “the significance and 
relevance of insight goes beyond any concrete problem and application … Thus by its 
very nature, insight is the mediator, the hinge, the pivot.  It is insight into the concrete 
world of sense and imagination.”243  It is this hinge offered by insight that lays the 
foundation for the possibility of building understanding through the process of learning. 
This process of learning involves groping in the dark and gradually building a 
chain or web of small insights.  “Imperceptibly we shift from the helpless infancy of the 
beginner to the modest self-confidence of the advanced student.”244  This accretion of 
insights makes up what Lonergan calls the “habitual texture” of our minds.  Before this 
accretion has occurred, we must undergo the process of learning and development that 
generates the originary, basic insights of infancy and childhood.  Children wonder, asking 
the implicit question “what is it” of objects encountered within the world.   
      Wondering and questioning start from our experience of data through our sensory 
activities.  We collect data through the senses.  From these sensory experiences, we 
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construct images.  These images are not only visual, for we can also imagine how things 
feel, sound, smell or taste.  Sense experiences and the images we cull from them are 
necessary for insight.  The grasp of intelligibility that constitutes insight occurs in the 
discovery of unities among diverse, concrete particularities of images.  Unlike the raw 
and sometimes chaotic experience of sense, the grasp of intelligibility unites sensible 
components into a pattern. Insight allows one to grasp an invisible pattern that orders the 
visible difference. 
      Just as experiences form the point of departure for insights, so also insights are 
the points of departure for conceptualization.  While concepts are important, they are not 
imposing or inflexible.  In fact, Lonergan declares that “conception is the playground of 
our intelligence.”245  Whereas Kant, for example, understands concepts as formal and 
rigid, Lonergan claims that concepts are “constituted by the mere activity of supposing, 
thinking, considering, formulating, defining.”246  This multi-faceted process of 
conceptualization is nevertheless an organized part of the thinking process, for 
conceptualization never occurs at random, but always together with an act of insight.  
Ultimately, conceptualization is driven by our taking notice of some clue to the 
relationship between the concrete and the abstract.  The recognition of such a clue is the 
product of concrete insights into data, constituted by discovery of the intelligible pattern 
that exists beyond the realm of sense.  Consider, for example, a swimmer who is trying to 
improve the speed of his backstroke.  He usually wears baggy swim trunks to practice, 
but one day he decided to wear a sleek, tight fitting suit.  Doing so, the swimmer 
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improves his time dramatically.  In questioning why he was able to swim so much faster, 
the swimmer has the insight that the only change in the data is the new swim suit.  His 
insight into the concrete data of the relationship between the suit and faster time ‘pivots’ 
on the concept of “drag,” the resistance of the water to the swimmer’s movements.  The 
swimmer supposes that the new, sleek suit is responsible for his new time, because his 
old, baggy suit produced greater resistance in the water.  This insight depends upon the 
recognition and definition of the concept of drag or resistance.   
All of this is the result of a process in which imagination cooperates with 
intellectual effort in order to satisfy the demands of wonder.  The ultimate achievement 
of this process is that question and insight, image and concept come together in a 
“patterned set of concepts” that provide the answer to our original question.247  The 
ultimate standard that must be met by insight is the fulfillment of the concrete question 
derived from wonder.  If we continue to feel the desire to know and continue to ask 
further questions because we are not yet satisfied, then the drive to know has not been 
quelled. Conversely, if we reach understanding, for example in formulating a definition, 
then for the moment one particular, concrete question has been fulfilled. 
 Lonergan outlines two types of definitions that express our insights in different 
ways.  Nominal definitions inform us about using names correctly, while explanatory 
definitions include a further insight into the intelligibility of whatever object is being 
defined.  Both types of definitions suppose insights, but while a nominal definition 
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“supposes no more than an insight into the proper use of language,” an explanatory 
definition “supposes a further insight into the objects to which language refers.”248 
 For Lonergan, “Every definition presupposes some other term.”249  So where does 
the process of defining begin?  He argues against the notion that “either definition is 
based on undefined terms or else terms are defined in a circle so that each virtually 
defines itself.”250  Instead he claims that definitions are contextual, they “emerge in 
solidarity with experiences, images, questions and insights.”251  When it comes to insight, 
the important factor is that various concepts cohere in order for one to grasp the 
intelligibility of the relations between the terms.  Lonergan explains that   
… for every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the 
terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the insight fixes both.  If 
one grasps the necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect roundness of this 
imagined plane curve, then one grasps not only the circle but also the point, the 
line, the circumference, the radii, the plane, and equality.  All the concepts tumble 
out together, because all are needed to express adequately a single insight.  All are 
coherent, for coherence basically means that all hang together from a single 
insight.252 
 
 This experience of things “hanging together” forms the “aha!” moment we so 
often associate with insight.  The act of insight captures the event of recognition of 
intelligibility, while the process of development is an accrual of many of these events. 
Lonergan claims that once a sufficient number of new insights develop as a result of any 
process of inquiry, a shift can take place.  This shift occurs through the emergence of a 
steady stream of related questions, and the development of further insights and 
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definitions, postulates and deductions which fulfill these questions.  This “complex shift 
in the whole structure” of one’s knowing is what Lonergan identifies as the emergence of 
a higher viewpoint.253  To illustrate this notion he discusses the transition from very 
elementary arithmetic into elementary algebra.  This transition begins with a 
“homogeneous expansion.”  This expansion constitutes a vast extension of an “initial 
deductive expansion.  It consists in introducing new operations.  Its characteristic is that 
the new operations involve no modification of the old.”254  
Lonergan’s example of such an expansion is drawn from arithmetic and algebra.  
Still, one could also think about the process of learning to read or play music, starting out 
with scales, building from the mastery of simple songs eventually to complicated 
ensemble pieces that require vast understanding of harmony, tempo and rhythm. 
Whether we are exploring algebra or Chopin, our insights always serve as a pivot 
or hinge between the image and the concept, between the concrete data and the abstract 
intelligibility.  So, in order to understand what it is to understand such things as 
mathematics and music, we must first learn to be attentive to the data of our own 
understanding.  Data falls into two types -- data of consciousness, as well as data of 
sense, which Lonergan identifies as “the [contents] of an act of seeing, hearing, touching, 
tasting, smelling.”255  So in addition to understanding the data of our sensations, we do 
wonder about and endeavor to understand the data, the experience, of our own 
consciousness of understanding. 
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III.  Regarding Data 
 
For Lonergan, data is what is presupposed by inquiry, in other words, we only 
notice data qua data once we have begun to wonder about it.  To be more precise, 
Lonergan claims that “Inquiry presupposes elements in knowledge about which inquiry is 
made.”256  These elements in knowledge are the data about which we wonder.  Lonergan 
describes the level of data as the level of ‘presentations,’ which is “presupposed and 
complemented by the level of intelligence, that it supplies…the raw materials on which 
intelligence operates, that … it is empirical … merely given, open to understanding and 
formulation but by itself not understood and in itself ineffable.”257     
 Lonergan’s account of data is not univocal, however, for he distinguishes between 
‘sensible data’ and ‘data of consciousness’; the two are related, but distinct.  Data of 
sense pertain to the flow of the experience of sensation, Lonergan states “A datum of 
sense may be defined as the content of an act of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, 
smelling.”258  This sensory experience gives rise to the data of consciousness, which 
“consist of acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, perceiving, imagining, 
inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth.”259  It is these 
data that are the basis for the cognitional process, which is oriented toward seeking out 
intelligibility in the universe.   
 Not all data are clearly intelligible, however.  Lonergan notes an additional 
category that references elements in the data which refuse our effort to make them 
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concretely intelligible.  This category is named the ‘empirical residue.’  According to 
Lonergan, “because the difference of particular places and the difference of particular 
times are given prior to any questioning and prior to any insight, because these given 
differences cannot be matched by insights that explain why places differ and times differ, 
there has to be introduced the category of the empirical residue.”260  He defines empirical 
residue as that which “(1) consists in positive empirical data, (2) is to be denied any 
immanent intelligibility of its own, and (3) is connected with some compensating higher 
intelligibility of notable importance.”261  Elements in the empirical residue are not objects 
of any direct insight.  For example, particular places and/or particular times, which differ 
as a matter of fact, and within which exists no immanent intelligibility to be grasped by 
direct insight into that fact, are distinguishable only by empirical residue.  The empirical 
residue as such lacks any intelligible pattern.  Therefore, the very fact of difference in 
place or time produces differentiation.  Lonergan notes that if place and time did not 
involve some underlying empirical residue, “every place and time would have its own 
physics, its own chemistry, its own biology.”262  He sums up this notion of the empirical 
residue, “In brief, individuals differ, but the ultimate difference in our universe is a matter 
of fact to which there corresponds nothing to be grasped by direct insight.”263 
 Unlike the empirically residual aspects of our experiences, the intelligibility of 
data in general can be grasped by direct insight.  These insights are mediated, however, 
by our ability to pattern our sense experiences.  Sense experience can be chaotic.  
                                                 
260 Ibid., 27. 
261 Ibid., 25-26. 
262 Ibid., 28. 
263 Ibid., 29. 
 84
Consider the barrage of sensations one experiences fighting through a crowded train 
station at rush hour, the deafening thunder of the approaching train, the overpowering 
smells of cologne, body odor, food from vendors, the shock of being bumped and pushed 
by harried passengers to get a seat on the crowded train.  There are too many sensory 
experiences for one person to process them all simultaneously.  Why and how, then, do 
some elements of this barrage reach consciousness out of the vast reserves of experiences 
of one’s own body, while many other elements do not? 
 The answer to this query is our orientation – that with which we are concerned at 
any given moment - which determines how our experiences are patterned or shaped.  
Insight will arise, but it has to await this primary level of experiential patterning in order 
to add a higher intelligible patterning.  Thus, within human experiencing, the images that 
rise to the surface, as well as the insights that order these images, do not occur randomly.  
There is some order to the selectivity of images that are allowed to emerge.  This 
ordering of images has several sources, but among the most important sources are the 
personal orientations derived from social and cultural constructions that select out of the 
raw sensory experience collected in everyday living.  This is important for understanding 
the nature of insight, for the patterning of images is foundational to the process of 
understanding.  The process of developing understanding does not occur in a vacuum.  
Human beings are social creatures, and our development of knowledge is shaped and 
patterned, although not completely determined, within our social environment.  In order 
to better understand these relationships, as well as the other patterns that affect the 
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development of understanding, Lonergan examines the four concerns that organize 
human life and human knowledge. 
 
IV.  The Patterning of Human Experience  
 
For Lonergan, to the extent that it is not distorted by bias, human living involves a 
gradual, steady accumulation of common sense insights.  This accumulation occurs 
through processes of informal teaching and learning, talking and doing, and emulating 
others.  He claims, “In this fashion, the discoveries and inventions of individuals pass 
into the possession of many, to be checked against their experience, to undergo the 
scrutiny of further questions, to be modified by their improvements.”264  This 
modification of insights occurs in a communal self-correcting process of learning, 
through which human intelligence develops specialized knowledge of the particular and 
the concrete.  Such development of intelligence occurs in tandem with the general 
patterning of human experience, in which various elements of our experience are 
organized into distinct patterns.  These elements of experience have a bodily basis and 
are functionally linked to bodily movements.  The selection and the patterning of 
sensations and bodily movements are controlled by consciousness, by its orientation, 
interest, attention and purpose.  Consciousness governs the patterns of experiencing that 
mold human living. 
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Lonergan describes four patterns of experience:  the biological, aesthetic, 
intellectual and dramatic.265  These represent the various patterns which invite questions 
and insights.  Patterning of experience is dynamic, and varies according to the particular 
orientation of the individual at a given moment.  In the next section, after giving a brief 
outline of the biological, aesthetic and intellectual patterns, I will focus on the dramatic 
pattern of experience in order to explain how this pattern functions, especially in relation 
to neural demand functions. 
 
V.  The Four Patterns  
 
Lonergan states that the stream of human consciousness “involves not only the 
temporal succession of different contents, but also direction, striving, effort.”266  It is this 
dynamic striving of consciousness that gives order to the psychic flow of experience.  
The first pattern that Lonergan discusses is the biological.  It consists of four main 
elements:  outer senses, which serve as the heralds of biological opportunities and 
dangers; memory, our repository of supplementary information; imagination, which aids 
in the projection of courses of action; and conation and emotion, which represent the 
“pent-up pressure of elemental purposiveness.”267   
A biological pattern of experience is a “set of intelligible relations that link 
together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily 
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movements,” the end of which is the reproduction or preservation of an organism.268  In 
addition, non-conscious immanent vital processes fit into intelligible patterns of 
biological significance, for example various organic functions such as digestion, or cell 
metabolism.  This patterning is considered biological because the flow of these relations 
is oriented toward the biological flourishing of the organism.   
At an intentional level, the biological pattern is characterized primarily by 
extroversion.  Elementary biological experiencing is concerned not with the immanent 
aspects of living but with its external conditions and opportunities.  Exigencies within the 
biological conjugates orient biological consciousness towards its “external conditions and 
opportunities,” such as the challenges of a harsh environment or an immediately available 
bounty of food or some other necessity.269 
A second kind of experiential patterning is the aesthetic.  Within the aesthetic 
pattern, experience moves beyond the limited purposiveness of biological consciousness.  
The aesthetic pattern instead captures the spontaneous authenticity of conscious living.  
Art is powerful as it serves both to liberate human beings from biological purposiveness, 
and to “[liberate] intelligence from the wearying constraints of mathematical proofs, 
scientific verifications, and common-sense factualness.”270  In opposition to the calm 
focus of the intellect, art captures the spontaneous joy of free intellectual creation.  Art 
serves to invoke, through symbol, meaning which cannot be understood through the 
detached and disinterested approach of theoretical inquiry.  Art gives expression to the 
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aesthetic subject, expressing the dynamic orientation of wonder.  For Lonergan, “man’s 
artistry testifies to his freedom.”271 
Conversely, a third pattern, the intellectual pattern, shapes one’s experiencing in 
such a way as to serve the development of the detached, disinterested demeanor of the 
intellect intent upon particular lines of inquiry.  This pattern is best observed in the 
theorist concentrating thoroughly upon a problem, censoring any image or clue which is 
irrelevant to the question at hand, and focusing completely on the insights and judgments 
sought.  In this transformation of sensitive spontaneity, there occur acts of reflection in 
which arise a passionless calm.272   
While the intellectual pattern shapes our experiencing as we pursue theoretical 
endeavors, ordinary human living is not restricted to only one pattern of experience.  
Unlike the detached, disinterested approach of the theoretician, our everyday life is a 
stream of consciousness that involves not only succession, but direction, a practical drive 
oriented toward getting things done in the social world.273  Lonergan names this 
orientation of everyday life the dramatic pattern of experience.274 
The dramatic patterning of consciousness organizes everyday human experience.  
The dramatic pattern aims to serve common sense in order to “get things done”275 but 
also to shape and orient human living so as to dignify human experience.  Lonergan notes 
that it is possible to detect a dramatic component in the motives and purposes behind 
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human action, for in human living the higher patterns elevate the lower functions.  This is 
accomplished by the transformation of the biological into the social.  For example food 
preparation and the act of eating are dignified by spatial and psychological separation, 
clothing is worn with dramatic flair rather than to simply cover and protect, and sex is not 
considered merely for purposes of procreation, but rather “becomes a great mystery, 
shrouded in the delicacy of indirect speech.”276 
As human beings going about our everyday lives, we act out what Lonergan calls 
the “drama of living,” a drama grounded in the freedom granted to human beings through 
art, as the ability to shape our lives through artistry liberates us from the bonds of 
biological purposiveness.  For Lonergan, the first work of art of any human being is his 
or her own living.  He claims that “The fair, the beautiful, the admirable is embodied by 
man in his own body and actions before it is given a still freer realization in painting and 
sculpture, in music and poetry.”277  This artistry is accomplished insofar as we are 
constantly constructing and revising a dynamic network of social relations.  Human 
beings shape their social lives through a dramatic sort of artistry which is “limited by 
biological exigence, inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and 
approval, sustained by respect and affection.”278  We shape our behavior and interactions 
with others within a dynamic intersubjective context, and therefore our social relations 
are never fixed or predetermined.      
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 The drama of human living is transitive; not only do we shape our social relations, 
but we too are shaped by the drama acted out in social life.  This is an evolutionary 
process, through which an individual’s character is formed.  The process is both 
voluntary and involuntary, working at both the conscious and unconscious levels. The 
dramatic pattern operates through the collaboration of intelligence and imagination in 
order to shape our behavior in society.  In the dramatic pattern, the intelligibility of 
particular sensible components of our experience is grasped under the conditions of the 
artistic imagination. In turn, intelligence unites these sensible components into the 
dramatic pattern of experience.  Following Aristotle, Lonergan points out that the 
formation of human character involves rational deliberation.  In the development of the 
dramatic pattern of experience, we draw upon insights and processes of self-correction 
(rationality) to impose an artistic pattern upon, and thereby transform, the basic 
aggressivity and affectivity of our experiencing.  Such dramatic patterning underlies what 
is usually called rational consciousness, which is a specialization of the intellectual 
patterning of experience. 
 This shaping of consciousness, however, is not directly analogous to the artist’s 
shaping of clay.  Our bodies cannot be treated like the raw material of the artist because 
in humans “there exist the exigencies of underlying materials, and the pattern of 
experience has to meet these exigencies by granting them psychic representation and 
conscious integration.  The biological cannot be ignored and yet, in man, it can be 
transformed.”279  Conation and emotion, the “pent-up pressure of elemental 
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purposiveness” are immanent within the basic materials which the biological pattern 
shapes.280  Thus, unlike the materials of the artist, the materials which emerge in 
consciousness are already dramatically patterned.  Insofar as these underlying neural 
demands are transformed through our own pains and joys, the dramatic patterning of 
experience differs from ordinary drama.  We are not only actors portraying a role; we are 
also authors and directors.  Our efforts require more.   
 This transformation of the biological is a universal human variable, occurring in 
every culture, albeit with radically different results.  And yet, there are many similarities 
in the way such transformation happens.  Dramatic artistry, as opposed to the purely 
aesthetic pattern, occurs in the presence of others.  Others, too, are actors in this 
“primordial drama,” a drama which is shaped by the fact that human beings are social 
animals.  We seek the appreciation, approval, respect, affection, guidance and friendship 
of others, while in our weaker moments we may also treat others with disrespect, act out 
in anger, and perhaps even do harm.  As this process has been repeated throughout 
history, human knowledge and artistry has accumulated over the centuries.  This 
accretion results from a process of imitation and learning from others, which leads to 
collaboration between people in their roles as dramatic actors.  This network of human 
social relations is grounded in “aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, where the 
artistry is limited by biological exigence, inspired by example and emulation, confirmed 
by admiration and approval, sustained by respect and affection.”281 
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 While human beings are actors in this drama of living, the drama itself also 
shapes and molds us through a concrete process of cognitional development.  Throughout 
our lifetime, insights emerge that organize our imaginative projects.   These insights are 
corrected through a process of trial and error, which gives rise to further questions and 
produces further corresponding insights.  This ongoing dramatic process of discovery and 
development shapes human character by presenting us with possibilities and choices to 
which we must respond.  “Out of the plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the 
discipline and play of education there gradually is formed the character of [a person].”282  
This process of formation is guided by rational consciousness, but we are not completely 
and utterly free to choose.  We are marked with our attitudes that are created by our past 
behaviors and to which we become habituated.  In our everyday living, our imagination 
and intelligence collaborate to formulate particular courses of action.  This collaboration 
is effected by the dramatic pattern which outlines “how we might behave before others 
and charg[es] the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggresivity 
and affectivity.”283  Ultimately, the work of the dramatic pattern is to sort out  “the 
materials that emerge in consciousness [which] are already patterned, and the pattern is 
already charged emotionally and conatively.”284  This underlying relationship which the 
dramatic pattern organizes is between the psychic and the neural.  It is important to note 
here that Lonergan’s understanding of consciousness differs from Freud.  What Freud 
means by “consciousness” Lonergan means by “understanding.”  For Lonergan, 
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consciousness is experience, so only that which is brought to consciousness can 
contribute to the process of creating images for insights.  Electrical impulses that occur 
within the brain, for example, are not automatically brought to awareness within 
everyday life.  For Lonergan, the unconscious is the neurophysiological level.  He 
explores this in his notion of the neural demand functions.   
 
VI.  Neural Demand Functions 
 In order for the dramatic patterning of experience to function, the unconscious 
neurophysical level must be brought under the control of the conscious psychic level.   
Lonergan calls this the “subordination of neural process to psychic determinations.”285  
Unlike animals, which have a limited ability to learn new skills, human beings have a 
tremendous capacity to change and shape our bodily movements in an untold number of 
ways by means of our dynamic patterning of our experience.  Lonergan concretizes this 
notion with the example of learning to play an instrument, “Were the pianist’s arms, 
hands, and fingers locked from birth in natural routines of biological stimulus and 
response, they never could learn to respond quickly and accurately to the sight of a 
musical score.”286  In this example, the psyche controls and determines the neural, but in 
general the neural patterns and processes also demand psychic representation and 
conscious integration.  For example, if one places a hand upon a hot stove, the patterns of 
the neural functions will demand of the psyche a corresponding experience of pain.  A 




neural stimulus-response mechanism will also demand for one to pull one’s hand off of 
the hot stove.   Lonergan illustrates this notion with the less vivid example of sight, in 
which “patterns of change in the optic nerve and the cerebrum specify and lead to 
corresponding acts of seeing.” 287  He links this example to all of the outer senses, and 
presumes that “memory and imagination, conation and emotion, pleasure and pain” also 
arise in coordination with specific demands of neural processes.288 
While neural patterns and processes “call for some psychic representation and 
some conscious integration,”289 their demands can be fulfilled in various ways.  We have 
some control over our psychic responses.  Unlike animals, humans are not restricted to a 
merely biological patterning of experience, in which both the unconscious and the 
conscious have the same end.  Rather, our possibilities are vast and change as frequently 
as our concrete situation, as well as the habitual texture of our minds.  Of course, our 
possibilities are not completely unlimited.  While all neural patterns and processes 
demand some form of conscious expression, they are conditioned by and contingent upon 
the particularities of the situation in which we find ourselves – for example, the realities 
of our bodily strengths and limitations, our physical environment, and our cultural 
situation - as well as the pattern of experience in which the demands are met.   
Within the biological pattern, there is little room for the “diversification of 
psychic contents,” while in the aesthetic pattern, there are vast possibilities for change, 
dictated for example by location, time period and social setting, although these 
                                                 




possibilities aren’t unrestricted.  The aesthetic and dramatic patterns of experience differ 
from the biological, insofar as they both “[penetrate] below the surface of consciousness 
to exercise their own domination and control and to effect, prior to conscious 
discrimination, their own selections and arrangements.”290  However, like the other 
patterns, the domination of the dramatic pattern over consciousness is limited by the 
requirement to heed the demands of neural patterns and processes.   
This is so because the demands made by neural processes constitute an exigence 
immanent within any organism, which in turn requires expression in some 
complementary way at the conscious level.  This exigence is not purely oriented toward 
knowing.  Lonergan notes that “The imperious neural demands are affective rather than 
apprehensive.”291  This means that they are oriented not toward the “apprehensive 
psychic contents, but for the conations and emotions that are far more closely linked with 
activity; thus while we imagine much as we please, our feelings are quite another 
matter.”292  Lonergan warns that if we violate the exigence constituted by the neural 
demands we shall “invite the anguish of abnormality.”293  In order to avoid such anguish 
human beings must strive to be in accord with both the normative function of our own 
intelligence, as well as with what is intelligible in the norm of our societies.294  Failure in 
this respect courts the stigma of rejection.   
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 In light of such a possibility, Lonergan examines the development of dramatic 
bias, which arises from an exclusion or refusal of insight.  Just as we can experience bias 
at the theoretical level, so too can “elementary passions … bias understanding in practical 
and personal matters.”295  The result of dramatic bias is a behavior that serves to restrict 
the pure unrestricted desire to know in dangerous and damaging ways.  Bias excludes 
insights and leads to narrow and distorted viewpoints.  This causes us to behave in ways 
that create error and misunderstanding within the individual and the community.  These 
sorts of misunderstandings lead the individual to withdraw from the drama of community 
life into the inner world of fantasy.    
 Extroversion is native to the biological pattern of experience.  The inward turn 
that results from bias subverts the extroverted dynamic of the biological pattern of 
experience, and results in a distorted differentiation within the individual between the 
persona, our outer self which is allowed to appear before others, and our inner ego, the 
internal, private impression one has of oneself.  Ultimately this failure of integrity leads 
to “incomprehension, isolation, and duality,” the arrested and aberrant development of 
common sense, and aberration of the process of development in general.296  In this 
differentiation that occurs in turning away from the outer drama of human existence, the 
individual becomes disconnected and as a result loses the opportunity for learning in 
cooperation with others.   
Lonergan uses the term “scotosis” to name this flight from understanding.  
Scotosis is a bias that retards the development of dramatic common-sense insights and 
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understandings.  In turn, scotosis results in a sort of “blind spot” which Lonergan calls a 
scotoma.  Scotosis is an unconscious process that arises from the censorship which guides 
or inhibits the “emergence of psychic contents.”  Scotosis and the resulting scotoma 
occur by means of the “spontaneous exclusion of unwanted insights.”297   
In addition, the expansion of scotosis usually requires that the individual 
undertake a process of rationalization.  When Lonergan discusses “rationalization of the 
scotosis,” he does not refer to rationality in the general sense of being rational.  Rather, 
this rationalization is an attempt to fit irrational, non-sensical ideas into the scheme of the 
scotoma.  For example, the wife who suspects her husband of being unfaithful (but 
doesn't want to believe it) smells unfamiliar perfume on his collar.  She may try to 
rationalize her insight, thinking, “He must have been squirted with perfume at a 
cosmetics counter,” when she knows very well he hates to shop and never goes into a 
store unless he absolutely cannot avoid it.  There is no rational justification for this 
conclusion, as it conflicts with her previous insights.  She knows he hates to shop, but 
rationalizes that he was at a cosmetics counter because she wants to exclude the insight of 
his possible unfaithfulness.  Thus, in scotosis, we may simply diminish unwanted insights 
as incorrect, or we might flee the unwanted insight in an “emotional reaction of distaste, 
pride, dread, horror, revulsion.”298  This sort of scotosis can remain unconscious and yet 
the scotoma can bubble up to the surface. 
 This example illustrates how the flight from understanding and the process of 
rationalization create the scotoma.  Working in tandem with scotosis is the process of 
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repression.  Scotosis results in an aberration of the understanding, but also of the 
censorship or abstraction that allows us to put together the proper images and clues that 
form an insight.  The desire to avoid an insight results in the repression from 
consciousness of the particular questions, images or clues that would bring the insight 
into consciousness.  Censorship is primarily constructive; it “selects and arranges 
materials that emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to an insight.”299  
Yet censorship also has another, negative side, selecting what to leave out.  This negative 
function is important because it “dictates the manner in which neural demand functions 
are not to be met.”300  In addition to positive and negative censorship, Lonergan also 
discusses aberrant censorship; both censorship and its aberrant form “regard directly not 
how we are to behave but what we are to understand.”301  Lonergan associates the 
aberrant form of censorship with the obstruction of understanding that results from 
repression. 
Specifically, Lonergan defines repression as an “exercise of the aberrant 
censorship that is engaged in preventing insight.”302  Repression results in an inhibition of 
neural demand functions which in turn prevents insights from arising.  This is 
accomplished by suppressing the demand for images (and any connected affects) which 
could point to the unwanted insights.  These insights are unwanted because they lead to 
the correction and revision of our current viewpoints and behavior.  According to 
Lonergan, this flight from understanding, “grounds the conscious, affective attitudes of 
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the persona performing before others, and it also involves the repression of opposite 
combinations of neural demand functions.”303  The same is true for the ego, and so those 
demands “make their way into consciousness with the affect detached from its initial 
object and attached to some other more or less incongruous object.”304   
Thus, both repression and inhibition, as functions of scotosis, serve to “defeat the 
efforts of the dramatic actor to offer a smooth performance” by the division of conscious 
living into the persona and the ego.305  This disruption of refined performance occurs 
because the sentiments of the ego, which are fantastical and private, can slip into the 
public performance of the persona.  For instance, we are subject to what are commonly 
referred to as “Freudian slips” or “slips of the tongue” in which the higher level of 
consciousness fails to bring the lower level into accord.  This sort of failure can function 
in many circumstances in which the lower finds expression despite the attempts of the 
higher to inhibit its expression.  For example, many forms of ordinary neurosis often 
become habitual.   
Thankfully, we are not always required to perform, whether on the public stage of 
the persona, or the private theater of the ego.  Rather, we are given the opportunity to slip 
away from these demands into the world of sleep.  In sleep is accomplished the relaxation 
of censorship, as well as the restoration of nerves both physically and chemically, as well 
as psychically.  The neural demand functions, as determinant of conscious contents in an 
awake state, have a strong influence over our dreams.  Dreams meet the “ignored claims 
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of neural demand functions”306 and as such preserve the freedom of the aesthetic, 
intellectual and dramatic patterns of experience.  In the dramatic pattern, unlike the 
biological pattern, these higher integrations are not enslaved to the neural demands.  For 
Lonergan, the ultimate function of dreams is to secure a “balance between neural 
demands and psychic events while preserving the integrity of the conscious stream of 
experience.”307  
Dreaming has an effect on the person one becomes while awake.  While we are 
dreaming, we can push our imagination to its limits and explore the full spectrum of our 
experience.  While we are awake, however, we are not so free, for we are held 
accountable for our actions.  Thus, in light of the dramatic pattern, we must question the 
development of moral norms.  As we have already pointed out, the development of 
human character involves a process of rational deliberation.  In addition, Lonergan points 
out that conscience and moral feeling arise in part by the “determination of judgment in 
accord with the feelings instilled through parental and social influence.”308  This calls into 
question the relation between emotion and rational judgment.   
According to Lonergan, “Normative objectivity is constituted by the immanent 
exigence of the pure desire in the pursuit of its unrestricted objective.”309  Objectivity, in 
Lonergan's sense, is deeply connected with the pure desire to know.  Therefore, to 
completely detach the cognitional process from all desire and emotion would virtually 
end the cognitional process, for it would separate us from the pure question.  It would 
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also separate us from the data of feelings.  It is necessary to understand and critique our 
feelings and it is necessary to ground our feelings in our insights.  Otherwise we would 
develop completely irrational emotions, like people who make rash judgments and enter 
into irrational fits of temper.  Still, this does not mean repressing emotions.  If we are to 
strive to be objective it requires us, beginning at the level of the dramatic subject, to 
develop a heightening of desire and emotional involvement in order to intelligently and 
critically integrate feeling into our living.   This is particularly important for moral 
character, which develops with regard to both feeling and reflection, within the context of 
the dramatic patterning of experience.  As Lonergan asserts with regard to moral 
development, “Once feeling takes the lead, critical reflection can prevent an arbitrary 
extension of the moral code.”310   So moral feeling guides us, for example, towards what 
draws us in as joyful and uplifting or away from that which shocks and disgusts us.  
Reflecting critically on our feelings and moral choices allows us to develop a moral code 
that is reasonable and does not violate our basic sensibilities, both as an individual and 
within the larger realm of society. 
Thus the dramatic patterning of experiencing is an important and complicated 
process. In order for humans to function in accord with the norm created by the 
spontaneous and dynamic phenomenon of wonder, experience must be patterned in 
particular ways.  This requires that the higher psychic and intellectual conjugates of 
experience must be in accord with the lower biological and neurological conjugates.  If 
this does not occur properly we will be likely to suffer from psychological disorders and 
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the incomplete or aberrant development of moral character.  Hence through neural 
demands, biological conjugates have psychic representation, which is accomplished 
through the dramatic patterning of human experience. 
 It will be demonstrated in Chapter Five how the dramatic patterning of human 
experience is relevant to questions of sex and gender.  First, however, I will develop an 
account of Lonergan’s complex and dynamic notion of metaphysics, as well demonstrate 
how this approach to metaphysics is significant for a theory of development. 
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Chapter Four:   
 




 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Lonergan develops a complex 
philosophical account of the human being.  This chapter will show that Lonergan’s 
understanding of the human being deeply informs his understanding of metaphysics, and 
as a result he rejects a deductive metaphysics based in logic and conceptualism.  Instead, 
he claims that, distinct from theoretical accounts of being developed by philosophers and 
theologians through the history of Western intellectual culture, there exists a 
spontaneously operative notion of being which is common to all human beings.  This 
spontaneously operative notion is what Lonergan calls the “intention of being,”311 and is 
identified as “the pure desire to know” discussed in Chapter One.   In order to understand 
what Lonergan means by metaphysics, then, we must first revisit his understanding of 
this notion of being and its relation to human intelligence. 
Lonergan’s effort in the second chapter of Insight is to highlight the essential 
dynamism of human intelligence, especially with regard to scientific method.  In 
undertaking scientific inquiry, we do not follow a plan, for a plan assumes a known end 
or goal.  A method, conversely, is based in questions and inquiries which aim at the 
“known unknown.”  Method, in this sense, rests upon the fact that we are driven to 
discover that which we do not yet understand or know.  Insights emerge; they are novel 
and spontaneous, never planned.  For Lonergan, there is a dynamism, most evident in 
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science, that is characteristic of the human mind in general.  Moreover, the dynamism of 
the mind in turn corresponds to the dynamism of the universe.  
Wonder and questioning underlie not only classical scientific investigation, but 
also all of the operations of the human mind.  Lonergan wants us to attain a critical 
understanding of wondering and questioning in order to appropriate our irrepressible 
orientation toward intelligibility.  This is a far more comprehensive heuristic orientation 
than is found in classical science.  We expect to discover, to have insights and make 
judgments, not only regarding scientific investigations, but about everything.  
Philosophy, as well as science, begins in wonder, not in propositions.  Wonder is the 
dynamic operator that pushes us toward this comportment.  For Lonergan, this 
comprehensive heuristic orientation is a normative experience of human existence and 
the genuine ground of metaphysics.   
 
II.  The Notion of Being 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, Lonergan speaks of a notion rather than a concept 
of being.  Understanding what he means by this term is of great importance for 
understanding Lonergan’s view of the cognitional process, of metaphysics, and of the 
universe itself.  For him, the universe is like the cognitional process in that both are 
dynamic.  The cognitional process arises out of the deep and spontaneous orientation of 
the knower to wonder about the unknown.   
Lonergan calls this orientation the “desire to know” and says that by this he 
means  
 105
the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection 
… the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and 
imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to 
the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge.312 
 
This orientation is what Lonergan means by “the notion of being”.  He does not approach 
being conceptually, but anticipatorily.  Lonergan does not think of being as the content of 
a concept, but rather as the not yet known community of everything that is.  As such his 
notion of being is not rigid, nor is it even formed like an idea.  Rather the notion of being 
is the way that the orientation toward the universe of being operates the cognitional 
process of the knower.    He uses the term ‘notion’ to suggest an open-ended, unrestricted 
comportment, rather than a formed concept or understanding.  This orientation arises out 
of the experience of wonder.  Lonergan argues that this spontaneously operative notion of 
being, which is common to all knowers, operates irrespective of the theoretical accounts 
of the genesis and content of being as developed by philosophers and theologians 
throughout the history of Western intellectual culture.  This notion of being is 
demonstrated by the experience of wonder, an experience which Lonergan finds to be 
ubiquitous.  He notes “Neither centuries of inquiry nor enormous libraries of answers 
have revealed any tendency for the stream of further questions to diminish.”313 
For Lonergan, wonder is the expression of intelligent inquiry, which transcends 
basic sensitive experience.  He calls wonder the “hinge” or “pivot” because it serves to 
connect, or in a sense mediate, between merely sensitive living (expressed in the 
biological pattern of existence) and intelligent inquiry.  Wonder frees intellectual activity 
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from the prison of the biological pattern through its important function of anticipation.  
Through wonder and inquiry we anticipate being, we anticipate the “to-be-known through 
that content.”314  We anticipate the particular content of a particular known, but we also 
anticipate the totality of being.  Lonergan describes this anticipation accordingly, “Hence, 
prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through 
all answers.”  This anticipation also enables wonder to perform its role of selection; it 
“selects data for insight.”315 
As wonder transcends sensitive experience, the notion of being constitutes some 
contents as cognitional, as opposed to merely experiential.  Insofar as our wondering 
about things extends beyond what we know so far, so does the notion of being.  It is not 
in wondering about things that we come to know them, though.  In order to reach 
knowledge of being, we must first reach insights and then judgments, in which we affirm 
or deny the existence or reality of a thing.  As Lonergan puts it, “until we are ready to 
affirm or deny, we do not yet know whether or not any X happens to be.”316  While the 
act of judging allows us to affirm or deny the fact of a thing’s existence, judgment does 
not constitute the notion of being.  This notion is our intention of being prior to any act of 
judging.  This intending depends on our wondering and reflecting about things in the first 
place.  It is expressed in the question “is it so?” to which judgments respond.317   So we 
must conclude that the notion of being exists, in fact, prior to our making judgments.   
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The question of the relation between being and existence is certainly a live one in 
the history of philosophy.  There are many things that we can think about, but not all of 
them can be affirmed to exist.  Some therefore conclude that thinking prescinds from 
existence, and therefore from being.  This would result in a reduction of thinking about 
being to thinking about nothing, and led some philosophers to the conclusion that being 
and existence must be different things.  Lonergan disagrees with this conclusion, arguing 
that it is judging, not thinking, that allows us to reach a determination about the fact of 
something’s existence.  We can think, imagine or fantasize about things that don’t exist, 
but ultimately one aim of thinking is to make a determination about whether those things 
that we think about actually exist.  This means that the notion of being goes beyond 
merely thinking about things, toward making a determination or judgment about their 
actuality.  Lonergan concludes that the notion of being is prior to thinking, as well as to 
judging.   
 
III.  The Metaphysics of Finality and Emergent Probability  
Corresponding to the dynamism of the human subject’s mind, Lonergan identifies 
a correlative dynamism of the universe of being itself, which he calls “finality.”  
Lonergan identifies an isomorphism between knowing and being, and therefore between 
the cognitional and the metaphysical.  The relentless inquiry which sustains all 
cognitional acts is reflected in the universe and therefore has great metaphysical 
importance.  As normal human inquiry is headed toward the intelligibility of being, the 
subject/object split that has been so problematic through the history of philosophy 
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disappears in the isomorphism between knowing and being. This means that human 
beings, as self-reflective inquiring subjects, are not limited to biological consciousness. 
There is more to the real than the dualistic already-out-there-now reality of presence 
endemic to biological consciousness.  We can recognize and affirm this fact through 
appropriating our own cognitional process.  Hence, becoming a metaphysician requires 
self-appropriation, for we have an intrinsic norm within us that guides us toward the 
dynamic being of the universe.  In order to respect this norm we have to pay close 
attention to and appropriate our own process of knowing. 
 The central feature of Lonergan’s metaphysics is therefore what he calls the 
notion of finality.  Insofar as we are inquiring, we are incomplete, unfinished.  When we 
inquire we are also participating in the finality that moves the universe and ourselves 
upward, toward a fuller and more differentiated way of being.  Our desire to know and 
understand being is unlimited, yet the limits of our possible experience restrict our ability 
to fulfill that desire.  Proportionate being is therefore the more restricted realm of being, 
limited by sensitive experience.  We as human knowers can come to the realization that 
we are limited by our horizon, our experience, and our historicity, for we also can 
recognize that there are questions about realities that may exist beyond the realm of 
possible human experience.  This does not mean that we can have no knowledge or 
understanding of these realities.  Rather, the question of the limit of human knowledge 
and understanding remains an open question for metaphysical inquiry.  Be that as it may, 
the primary focus of Lonergan’s metaphysics is the natural universe, or what he calls 
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“proportionate being.”  Finality is the fundamental feature of this universe of 
proportionate being. 
Lonergan speaks of finality as an objective process which is “the becoming of 
proportionate being.”318  He claims that there exists a parallel between this objective 
process and cognitional activity.  
By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. 
This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the 
dynamism of proportionate being.  It affirms that the objective universe is not at 
rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid.  As it 
regards present reality in its dynamic aspect, so it affirms this dynamism to be 
open.  As what is to be known becomes determinate only through knowing, so 
what is to be becomes determinate only through its own becoming.319 
 
Thus, reality is an open dynamism, grounded in potency, and revealed through finality. 
In a general sense, finality reflects the fact that the whole order of proportionate 
being is emerging.  Metaphysically and objectively, finality corresponds to human 
wondering.  Like human inquiry, the whole universe of proportionate being is on the 
move. Indeed, “Its [cognitional process’] heading towards being is but the particular 
instance in which universal striving towards being becomes conscious and intelligent and 
reasonable.”320  But finality is not limited to human consciousness; it embraces the whole 
universe.  Significantly, though, finality attains self-awareness in human wondering 
insofar as we wonder about everything that is emerging, including ourselves and our own 
capacity for wonder.   
                                                 




Lonergan characterizes his notion of finality with the remark that proportionate 
being is “upwardly but indeterminately directed.”321  Such a notion is only possible in a 
metaphysics in which substance is not a rigid determiner of what is.  If substance were a 
rigid determiner of being, then being would be determinately directed.  This would make 
impossible any change or flexibility in the universe of being.  Indeed, it would mean that 
emergence was itself impossible. It would mean that the universe was static, that the 
“nature” or existence of things was wooden and fixed.  In Lonergan’s view the universe 
is real and the real is dynamic.  Perhaps most importantly, this means that we live in a 
universe that is incomplete.   
This does not mean, however, that the universe of proportionate being is without 
direction.  In this dynamic universe, potency is directed toward form and form toward 
act.  In addition, the accidental coming together of diverse events (“acts”) sets the stage 
for the emergence of new, novel forms and further events/acts.  This directedness of the 
universe of being is not inflexible, because within the directed dynamism of finality, non-
systematic divergence is possible.  This non-systematic divergence reveals that “The 
directed dynamism of finality is not determinate.”322   
On the human side, our capacity for wonder is an expression of finality within the 
knowing subject.  On the side of the universe, the expression and structure of finality is 
what Lonergan calls “emergent probability.”    Central to the notion of emergent 
probability is Lonergan’s principle of emergence.  He observes, 
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The prototype of emergence is the insight that arises with respect to an 
appropriate image; without the insight, the image is a coincidental manifold; by 
the insight the elements of the image become intelligibly united and related; 
moreover, accumulations of insights unify and relate ever greater and more 
diversified ranges of images, and what remains merely coincidental from a lower 
viewpoint becomes systematic from the accumulation of insights into a higher 
viewpoint.323 
 
With the emergence of insights, the dynamism of the mind offers a prototype; emergence 
is far more general, emergence is the principle of intelligible unity.  This principle of 
emergence is the foundation for Lonergan’s discussion of the higher integrations of lower 
manifolds.  Emergence occurs out of manifolds of things which are initially related only 
coincidentally, but which become systematized by higher forms and integrations.   
 The more universal phenomenon of the emergence of intelligibility in the 
universe is treated in Lonergan’s analysis of schemes of recurrence.  According to this 
analysis, events and things exist within ever emerging "flexible circles of ranges of 
schemes” of recurrence.324  This means that events and things, including human beings, 
are intrinsically interrelated metaphysically in an ever-developing emergent universe.  On 
a basic level, schemes of recurrence include the circulation of water over the surface of 
the earth, the routines of animal life, the repetitive, economic rhythms of production and 
exchange.325  These are examples of single schemes, but single schemes are only single 
components in “conditioned series” of schemes of recurrence. Lonergan illustrates series 
of schemes with the example of the dietary schemes of animals:  “All carnivorous 
animals cannot live off other carnivorous animals.  Hence, a carnivorous, dietary scheme 
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supposes another herbivorous dietary scheme, but, inversely, there could be herbivorous 
animals without any carnivorous animals.”326  In other words, certain schemes are 
conditioned by the existence of other schemes, but not all schemes are dependent upon 
another for their existence.  
Additionally, he distinguishes between possible, probable and actual seriations 
that result in schemes of recurrence.  Actual seriation refers to “schemes that actually 
were, are, or will be functioning in our universe along with precise specifications of their 
places, their durations, and their relations to one another.”327  Actual schemes can be 
tracked; their existence is a fact.  Whereas an actual seriation exists in fact, a probable 
seriation exists as an ideal, and not in fact.  Rather, probable seriation  
has to exhibit the cumulative ramifications of probable alternatives.  Accordingly, 
the probable seriation is not a single series, but a manifold of series.  At each 
stage of world process328 there is a set of probable next stages, of which some are 
more probable than others.  The actual seriation includes only the stages that 
occur.  The probable seriation includes all that would occur without systematic 
divergence from the probabilities.329   
 
Probable seriation, Lonergan notes, is governed by both the classical and statistical laws 
that regulate our world.  Conversely, possible seriation is not dependent on statistical law.  
Rather, it “… includes all the schemes of recurrence that could be devised from the 
classical laws of our universe … Of the three seriations, then, the possible exhibits the 
greatest complexity and variety.”330  Lonergan’s basic idea here is that schemes of 
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recurrence will emerge and survive not necessarily, but only probably, and when they do, 
they make probable still further emergences.   
‘Emergent probability,’ therefore, is the concrete manifestation and structure of 
the finality of the universe.  This is a central notion for Lonergan’s thought, one which he 
considers to be an “explanatory idea.”331  The explanatory importance of emergent 
probability comes into clearer view when we consider the claim that there exists a “world 
process in which the order or design is constituted by emergent probability.”332  For 
Lonergan ‘world process’ is a very concrete notion which refers to “a spatio-temporal 
manifold of events.”333  Still, world process is no mere random flux.  It has a structure 
which is governed by both classical and statistical laws.  For this reason, world process is 
moved along by the organizing factor of emergent probability.  
 
IV.  The Notion of Objectivity 
 Since the era of Kant and his contemporaries, the problem of objectivity has 
become the problem of how it is possible to know how reality really is, apart from the 
construction and imposition of the mind in its attempts to know the real.  For Lonergan, 
the answer to this problem comes in what he calls the principle notion of objectivity.   
Objectivity relates to the notion of being through the crucial role of making 
judgments.  Being is “what is to be known in the totality of true judgments.”334  On the 
other hand, Lonergan notes that “Objectivity in its principal sense is what is known 
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through any set of judgments satisfying a determinate pattern.  In brief, there is 
objectivity if there are distinct beings, some of which both know themselves and know 
others as others.”335  This knowledge is achieved through making judgments, and 
ultimately affirming them as correct.  This will occur only if the knowing subject 
practices both intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, leading eventually to one’s self-
affirmation as a knower.  This, however, is complicated by the fact that human existence 
is fraught with tension arising from the differentiated patterns of experience which 
govern human living. For Lonergan, it is this fact, the polymorphism of human 
consciousness, which is the problem underlying any attempt to develop a method of 
metaphysics.    
While people regularly make judgments, they cannot necessarily give a full or 
correct account of “their knowledge of objects and subjects.”336  Commonly, we fall into 
an explanation that relies on our biological sense of the reality of objects, rather than our 
knowledge of those objects.  Lonergan describes this biological viewpoint as awareness 
of the “‘already-out-there-now-real’.”337 The already-out-there-now is the notion of 
objectivity and reality inherent in what Lonergan calls the “biological pattern of 
experience.”338  It is a notion of objectivity and reality, which privileges “presence” 
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(‘already’, ‘there’, ‘now’).  Animal consciousness has no concern for what is absent, 
since it cannot serve biological needs.  But human knowing is concerned with everything 
that can be understood and judged – most of which is not immediately present.  Since the 
imperiousness of immediate biological purposiveness can interfere with the broader 
concern of human knowing, this differentiation or polymorphism of consciousness is a 
principle challenge in the development of a proper meaning of metaphysics.  
 To place him within the history of philosophy, one could say that Lonergan 
deviates from Thomistic metaphysics not in its content, but in the way that it has been 
interpreted over the centuries.  He thinks that what we need to know about being, about 
thinking, about metaphysics is in Aquinas’ writings, but interpretation of Aquinas’ 
“account of wisdom in cognitional terms” has been interfered with by the “polymorphism 
of the human consciousness.” 339  Lonergan’s critique is that philosophers and theologians 
have not inquired deeply enough into human understanding to work out the truth of the 
Thomistic account.   
The human mind is polymorphic insofar as it exists in or assumes different forms, 
for example, the differentiated patterns of experience discussed earlier.  Polymorphism is 
rooted in patterns of experience.  The intellectual pattern is the only “pure” pattern, in 
which we let inquiry lead wherever it may.  This is not an undistracted state, but rather a 
state in which our inquiry is radically open, radically unclosed-off.  The genuinely 
intelligent inquirer must detach from anything limited for the sake of everything 
unlimited. The problem of polymorphism gives rise to general bias, which is the tendency 
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to allow the practical pattern to undermine and/or overwhelm the theoretical and other 
patterns of experience.   
The first important judgment that relates to this understanding of the mind is the 
affirmation that “I am a knower.”340  Still, this affirmation must be situated within a 
context of further judgments about other objects.  We affirm the existence of other 
objects; we also affirm the difference between those objects and ourselves.  Perhaps more 
importantly, we are also able to “intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence 
of other knowers” who differ from ourselves.341   If we are correct in our judgments, then 
we validate the notion of objectivity, for it is composed of the set of judgments that 
correctly affirm objects and subjects. 
Lonergan notes three aspects of objectivity.  First, the experiential aspect which is 
“proper to sense and empirical consciousness”; next the normative aspect which arises 
out of tension between the desire to know and subjective desires and inclinations; and 
third the absolute aspect which is “contained in single judgments.”342  If a judgment 
affirms some intelligibility to be consistent with an experience, then the reality must have 
components corresponding to experiencing, understanding, and judging.  
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Lonergan points out that people frequently jump to the conclusion that our 
knowledge of objects is evident through the obvious experiential aspect of knowing.343  It 
is not unusual for persons to utter a statement such as ‘I know X is real because I can feel 
it, touch it, hold it in the palm of my hand, etc.’ This however is a mistaken conclusion, 
for the correct affirmation of objectivity requires more than mere experience.  Human 
knowing is complex, as is the notion of objectivity.  Experiencing, understanding and acts 
of judgment must coalesce into a “pattern of judgments … [for] prior to judgment one 
can think of being, but one cannot know it; and any single judgment is but a minute 
increment in the process toward knowing it.”344 In order to reach the affirmation of 
objectivity, this pattern of judgments is dependent upon a very particular act of 
affirmation.  Lonergan argues that the complete notion of objectivity addresses the 
problem of transcendence, also referred to as the problem of solipsism.345  He states 
On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or 
think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes 
the correct affirmation, I am.  Further, we contend that other judgments are 
equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and 
reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being 
other than the knower.  Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a 
known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive 
differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and 
subject.346 
 
Thus, Lonergan asserts that insofar as we engage in the act of reaching and affirming this 
complex pattern of judgments about the existence of distinct beings, we both affirm 
objectivity and create transcendence. 
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V.  Metaphysical Terms:  Potency, Form, and Act 
 
  While Lonergan relies on the traditional metaphysical vocabulary of potency, 
form, and act, he reinterprets these terms.  For Lonergan, potency “denotes the 
component of proportionate being to be known in fully explanatory knowledge by an 
intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue.”347  The intellectual 
patterning of empirical residue requires an attentiveness to diversity and multiplicity, 
such as when the knowing subject wonders ‘Why is there so much of all this?’, whether a 
particular concrete ‘this’, or ‘thisness’ generally.  The experience of potency is of a 
complete radical openness to experiencing everything about everything.  Potency is 
experience transformed by wonder, with intellectual curiosity patterning the sum of 
human experience.  The knowing subject experiences wonder as the often-uncomfortable 
tension of the desire to know, to such an extent that Lonergan describes the human 
subject as a “concrete unity in tension.”348  Potency describes both radical intelligible 
possibility, and a radically open diversity that reflects the difference and multiplicity 
which constitute the universe of being.  Ultimately, potency reflects the experiencing of 
multiplicity as potentiality.     
Form, on the other hand, reflects an understanding not of limitless multiplicity, 
but of limited possibility.  As we move from potency to form, wonder gives way to 
understanding.  Form determines; Lonergan claims that form “denotes the component of 
proportionate being to be known not by understanding the names of things, nor by 
understanding their relations to us, but by understanding them fully in their relations to 
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one another.”349  So while potency corresponds to the way in which we experience the 
vastness of the universe, form corresponds to our ability to understand things primarily in 
terms of relatedness.  Still, understanding and the formulation of a definition of 
relatedness do not guarantee that we have accurately determined the actual relations that 
we are seeking.  Insight, the act of the intellect that produces the content of the 
understanding expressed in form, narrows the field by placing conditions on the object of 
inquiry. By itself, however, insight cannot confirm with certitude that its conclusions are 
correct.   
With that affirmation of accuracy, one enters the realm of act.  Act “denotes the 
component of proportionate being to be known by uttering the virtually unconditioned 
‘Yes’ of reasonable judgment.”350  Act is related to form, for judgment refers always to 
the content of some insight, which in turn relates to our experience of the world 
expressed in potency.  It is reflective insight paired with judgment that enables us to 
claim with certainty that we have understood correctly and truly.  Reflective 
understanding enables us to “utter the virtually unconditioned ‘Yes’ of reasonable 
judgment.”351  This is the ultimate outcome of the cognitional process, in which inquiry 
transforms experience into correct understanding. 
Thus, for Lonergan, potency, form and act constitute a unity that is reflected in 
the cognitional process itself.  Before we can arrive at an affirmative judgment we must 
first have some experience of what is to be known, we must inquire into and develop a 
                                                 




(potentially flawed) understanding of its nature.  Gradually overcoming these flaws in 
understanding, one moves toward a virtually unconditioned judgment of the corrected 
understanding of experience. Potency, form, and act constitute a single known; they 
reflect the three separate levels of cognitional activity that are unified as a single 
knowing, that comes to fruition in the knower’s affirmation of the unconditioned.    As 
such, potency, form, and act are “three components of a single proportionate being.”352  
The understanding that is reached in affirming a judgment is a singular definition or 
specification shared by potency, form, and act. 
Lonergan quickly differentiates the general account of potency, form and act into 
two general classes:  conjugate potency, form, and act, and central potency, form, and act.  
Conjugate potency, form, and act have to do with intelligible relationality.  Conjugates 
are terms defined implicitly by their empirically verified and explanatory relations.  
These terms are conjugate forms that are verified in the empirical residue of experience, 
and constitute unities with conjugate potencies and acts.  Conjugate potency refers to the 
facts of spatio-temporal relatedness that exist as aspects of the empirical residue, while 
conjugate act refers to the ‘occurrence’ of facts that effect the relations between data.353  
Conjugate forms detail similarity and yield explanatory power by explaining how data is 
related to other data.   
Conjugate forms differ from another kind of form that pertains to the intelligible 
unity of data as individual.  Lonergan names this ‘central form’, in which the knower 
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grasps the “intelligible unity, identity, whole” of concrete, individual data.354  Like 
conjugate form, central form also constitutes a unity with central potency and central act. 
Central potency refers to the “individuality of the empirical residue,” while central act 
refers to the “existence” of the intelligible unity.355    
 
VI.  Metaphysics and Development 
While emergent finality is a general metaphysical feature of the entire universe, 
certain beings within the universe exhibit an even more structured kind of finality that 
Lonergan calls “development.”  He defines development generally as “the linked 
sequence of dynamic higher integrations.”356  More specifically, development is “a 
flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations 
that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through 
successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.”357  The 
course of development is capable of both major and minor flexibility.  Minor flexibility 
suggests that development “can pursue the same ultimate goal along different routes.”358  
Major flexibility “consists in a shift or modification of the ultimate objective.  In biology 
… adaptation, in depth psychology … sublimation, in cognitional activity … the manner 
in which inquirers, often enough, begin from one problem only to find themselves by the 
logic of issues forced to engage in the solution of another.”359  
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Emergence, along with correspondence and finality, are for Lonergan the basic 
principles of development.  Correspondence means that “significantly different 
underlying manifolds require different higher integrations.”360  For example, the human 
patterns of hearing and sight are the resulting higher integrations of differing neural 
structures and events in the eye and ear.  Higher integrations of lower, differing 
coincidental manifolds take different forms, both static and dynamic.  An integration is 
static when it  “dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings 
about a noticeable imperviousness to change.”361  The result of a static integration is 
stability.  For example, a highly stable chemical element such as neon is the highly stable 
integration of electron motions which resists forming bonds to create additional chemical 
compounds.  Conversely, a dynamic integration is “not content to systematize the 
underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until by the principle of 
correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, 
a new integration is introduced.”362  For example, during the pupa stage, a caterpillar so 
drastically alters its own chemical composition that the body of a moth is needed to 
reintegrate it.363  Both emergence and correspondence are related to the notion of finality, 
in which “The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed 
dynamism toward ever fuller realization of being.”364 
Biology, psychology and cognitional theory study three types of development:  
Organic development, psychic development and intellectual development.  Biologically, 
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in the organic event of cell division, we can distinguish between reproduction and 
growth; reproduction is a “multiplication of life” while growth is an instance of 
development.  Describing this development, Lonergan claims that “Higher integration is 
on the move, for growth is not merely an increase in bulk, but also an increase in 
differentiation.”365 
Whereas organic development applies to organisms generally, psychic 
development is limited to animal organisms.  Unlike lower organisms,  “the animal in its 
development has to include the genesis and patterned distribution of neural tissues … 
neural differentiation and structure provide a material basis for a sequence of increasingly 
complex forms of sensitive consciousness.”366   According to Lonergan, there are two 
types of psychic development, differentiation and integration.  He claims that 
The multiplication of particularized nerve endings grounds a possibility of 
increasingly differentiated sensible impressions and sensitively guided 
components of movement.  The mounting hierarchy of nerve centres grounds the 
possibility of ever more notable integrations of impressions and ever more 
diversified co-ordinations of response.367   
 
The most complex realization of this development occurs in the human animal, which has 
the capacity to attain “a richly diverse and highly integrated sensitive consciousness.”368 
Differentiation may be more highly developed in an animal,369 but a human being has a 
far greater power of integration.   
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“Neural development,” Lonergan claims, “merely supplies the underlying 
manifold for psychic development.”370  Psychic development is conditioned by neural 
development, “but it consists neither in neural tissues nor in neural configurations nor in 
neural events but in a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of 
capacities for perceptiveness, aggression or affective response, for memory … 
imaginative projects, and for skillfully and economically executed performance.”371  This 
does not always function perfectly.  Lonergan offers the illustration of a person who 
suffers from multiple personalities as an example of abnormal integration.  He claims that 
“the higher integration of sensitive consciousness can so interact with its neural basis as 
to generate different and incompatible integrations.”372  
Perhaps the best example of the notion of development is intellectual 
development.  Human intelligence develops through a cognitional process in which we 
grasp images, and are pressed, through the tension of inquiry, to integrate them 
intelligibly through the act of insight.  In turn, our desire to know moves us toward 
further questions.  As a result, we discover and investigate further data and reach further 
insights.  This process is in effect for all fields of human knowledge and understanding, 
from commonsense endeavors to mathematics, science and philosophy.373  In all of these, 
as well as all other fields, “development is a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and 
increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively 
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transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of 
correspondence and emergence.”374 
  Generally speaking, the universe emerges through schemes that are flexible, but 
which are directed or oriented by finality.  In emergent probability, schemes emerge 
randomly, providing the foundation for development.  Lonergan notes that “It is emergent 
probability that provides the compound conditioned series of things and of schemes of 
recurrence such that the developing organism or psyche or intelligence will have an 
environment in which it can function successfully.”375  Unlike the random emergence of 
schemes, in development the integrator/operator emerges developmentally, purposefully.  
Like the phoenix bird, it undermines its own existence in order for the next level to 
emerge.  This occurs at all levels of development, including the organic, psychic and 
intellectual.   
 
VII.  Concrete Instances of Development:  Organic, Psychic, and Intellectual 
 
 Lonergan’s discussion of the metaphysics of human development provides the 
crucial link for engaging with feminist writers.  But according to Lonergan, human 
beings develop simultaneously on at least three levels.  Therefore, in order to bring 
Lonergan’s work into dialogue with the feminist concerns dealt with here, we need to 
consider these lines of development, beginning with the organic.   
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Organic Development 
The study of organic development begins with the experience of and inquiry into 
thing-for-us:  the organism.  That study begins with the anatomy of the organism, a “… 
descriptive differentiation of different parts.”376  Anatomy leads to physiology, by which 
we are able to “relate the described parts to organic events, occurrences, operations.  By 
these insights the parts become known as organs.”377  In order to connect anatomy and 
physiology we must “relate the capacity-for-performance of each part to the capacities for 
performance of the other parts.”378  We must move forward from the thing-for-us based 
upon insights that grasp parts as described. For example, the bones in the inner ear are 
described metaphorically as the ‘anvil’ and the ‘stirrup,’ because they share a perceived 
likeness to these objects.  We move toward the thing-in-itself, by which Lonergan means 
parts in their relationships to other things - toward “insights that grasp described parts as 
organs.”379  In making this move, we drop the use of metaphor, because metaphors now 
distract us from understanding “insights that grasp conjugate forms systematizing 
otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical and physical processes.”380 
Organisms function within flexible circles of schemes of recurrence based upon 
physiological laws that account for the regularities that exist within the higher organic 
system, regularities beyond the explanatory range of physical and chemical laws.  These 
schemes must not contradict the related set of capacities for performance of the organic 
parts/organs.  For example, on the organic level, when a cell poisons itself it cannot 
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sustain its own operation, and cannot survive.  If the related set of capacities for 
performance of the organic part is not to be contradicted, the cell ought not poison itself 
with toxins.  Similarly the psyche ought not do so to its underlying nerve cells, and the 
mind ought not do so to its own psyche. 
The transposition of anatomy and physiology to the thing in itself reveals an 
underlying manifold of cells, chemical processes, and physical changes as components in 
what Lonergan describes as the “organism as higher system” as integrator.381  He makes 
it clear that the organism as higher system is to be understood as the historically 
interrelated set of conjugate forms.  First, the knower studying the physiology of the 
organism would grasp a set of functions (conjugate forms) interrelating to the organs of 
the organism.  Next this set of conjugate forms as higher system/integrator also is related 
to the “physical, chemical, and cytological manifold.”382  In other words, these conjugate 
forms are related to one another, but also emergent in organic parts through which the 
relations that make up the organism can be reconstructed.  The conjugate forms that make 
up the higher system (the organism) create regular, predictable occurrences in an 
underlying manifold, the parts of which are otherwise related only coincidentally.  And 
lastly, the organism as higher system serves as “… the ground of the flexible circle of 
ranges of schemes of recurrence,” through participating in activities within its 
environment.383   
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The higher system, at any stage of development, is therefore an integrator.  Higher 
system serves as an integrator, for example, through the simultaneous interlocking of 
parts, such as in the skeletal system, or at the cellular level through homeostasis, which 
maintains a state of organized functioning.  The data of the integrator, as well as the 
procedure for studying it, is very complex.  This procedure includes collecting data on the 
integrator by studying its parts, identifying the functions of those parts, identifying how 
these functions interrelate and thereby grasp the “flexible circle of ranges of schemes of 
recurrence” that arises from them, and identifying the “underlying physical and chemical 
manifolds”384 that apply to the organism as integrator.  This means that we must first 
attend to the data on the integrator and second try to understand the data.   
But the higher system is also an operator. That is, “it so integrates that underlying 
manifold as to call forth, by the principles of correspondence and emergence, its own 
replacement by a more specific and effective integrator.”385  While the higher system as 
integrator expresses the maintenance of living processes, the function of the operator is 
modification.  The data on the operator are data on different modes of integration within 
the organism at different stages of development.  The relevant heuristic structure is 
“specify the operator.”386  This means gaining insights into how the higher system as 
operator effects transitions within the organism from one stage to the next.  This is 
important information to collect because, generally, development means “higher system 
on the move,” and the higher system is the “ground of the flexible circles of schemes of 
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recurrence in which the organism functions.”387  Because the operator effects the 
emergence of higher-level, modified schemes of recurrence within the organism, the 
higher system as operator is a highly specialized form of finality, the “upwardly directed 
dynamism of proportionate being.”388  This dynamism, however, is still conditioned by 
instability, incompleteness, and imperfection.  
 
Psychic and Intellectual Development 
 
Nearly the same heuristic structure that applies to organic development also 
applies to psychic and intellectual development, although with certain nuances.  In the 
animal, there exists organic and psychic development.  However, in the human animal 
intellectual development occurs as well.  In the organism, the underlying manifold and 
the higher system are unconscious, while in human intellectual development, both the 
underlying manifold of sensible presentations and the higher system of insights and 
formulations are conscious.  In psychic development, the underlying neural manifold is 
unconscious but the supervening higher system is conscious.  Intellectual development is 
cognitional, while psychic development “consists in the events and processes of the 
nervous system.”389 
 Psychic development moves both laterally and vertically.  The lateral movement 
“is an increasing differentiation of the psychic events in correspondence with particular 
afferent and efferent nerves.”390  This movement is conditioned by the developing 
physiology of the nervous system.  The vertical movement consists of “… an increasing 
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proficiency in integrated perception and in appropriate and coordinate response.”391  
While the lateral movement is limited by the physical makeup of the nerves, vertical 
movement is limited by the way that nerve endings combine to make different operations 
possible, and the interaction of the nerves with “higher neural centers” which can 
coordinate the working of diverse neural pathways.392  
 At a basic level, the conjugate potency for the development of human 
neurophysiological operation is as follows:  first, at the level of potency the nervous 
system fires synapses, which is a physiological response.  Next, at the level of form, 
selection occurs.  This begins the process of integration, or the first level of 
consciousness – being attentive.  Lastly, conjugate act occurs at level of the psychic 
operator.   
Of course at some level, human behavior is also animal behavior.  In the behavior 
of animals in any stage of development, there exists a flexible circle of ranges of schemes 
of recurrence.  Implicit within these are psychological correlations of classical type, and 
implicit within these would be conjugate forms that are responsible for our habits of 
perception and response, such as aggression and affectivity.  These conjugate forms seem 
to emerge in our neural configurations.393  The difference, however, between the animal 
and the human is the plasticity in the way that human neurophysiology can be organized.  
For example, if we compare a baby raccoon with a baby human, we must note that a baby 





raccoon will never learn to perform a perfect plié, because animals are hardwired for a 
certain psychic integration.   
For intelligence, “conceptual construction is the formulated higher system as 
integrator,” whereas the emergence of the further question serves as operator.394  
Intellectual development differs from organic and psychic development in interesting 
ways.  First, unlike the previous two forms of development, intellectual development is 
almost completely free from limitation.  This results from the fact that intelligence 
endeavors to integrate not only the knower, but also the entire universe about which the 
knower asks questions.  In addition, unlike the organism or psyche, both of which aim at 
pragmatic goals of survival or success, intelligence is largely liberated from such 
concerns.  Intelligence aims at grasping the unconditioned intelligibility of everything 
about everything. 
The psyches and intelligences of humans can be attentive in much more flexible 
ways than can those of animals.  It is through this flexibility that we can talk about 
humans “constructing” their bodies and their environments.  This does not mean some 
sort of unlimited, infinite flexibility, for it is possible to have incoherent and unintelligent 
responses to one’s body or environment.  It is perhaps on this account that Lonergan 
could be described as, in a way, “essentialist” insofar as he wants to affirm that we can 
make distinctions between an intelligent and unintelligent response to experience.  Yet he 
does not want to deny that this response is also constructive.  However, judgments about 
what is a coherent or intelligent response must always take into account the particular, 
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concrete situation of the person involved.  It would be incoherent for philosophers to 
make blanket statements about what one ought to do without failing to embrace the most 
basic of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts, to ‘be attentive’.   
It is also important to remember that the ordering of the nervous system occurs 
within a social drama of meaning. As Lonergan remarks, the “The first condition of 
drama is the possibility of acting it out, of the subordination of neural process to psychic 
determination.”395 This occurs in multiple ways.  Conative, sensitive and emotive 
elements direct and release our bodily movement. However our bodies are initially 
detached from these influences and originally are plastic and indeterminate.  Our 
development (of language for example) involves “endlessly complex correlations … 
between the psychic and the neural.”  As we develop, the correlations become “automatic 
and spontaneous.”396  The psychic exerts control over the neural, but neural patterns and 
processes also demand “psychic representation and conscious integration.”397  Lonergan 
does not discuss this fully, but concludes that “memory and imagination, conation and 
emotion, pleasure and pain all have their counterparts in corresponding neural processes 
and originate from their specific demands.”398   
These demands are conditioned, however, by our concrete situation, including the 
conditions of our physiology as well as our patterns of experience.  At the conscious, 
psychic, experiential level, the dramatic pattern selects its own arrangements.  This 
selection at the level of the dramatic, or even aesthetic, occurs among a vast field of 
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potentialities for the shaping of human life and experience.  Playing on the dramatic 
metaphor, Lonergan writes that “All the world’s a stage and not only does each in his 
own time play many parts but also the many parts vary with changes of locality, period, 
and social milieu.”399   All of these factors, among others, shape the conditions which 
effect the concrete situation encountered by the dramatic subject.  These complex and 
diverse factors must be brought into balance with the demands of neural patterns and 




In each human being, organic, psychic and intellectual development are 
interlocking processes.  Each level is governed by its own laws, schemes of recurrence 
and conjugate forms.  Each form “stands in emergent correspondence to otherwise 
coincidental manifolds on the lower levels.”400  As a result, human actions are 
complicated, and can involve a multiplicity of components which must be in accord with 
the laws and schemes that are appropriate to govern them.  The problem that arises in 
formulating human development in metaphysical terms is that “higher correlations 
pertain to systems on the move.”401  The challenge for the philosopher is to formulate the 
heuristic categories that pertain to human development, with its “triply compounded” on-
the-move structure.   
Lonergan claims that the individual human being is, at any stage of development,  
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an individual, existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, 
and intellectual conjugates.  The organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugate forms 
ground respective flexible circles of schemes of recurrence that are revealed in the 
man’s spontaneous and effective behavior, in his bodily movements, in his dealings 
with persons and things, in the content of his speech and writing.402  
  
As the human being engages in different types (genera) of activity, the patterns of 
experience emerge, some of which are mutually exclusive, for example the practical 
pattern and the mystical pattern.  This emergence and refinement of patterning is part of 
the process of developing.  In this process, “The flexible circles of schemes of recurrence 
shift and expand” as we move into successively higher levels of functioning and 
integration.403  This occurs, in part, because each concrete pattern of experience that is at 
work in a person’s life serves as an integrator, to maintain the organized functioning of 
that life.  This function does not occur spontaneously.  Rather it comes about as a set of 
conjugate psychic forms that emerge as the result of a long process of development.  For 
example, Lonergan notes that in the dramatic pattern, we elevate the merely biological 
functions, such as eating, to the level of the social.  An infant struggles simply to master 
the physical task necessary to move food from hand to mouth, but fully functioning 
adults deftly use complicated utensils within a socially determined realm of meaning, 
whether it be the multiple forks, knives and spoons set on an elegant Western table, or the 
delicate chopsticks of the East.   
In addition to patterns of experience, the “law of effect” comes into play here, 
which signifies that “development occurs along the directions in which it succeeds.”404   
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One who displays no talent for music will not audition for the orchestra, while the 
mathematical prodigy who struggles with poetry will likely pursue studies of 
computation more so than literature.  Significant here is also the “anticipated law of 
effect”, which reveals that human development is pushed forward through our 
engagement with the world.  We ask questions and spur new insights, we desire new 
insights so we participate in further investigation.   
 At issue in human development is what Lonergan calls the “law of integration,” 
which highlights the tension between the initiation of development versus integration.405  
Development is initiated in various ways at various levels.  At the level of the organic 
“the organism is an upwardly directed dynamism, seeking to be more fully, evoking its 
higher integration by calling forth psychic images and feelings” (471).  At the psychic 
level we discover human sensitivity, a calling forth of value and intersubjectivity, which 
is of itself developing.  At the intellectual level, wrestling with a puzzling intellectual 
problem, or the recognition that another will opposes my own, can also serve as initiators 
of development.   
Conversely, repression serves as a subversion of development.  Because the 
human being is a unity, proper human development only occurs when “a new scheme of 
recurrence is established in his outward behaviour [sic], in his thinking and willing, in his 
perceptiveness and feeling, in the organic and neural basis of his action.”406  The mere 
establishment of such a scheme of recurrence is not sufficient for development.  Rather 
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“complementary adjustments and advances” must be put into effect and pushed forward 
by the direction of the process of development.407 
The “law of limitation and transcendence” highlights that fact that there is a 
“tension inherent in the finality of all proportionate being [which] becomes in man a 
conscious tension.”408  Psychic and intellectual development is difficult in a being whose 
temptation is to embrace the comfort of the status quo, but whose potential is to be 
realized in change and movement.  Our greatest possibilities and highest integrations lie 
in intellectual integration and its dependent psychic integration.  Lonergan makes a very 
important observation in this connection:  “Nor are the pure desire and the sensitive 
psyche two things, one of them ‘I’ and the other ‘It’.  They are the unfolding on different 
levels of a single, individual unity, identity whole.  Both are I and neither is merely it.”409  
This issue of wholeness is often raised by feminist authors in their critiques of patriarchal 
systems and cultures.  Feminists, for example Simone de Beauvoir, argue that such 
systems make it difficult, if not impossible for women to reach wholeness, as a result of 
an association (real or symbolic) of maleness with universality.410  Women, particularly 
those who embrace cultural ideals of femininity, are often seen as living in tension as a 
result of being cut off from the universal realm of intelligence and rationality traditionally 
associated with masculinity. 
 Lonergan would agree with de Beauvoir insofar as prevailing cultural meanings 
do not offer meaningful resources to women for full organic, psychic and intellectual 
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integration.  The levels and manifestations of cultural limitation of women’s integration 
vary between cultures, but exist to some degree almost universally.411  Lonergan would 
further argue that the prevailing Western conceptions of intelligence, rationality, and 
therefore masculinity are limiting for all persons, insofar as these conceptions are 
impoverished in comparison to his own account of the unrestricted dynamics of human 
knowing.  For this very reason, he would also argue that men, no less than women, must 
live in the tension of the “law of genuineness” – the tension of constantly taking 
responsibility for one’s own integral, whole development.  And yet, the prevailing culture 
is more prone to obscure this tension for men, encouraging a type of masculinity that is 
oriented toward self-assurance and control of oneself and one’s environment.  
Unfortunately, in many cultures, women are too often treated as an object within man’s 
environment, which ultimately can lead to violence perpetrated by men against women 
(or other males who do not embrace such a standard of masculinity).  This ultimately 
leads to an ethical question, because some women live in cultures so repressive as to 
mean near certain death for a woman who attempts to take such a responsibility for 
herself.412 
Lonergan would claim that tension is experienced by all persons (although he 
might not dispute that women experience this tension in a different and heightened way 
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than many of their male counterparts).  His argument is that the experience of this tension 
within human beings leads to the law of genuineness.  In realizing that such tension exists 
with a human being, we are led to raise the question, can a self-conscious human being 
develop in a genuine way?  What might that mean?  Insofar as there is a tension in human 
consciousness, Lonergan claims that 
Genuineness is the admission of that tension into consciousness, and so it is the 
necessary condition of the harmonious co-operation of the conscious and unconscious 
components of development.  It does not brush questions aside, smother doubts, push 
problems down, escape to activity, to chatter, to passive entertainment, to sleep, to 
narcotics.  It confronts issues, inspects them, studies their many aspects, works out 
their various implications, contemplates their concrete consequences in one’s own life 
and in the lives of others.413 
 
Such genuineness is ideal and rare, as is the possession of true intelligence and wisdom.  
As the human being develops he or she moves away from the struggle for detachment 
from bias and scotosis, toward an “ever more intelligent, more wise, more self-reliant 
unfolding” of the pure desire to know the universe of being.414  The displacement of the 
tension between limitation and transcendence is “the root of the dialectical phenomenon 
of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical 
differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and 
religion, in educational theory and history.”415 
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VIII.  Metaphysics as Heuristic and Dialectical 
Lonergan’s metaphysics is grounded in the dynamic notion of being.  Among its 
basic metaphysical commitments are the intrinsic, dynamic finality of proportionate 
being.  His metaphysical account of human beings entails a complex, integrated, tripartite 
developmental process.  The central and repeated emphasis on dynamism present in 
Lonergan’s metaphysics, and its possible and likely distortions, requires a different kind 
of metaphysical method.  The traditional methods rooted in logic, conceptualism and the 
privileging of presence (the already out there now) cannot do justice to such dynamic 
realities.  Rather, the method of metaphysics has to be heuristic and dialectical – although 
Lonergan’s understanding of dialectical differs from his predecessors.   
 Lonergan’s method of metaphysics is heuristic.  Metaphysics is wide open and 
dynamic because it is rooted in wonder.  Equating the notion of wonder with the pure 
desire to know, Lonergan notes that, “Prior to the neatly formulated questions of 
systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their 
source and ground.”416  It is this wonder about the universe of being that distinguishes 
human knowers from animals, for animals are limited to the habitual routines of merely 
sensitive living. According to Lonergan, “What breaks that circuit [of merely sensitive 
living] and releases intellectual activity is the wonder Aristotle described as the beginning 
of all science and all philosophy.”417  Wonder is dynamic because being itself is dynamic.  
Being, however, is not made manifest to us in any immediate way.  Rather, our implicit 
desire to know and understand the universe of being is the particularly human horizon 
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that makes it possible for wonder to emerge and draw us toward the dynamic universe of 
being.   
For Lonergan, there is an isomorphism between knowing and being, between the 
operations of the human intellect and the nature of the universe itself.  Fundamentally, 
Lonergan understands the human intellect as dynamic, and as engaged with a dynamic 
universe that is not rigid or fixed, but always in motion.  Through the process of 
experiencing, understanding and judging that constitutes knowing for Lonergan, we seek 
out being.  As Joseph Flanagan notes in his commentary on Lonergan’s philosophy, “It is 
being that explains why all knowers are engaged in knowing … Being is the objective of 
knowing, and knowing proceeds as it does in order to judge being.  Knowing, then, is not 
outside being; rather the structure of knowing corresponds to, and is intrinsic to, the 
structure of being.”418 
Like classical scientific method, metaphysics, too, is heuristically structured, but 
its structure is not limited to classical insights about correlations.  This heuristic structure 
is what allows us to pursue the process of inquiring about something that we know 
nothing about. Lonergan elaborates on this idea, explaining that “A heuristic notion … is 
the notion of an unknown content,” for example, being.  Lonergan describes the structure 
as follows: “Name the unknown.  Work out its properties.  Use the properties to direct, 
order, guide the inquiry.”419 While the notion is unknown, we can anticipate the method 
or the “type of act through which the unknown would become known.”420  Method, 
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whether scientific or metaphysical, is concerned with the operations of the human mind 
which generate ideas and relate ideas together.   
 Unlike classical science, which aims at the understanding of correlation, the aim 
of metaphysics is an ordered set of heuristic notions that anticipates the whole of 
proportionate being - everything that could possibly be experienced, understood, and 
affirmed by human reason.  According to Lonergan, the practice of explicit metaphysics 
requires the implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. 
While “A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions … an integral heuristic 
structure is the ordered set of all heuristic notions,” or all that could possibly be known 
by human reason.421 
Lonergan’s method of metaphysics is also dialectical. Yet he takes pains to 
distinguish his method from that of Hegel, perhaps Western philosophy’s best-known 
dialectician.  Hegelian dialectic, according to Lonergan, is “conceptualist, closed, 
necessitarian, and immanental” while in contrast, Lonergan’s own position is 
“intellectualist, open, factual and normative.  It deals not with determinate conceptual 
contents but with heuristically defined anticipations.”422   Lonergan must be careful to 
distinguish himself from Hegel, for he admits that his work holds strong parallels with 
Hegel’s own.  However Lonergan argues that Hegel’s deepest error was his failure to 
recognize the role of judgment in reaching an understanding of the virtually 
unconditioned.  Lonergan notes that while Hegel “effectively acknowledged a pure desire 
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with an unrestricted objective,”423 nevertheless he was following Kant, and neither 
thinker recognized the constitutive component of judgment that allows the knower to 
affirm (or deny) the virtually unconditioned. 
As a result, Hegel is unable to affirm a concrete, factual, actually existing 
universe of the virtually unconditioned.  Instead he is limited to a “universe of all-
inclusive concreteness that is devoid” of the virtually unconditioned.  It is this universe 
that Hegel names the “Absolute Idea.”424  This notion of the Absolute Idea shapes 
Hegel’s understanding of dialectic as an immanent process that moves “from position 
through opposition to sublation that yields a new position to recommence the triadic 
process until the Absolute Idea is reached.”425   
Stripped of its intention toward a universe of existents, the pure desire is reduced 
by Hegel to something which “underpins and penetrates all conceptual contents” as 
opposed to, for Lonergan, that dynamic orientation which draws us out of ourselves 
toward the universe of being.426  In the Hegelian system, the pure desire “becomes 
indistinguishable from the notion of nothing.”427  Lonergan claims of Hegel that “His 
viewpoint is essentially the viewpoint of a thinker who does not and cannot regard the 
factual as unconditioned, who cannot acknowledge any factually fixed points of 
reference, who cannot advance by distinguishing the definitively certain, the more or less 
probable, and the unknown.  Hegel’s range of vision is enormous; indeed it is unrestricted 
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in extent.  But it is always restricted in content, for it views everything as if there were no 
facts.”428 
Ultimately, Hegel’s system (which on the surface seems impenetrable insofar as it 
explains away any contradictions/contradictory claims as arising from some incomplete 
viewpoint already included within the system) turns out to be a merely restricted 
viewpoint.  According to Lonergan, this Hegelian approach cripples human rational 
consciousness by failing to properly account for the role of judgment in affirming the 
virtually unconditioned.  Lonergan also complains that Hegelian dialectic is purely 
positive, with its view of a system that is ever progressing toward the Absolute Idea.  
Lonergan, however, is post-Hegelian, and indeed post-modernist in his respect for the 
social surd, which he later calls the problem of evil, a problem that cannot be swept away 
in the abstract progress of history.   
For Lonergan, the dialectical method of metaphysics is a factor in multiple ways 
within the individual and the community.  First, we can distinguish between dialectical 
processes and dialectical method.  For Lonergan, dialectical method is important in order 
to come to terms with the special and complex problems that characterize dialectical 
processes.  In his discussion of generalized empirical method, which draws its data from 
consciousness itself, Lonergan notes that “Generalized method has to be able to deal … 
not only with the data within a single consciousness but also with the relations between 
different conscious subjects, between conscious subjects and their milieu or environment, 
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and between consciousness and its neural basis.”429  Dialectic, then, is the foundation or 
operator of generalized empirical method, the method Lonergan employs to come to 
understand the events that occur within consciousness.   
Dialectical method involves the “unfolding of positions inviting development and 
counter-positions inviting reversal.”430  Positions and counter-positions are held by the 
individual at many levels, from the common-sensical to the philosophical.   All persons 
hold some general position (or counter-position) about knowing, reality, objectivity, or 
the good – we could call this the philosophical dialectic.   In addition, each person holds a 
position or counter-position about their own existence, for example our self-image, self-
concept, self-understanding – we could call this the dialectic of the dramatic persona.   
The process of dialectic is a manifestation of tension within the individual.  This 
tension arises when irrationality is introduced into the cognitional process.  Dialectic can 
be described as rational progression in tension with irrational regression and decline.  
Generally speaking, dialectic “is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of 
change.  Thus there will be a dialectic, if 
1.  there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character 
2.  the events may be traced to either or both of two principles 
3.  the principles are opposed yet bound together, and 
4.  they are modified by the changes that successively result from them.”431 
 
Lonergan specifically discusses the dialectic of the dramatic subject, which he says is 
“concerned with the entry of neural demands into consciousness.”432  The tension which 
sparks this dialectic of the dramatic subject (or persona) is dramatic bias.  While this 
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discussion might sound technical and abstract, Lonergan’s concrete point is that this 
dialectic, this dramatic tension within the subject, shapes who we are as individuals.   
This individual dialectic follows the fourfold steps described above, with a few 
specifications.  First, the aggregate of events that leads to the dialectic of the dramatic 
subject consists of contents and affects that emerge into consciousness.  These contents 
and affects originate from the neural demand functions, as well as the exercise of 
censorship, in either a constructive or repressive fashion.   These two principles, the 
neural demand functions and the censor, “are linked as patterned and patterning; they are 
opposed inasmuch as a misguided censorship results in neglected neural demands forcing 
their way into consciousness.”433  The changes that occur within the dramatic persona 
based on this dialectical tension are cumulative and concrete.  Overall, we can surmise 
from Lonergan’s account that the basic tension for the individual is between openly 
asking and answering questions for reflection, as opposed to vigorously avoiding these 
questions. 
The philosophical dialectic and the dialectic of the dramatic persona intersect, and 
this intersection affects the individual and his or her community.  Within the group, we 
find spontaneous subjectivity in tension with intelligent social order, within a community 
of knowing subjects.  According to Lonergan, the dialectic of community “regards the 
history of human relationships” and “is concerned with the interplay of more or less 
conscious intelligence and more or less conscious spontaneity in an aggregate of 
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individuals.”434  This dialectic is mainly concerned with an aggregate of social events, 
arising from the principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense.  
These principles are linked because “the spontaneous, intersubjective individual strives to 
understand and wants to behave intelligently; and inversely, intelligence would have 
nothing to put in order were there not the desires and fears, labors and satisfactions of 
individuals.”435  The opposition of these linked principles is responsible for the tension of 
community.  Common sense develops as we learn from the mistakes and successes of 
those who come before us; intelligence develops and we adapt our living to meet its 
demands.  Yet our adaptations (both on the individual and communal level) are not 
always successful, and so we attempt to maintain a balance between social tranquility and 
social crisis.  
The reality of dialectic for Lonergan means that humans develop, or fail to do so, 
both individually and as a community; ideas and understandings change, positions push 
us forward, counter-positions move us back.   Lonergan notes  
one might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of 
individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual 
dialectics.  In this relationship, the dialectic of community holds the dominant 
position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it 
moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the 
censorship.”436  
 
Dialectic is a manifestation of interfered with and distorted development.  Dialectical 
process can be described as rational progression in tension with irrational regression and 
                                                 
434 Ibid., 218. 
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436 Ibid., 218.  My emphasis. 
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decline.  Dialectic then “is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of 
change.”437 
Lonergan’s attention to the social surd, the unintelligible bias that is immanent 
within and concretely constitutive of the facts of a given social situation, manifests a 
concern with what he names the “distorted dialectic of community”438 which is a 
manifestation of the decline or reversal of emergent probability within human living.  
Feminists would certainly contend that the oppression and victimization of women 
through centuries of patriarchy is a vivid example of the social surd.  Speaking of 
Lonergan’s analysis of social bias and decline, William Loewe notes 
Lonergan identifies one dynamic that he finds especially pernicious.  Egoism and 
the self-interest of groups can pervert praxis, giving rise to a situation that 
embodies not intelligence and responsibility but their opposite.  Such a distorted 
situation in turn calls for pseudo-theory, theory that draws its plausibility from the 
facts of the situation to which it corresponds and that, rather than criticizing that 
situation, accepts its distortions as a given, as simply the way things are.  Theory 
of this sort renders distortion normative.439 
 
It is this question about normativity that motivates the debate over the relationship 
between sex and gender.  Feminists contest the long-held view that traditional gender 
stereotypes of masculinity and femininity are normative expressions of sexual biology.  
While Lonergan does not comment directly on this question, in the following chapter we 
will attempt to bring his position into dialogue with feminist critics, creating a dialectical 
encounter of sorts, to attempt to shed light on this question. 
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Chapter Five: 
An Exercise in Dialectic 
I.  Introduction 
This project elaborates a metaphysics of the relationship between sex and gender.  
To that end, Chapter Two aims to briefly sketch out the approaches undertaken by four 
feminist theorists in their attempts to address this topic.  My own work follows a path 
distinct from these theorists, in its attempt to elucidate a metaphysical position that works 
in concert with these feminist analyses, rather than clashing with their philosophical 
approaches which consider seriously the relation between sex and gender.  This chapter 
will demonstrate an exercise in dialectic, bringing into dialogue the work of Irigaray, 
Grosz, Gatens, and Butler with my own attempt to give voice to a coherent metaphysics 
of sex and gender. 
Irigaray, et. al. would certainly agree that the category of gender has become of 
utmost significance to feminist analysis, even while they use different means to 
problematize the relation between sex, gender, and metaphysics.  A great deal of feminist 
work is focused on the worthwhile project of creating social and political conditions 
which are ripe to embrace a discourse of equality; among other important concerns, 
feminists seek for all women equal opportunity for education, equal pay for equal work, 
and equal treatment under the law.  The point of returning feminism to a metaphysical 
discourse, though, is to deepen our approaches to these concerns.  Tina Chanter, for 
example, asks “is ‘equality’ among men and women a worthwhile goal or does it restrict 
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feminism within a liberalism born out of patriarchal system?”440  A metaphysics of sex 
and gender points us beyond the discourse of equality, to examine fundamentally the 
philosophical underpinnings that foster the system of inequality. 
 
II. A. Luce Irigaray and Desire 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, Irigaray considers sexual difference to be 
ontologically fundamental.  She posits a critique of the Western concept of desire, 
claiming that it arises out of masculine morphology, and is the ground of Western 
philosophy and metaphysics.  She associates this Western thinking with a desire for 
completeness, and/or closure, which leads to the problem of solipsism.  She argues that 
this desire is related to the Western metaphysical understanding of the relationship 
between God and being, insofar as the aim of masculine philosophy is to reach a ‘God’s 
eye view’, replicated in the “immediacy of the noesis.”441  
In opposition to this masculine desire, Irigaray posits a notion of feminine desire.  
She claims that woman’s desire is fluid, constantly in motion, and stems from the 
morphology of the female body.  This desire is related to what she calls the ‘feminine 
imaginary’; she describes fluid, amorphous symbols that evoke the feminine imaginary 
which, she argues, has been eliminated from Western metaphysical language.   
Irigaray’s philosophical approach is inspired by Heidegger’s project in Being and 
Time.  For Heidegger, the question of Being was the question of the age.  Heidegger is 
concerned with the way in which the Western philosophical tradition, from Aristotle on, 
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covers over the question of the meaning of Being.  In a similar fashion, Irigaray suggests 
that the question of sexual difference has supplanted the question of Being as the central 
philosophical concern of the contemporary age.  Historically, the rise of organized 
feminism and the development of feminist theory brings a concreteness to the question of 
sexual difference.  Centuries of male philosophers did not raise the question of sexual 
difference because their maleness was not an issue for them.  The situation of women 
leads to our questioning of sexual difference – our sex, our femaleness, our non-
maleness, is an issue for us.  Generally speaking, feminist concerns are motivated by the 
concrete, historical, social situation.   
From a Lonerganian point of view it is plausible that rather than the question of 
sexual difference, the question of ‘pure question’ is the question of our age.  As 
elaborated in Chapter One, Lonergan’s notion of pure question is always manifest in a 
particular person under particular social, historical, and material conditions.  According 
to Lonergan, pure question is the experience of a deep and abiding openness and 
receptivity, shared by all humans, which is the manifestation of unrestricted desire.  
While pure question is associated by Lonergan with a pure desire to know, the sort of 
desire that arises out of an orientation towards pure question is not simply focused on 
knowing.  Rather, pure question is manifest as an originary willingness and desire to 
become whole, to live in a way that is integrated rather than fragmented by bias and 
ignorance.  An attentiveness to sexual difference would certainly be an important part of 
living in such an integrated manner. 
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Irigaray, however, is very critical of the notion of desire as manifest within the 
Western philosophical tradition.  She claims that the notion of desire is biased from a 
masculine point of view.  According to Irigaray, the male experience of desire is tellic.  
That is to say, the male desire seeks a telos, it seeks completeness, fulfillment - an 
ordered universe in which everything is categorized and put into its place.  Hence this 
experience of desire is the ground of masculine philosophy.  She proposes a new 
economy of desire based on generosity, which would destroy the notion of desire as 
tellic. 
A Lonerganian response would be that Irigaray’s account describes the 
phenomena of bias imposed on experience.  According to Lonergan, the pure desire to 
know is resisted because giving oneself over to the demands of intelligence can be very 
uncomfortable.  Resisting the comfortable status quo created by one’s own biases is the 
challenge of genuineness.  It is important here to emphasize that this notion of 
genuineness arises out of Lonergan’s metaphysics.  As such, it does not suggest some 
kind of static approach to ‘being who one is.’  Rather, to be genuine means to be open 
and responsive to the demands of pure desire.  According to Lonergan, you could say that 
genuine, originary desire (male as well as female) seeks completeness, but not as Irigaray 
describes.  Rather, as an ongoing incompleteness in an emergently probable universe in 
which things are unstable, the unrestricted desire to know has the character of fluidity.  
More specifically, the unrestricted desire to know is isomorphic with the constantly 
emerging incompleteness of the universe.  The universe emerges in a probable way, not 
in a manner which is certain or determined, and so the universe itself has the character of 
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fluid and dynamic emergence.  Pure desire respects this dynamism and is in opposition to 
the kind of tellic desire that Irigaray so rightly condemns. 
 
II. B.  Metaphysics and Solipsism 
   
Irigaray holds that the Western metaphysical tradition is plagued by solipsism, 
and solipsism is reflective of the 'logocentric' order of Western metaphysics.  Following 
Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence (that is, a metaphysical system which 
posits presence as the central form of Being442) Irigaray associates the privileging of 
presence or consciousness with the masculine character of Western philosophy.   
 Lonergan shares Irigaray’s concern with the privileging of presence in the 
Western tradition.  Lonergan’s metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence.  His 
critique of the “already out there now real”443 is in fact a critique of the metaphysics of 
presence.   His is not a metaphysics of presence, but a metaphysics of what is.  In 
Lonergan’s approach to metaphysics, the subject becomes known as an antecedent to 
being.  He examines a method for metaphysics that does not begin with the subject, but 
distinguishes certain kinds of knowns from other kinds of knowns.  He does not assume a 
prior understanding of the subject.  Rather, like all of the other elements of the universe, 
the subject must become known through experiencing, understanding and judging.  
Lonergan’s metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and non-difference, but a 
metaphysics of dynamism and relatedness.  He does not understand consciousness as an 
                                                 
442  See Derrida, “Différance,” 16.     
443  Lonergan, Insight, 251.  
 153
imperious form of silence, but as experience to be interpreted.  This can be understood as 
the consciousness of an already languaged subject. 
 
II. C.  Irigaray’s Discussion of “Place” 
Irigaray argues that women have been relegated within the ontological category of 
space by the Western philosophical tradition.  Lonergan would agree with Irigaray that 
through the history of Western philosophy and science, space has been understood as a 
container, for example, in Newton’s idea of absolute space.  In order for Newton to 
undertake his physics he needs to posit an absolute container to serve as the ground for 
his system and his equations.  Removing the notion of space as an absolute container 
undermines classical physics.  In contemporary discourse, Einstein substitutes the 
intelligibility of relatedness for the notion of an absolute container.  Space (and time) 
becomes dynamic relatedness.  We find a similar approach in philosophy, for example 
when Heidegger understands time as a manner of relating he undermines the Western 
notion of time as linear.  Following Einstein, for Lonergan, space and time are 
intrinsically related.  In particular, space-time is a construction of our concrete 
experiences and is the lowest of the manifolds.   
Irigaray critiques the masculine bias of philosophical theories of place, arguing 
that the notion of place has been construed wrongly by the philosophical tradition, 
starting with Aristotle.  As Tina Chanter notes  
Irigaray reads Aristotle’s essay on place as one of the inaugural texts of the 
Western tradition to obscure the place of woman …With regard to Aristotle, she 
sees in his text the obliteration of sexual difference.  Aristotle asks about the 
nature of place, about the ways in which bodies are contained in their places, 
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about what can be said of places that contain growing things – but he neglects to 
ask about those bodies that serve as receptacles for human bodies (see ES;  36-40; 
E:  43-46).  He forgets to ask, in this context, about the containers that women in 
their role as mothers have provided, about their limits as containers, or about their 
boundaries as mothers.444 
 
A Lonerganian response suggests that the masculine technique of restricting woman to 
the realm of place is a result of allowing bias to interfere with the further pertinent 
questions that arise in any attempt to join our concrete experiences together.  This bias 
reveals the difference between a merely animal habitat and a fully human world, for in a 
human world we must consider human meanings and values as a significant part of how 
we integrate our experiences.  The pressing question becomes, ‘how do we relate all of 
our other experiences to our immediate concrete experience’?  When we allow distorted 
psychic integrations to interfere we particularize women’s bodies (in fact, all human 
bodies) in ways that are inaccurate and unintelligible. 
 One way in which we relate our other experiences to our immediate concrete 
experience is through space and time.  Lonergan’s account of space and time is helpful in 
articulating a response to the concerns about ‘place’ raised by Irigaray.  Rather than 
thinking of space as a container, Lonergan understands our experiences of both space and 
time as relational.  He claims that we can define space as the “ordered totality of concrete 
extensions” and time as the “ordered totality of concrete durations.”445 He argues that 
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no individual human beings, nor even the totality of the human race, has experienced the 
totality of concrete extensions or durations.  Rather, we experience fragments of space 
and time which correlate to our concrete experience.446   
 Within concrete space there is some extension that is correlative to our 
experience, and within concrete time there is some duration that is correlative to our 
experience.447  What he means is that we do not experience all of concrete space or time, 
but only fragments of it, and so our particular concrete experiences of space and time 
relate to the totalities of space and time through frames of reference, which he describes 
as personal, public, and special.  The personal correlates our own individual experience to 
extension and duration, the public correlates our experiences to a public, common frame 
of reference, such as maps, clocks, and calendars, while special reference frames are 
employed in mathematics and physics to order imaginary space and time or concrete 
space and time, respectively.448 
 Insofar as space and time relate to our concrete experiences, Lonergan speaks of 
space-for-us and time-for-us.  He argues that space and time contain both an 
empirical/material element which consists of concrete extensions and durations, as well 
as an intelligible/formal element which orders these materials into singular totalities.  
Insofar as intelligence orders the material elements of space and time, “the notion of 
Space cannot be both concrete and all-embracing, and similarly the notion of Time 
cannot regard the totality of concrete durations.”449  In other words, space and time are 
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concrete and relational, and are not abstract containers.  In fact, Lonergan notes that 
“Space and time, if real, are determinations within being; and if they are determinations 
within being, then they are not the containers, but the contained.”450   
 Lonergan’s philosophy attends to our concrete experiences, including our 
concrete experiences of embodiment.  His understanding of space-time as relational 
overcomes the notion of the mother’s body as a receptacle because he insists that our 
understanding of space and time must always intelligibly relate to our concrete 
experience.  Our concrete experiences are mediated by meaning, meaning which shapes 
and patterns human experience.  Our experiences which are shaped by meaning are 
concrete, spatio-temporal, embodied experiences.  Rather than the neglect of bodily 
experience suggested in considering the pregnant body as a mere container or receptacle, 
what Lonergan is calling for is a true attentiveness to our concrete, spatio-temporal 
embodied existence, which includes the experience of carrying another human being 
within one’s body.  
 
III.  Elizabeth Grosz 
Grosz’s thinking about embodiment coheres intelligibly with Lonergan’s 
metaphysics in certain ways.  As I argued in Chapter Two, for Grosz, biology is “an open 
materiality, a set of (possibly infinite) tendencies and potentialities which may be 
developed, yet whose development will necessarily hinder or induce other developments 
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or trajectories.”451  For Grosz, biology is an open materiality.  Biology is not a form 
whose contents are historically provided, nor a base upon which cultural constructs are 
founded, nor indeed a container for a mixture of culturally or individually specific 
ingredients. 
This understanding of biology is related to Lonergan’s notion of potency.  For 
Lonergan, potency is the fertility of concrete plurality that is open to emergences of 
various kinds.  This is as true of the “conjugate potencies” proper to biology as it is of all 
other levels of conjugate potencies.  Grosz’s description of biology quite accurately 
parallels Lonergan’s notion of emergent probability.  However, Grosz does not explore 
whether, at the human level, there can be authentic or inauthentic emergences and 
integrations of materiality.  For example, distortions at the psychic level can lead one to 
seek out physical harm, such as cutting oneself to relieve psychic pain.  Lonergan, on the 
other hand, would argue that authentic emergences and integrations of materiality require 
attentiveness to the normative demands of the unrestricted desire to know.  Failure to 
respect and attend to these demands of intelligence, as well as the neural demands of the 
unconscious component of human biological existence, can result in inauthentic 
emergences and integrations of our material existence. 
 Grosz is drawn to, and draws upon the insights of, thinkers such as Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, all of whose thinking about the body is marked by the 
treatment of corporeality as a series of surfaces, energies, flows and forces.  These 
notions of underlying movement within corporeality are similar to Lonergan’s 
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understanding of underlying manifolds which become integrated and systematized by 
higher levels.  However these post-modern thinkers lack or reject a notion of finality, 
which is central to Lonergan’s metaphysics.  Yet Lonergan’s notion of finality is 
“upwardly but indeterminately directed,”452 thus avoiding a key objection raised by Grosz 
and other post-modern thinkers against traditional, deterministic notions of teleology. 
 But again here we must consider the possibility of authentic and inauthentic 
corporeal integration, as well as intelligible and unintelligible three-fold (organic, 
psychic, intellectual) development.453 Feminists have rightly challenged and 
problematized the many ways in which the female body has been inauthentically 
integrated both at the individual level and by culture as a whole.  There are many 
practices in human cultures, both Western and Eastern, which result in inauthentic or 
unintelligible corporeal integration.  For example, in Japanese culture, tradition holds that 
women are banned from the sacred arena of the Sumo wrestling ring.  As discussed in a 
recent article in the Taipei Times depicting the scandal that occurred when a woman tried 
to publicly enter the Sumo wring, “Sumo is linked to the Shinto faith, whose rituals 
strictly forbid any contact with blood, such as that shed by women during menstruation 
and childbirth.  Women, considered to lack purity, were not even allowed to watch sumo 
until the late 19th century.”454  Women are considered unclean, and their presence would 
contaminate sacred space.   
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In Western culture, the female form has been oversexualized, with the result being 
a disconnection from biological function toward an often radical reformation of the body.  
For example, the female breast fulfills the biological function of nursing infants, but has 
become an object of sexual fixation within Western culture.  The popularity of cosmetic 
breast enlargement is rampant, with often harmful physical consequences such as leaking 
implants, back pain, muscle tension and headaches resulting from the carriage of overly 
large breasts on a small physical frame.  From a Lonerganian and feminist perspective, I 
argue that these, and many other corporeal practices that serve patriarchal bias, are 
examples of unintelligible and inauthentic forms of integrations of underlying corporeal 
manifolds.   
 
IV.  Judith Butler 
 Judith Butler espouses a radical social constructionist position which discounts 
biological difference, although her position does not lead to a theory of equality of the 
sort that Irigaray and Gatens criticize.  Her most influential claim is that the purpose of 
the social construction of sexual biology is to enforce and normalize heterosexual desire 
and practice, while prohibiting the experience and incarnation of homosexual desire as 
abnormal and/or deviant.   
  Butler posits a critique of the metaphysics of substance, which she applies to the 
category of sex.  She claims that the dominant view of sexual biology is biased, arising 
from a metaphysics which understands the category of sex as a substance, or a 
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metaphysically “self-identical being.”455  She conceives of the metaphysics of substance 
as connected to the problems of hierarchical dualism that plague Western metaphysics.  
She is concerned by the tendency of Western philosophy to split reality into binary 
categories which are then ordered according to their perceived measure of substance, for 
example as masculinity is understood both as opposed, as well as superior, to femininity.  
Her response to this problem is to posit an alternative to the traditional conception of 
desire.  For Butler, desire is pure potency that can be structured and manifested without 
limit.  This notion of desire is a response to her primary concern about the cultural 
normalization of heterosexual desire, and concomitant designation of homosexual desire 
as deviant. 
For Butler, the unrestrictedness of human desire and potentiality is real and 
meaningful, and therefore must be preserved.  In its unrestricted character, human 
potentiality cannot be fulfilled within any closed system shaped by bias.  Her concerns 
here are significant.  However, her conclusion is problematic because she insists that the 
unrestrictedness of human desire should therefore undermine any and all systems.   
Butler assumes that system must remain static without any consideration of development.  
This is not a surprising conclusion considering that Butler understands that notion of 
system through a Hegelian lens.  Unlike Hegel whose notion of system leads to a static 
conclusion, Lonergan reminds us that system, metaphysically speaking, is always on the 
move.  Unlike in Hegel’s notion of system which follows a necessary and determined 
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path, in Lonergan’s metaphysics, systems such as schemes of recurrence and higher 
integrations are moving in intrinsically indeterminate ways.  
 To Butler, desire primarily means sexual desire, as opposed to the unrestricted 
view of desire articulated by Lonergan.  Her claim is that in heterosexist discourse, it is 
acceptable to desire only that which is classified as categorically other.  Hence the 
inclusion of heterosexuality and exclusion of homosexuality within dominant cultural and 
ethical discourse.   
 To address her position from a Lonerganian perspective requires a serious 
consideration of concrete human experience, for sexual desire is among the desires that 
human beings experience concretely.  And yet, the human experience of desire is not 
limited to sexual desire, or even to concrete experience.456  For Lonergan, desire is for 
everything and about everything.  Desire is, and is for, all within us that is not yet 
intelligibly integrated into our living.   
Butler and Lonergan both associate desire with potency, yet their understandings 
of potency differ greatly.  Rather than understand potency as unrestricted sexual and 
interpersonal desire as in the view articulated by Butler, Lonergan conceives of potency 
as that which has an inherent finalistic yearning for it knows not what.  Finality 
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permeates the entire universe, from electrons to spiders to human feeling and volition.  
Desire is the expression of this finality.   
Similarly, although they disagree on the nature of desire, both philosophers 
acknowledge that desire can become perverted.  For Butler, any insistence that she ought 
to normatively experience or feel heterosexual desire is inauthentic.  She contends that 
the insistence within some realms of contemporary Western culture that homosexual 
desire is abnormal and unnatural arises as a result of static, biased, and irrelevant 
metaphysical viewpoints.  Lonergan would agree that contemporary culture (including 
the marginalization and victimization of persons who experience homosexual desire) is 
rife with static, biased and incorrect metaphysical viewpoints.  Yet his critique of 
Western culture and philosophy differs from Butler’s.  For Lonergan, a culture which 
fails to remain open to potency is an impoverished culture.  Openness to potency, 
however, does not imply a moral relativism, because a culture is even further 
impoverished if it lacks a response to evil.  Lonergan’s notion of potency does not 
suggest chaos or an indeterminacy that undermines intelligibility.  Rather, openness to 
potency requires a fidelity to the normative demands of intelligence. 
 While Butler’s philosophical position is suggestive of a type of metaphysical 
relativism, I don’t believe this is ultimately her point.  She rejects the normalization of 
heterosexuality as unacceptable, which she claims arises from the social construction of 
biology.  Although she does not articulate a response to evil within Gender Trouble,457 
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she certainly would recognize and acknowledge that, for example, acts of violence 
perpetrated against a person based upon their sexual orientation cannot be sanctioned by 
human society.     
Butler is primarily concerned with the reification of categories of identity into 
substance, especially with regard to notions of gender identity.  She claims that  
Gender can denote a unity of experience, of sex, gender, and desire, only when 
sex can be understood in some sense to necessitate gender – where gender is a 
psychic and/or cultural designation of the self – and desire – where desire is 
heterosexual and therefore differentiates itself through an oppositional relation to 
that other gender it desires.458   
 
She argues vociferously against this reified understanding of the relation between sex and 
gender, which she understands as an attempt to normalize a heterosexual orientation for 
all individuals within society. 
 Certainly Butler would consider forcing a person to accept or inauthentically 
portray a sexual orientation that is not their own to be objectionable, perhaps even 
unethical. However the question of ethics raises the problem of norms for Butler, as 
related to the problem of concrete experience.  Butler backs herself into a philosophical 
corner with her attempts to articulate an alternative to a static metaphysical system and 
deterministic notions of teleology.  She is correctly insistent on rejecting a static and 
deterministic metaphysics, but without a notion of a dynamic metaphysics as an 
alternative she is left with a position that rejects any notion of normativity and as a result 
undermines the very sort of ethical position that she seems to advocate. 
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Butler is attentive to the concrete experience of sexual desire, but otherwise 
largely ignores the problem of concrete human experience.  This is especially so with 
regard to what Lonergan might describe as the concrete experience of the desire to be 
normative, which for Butler is a desire constructed by society.  She associates this desire 
with a capitulation to the status quo, rather than seriously developing the possibility of 
the emergence of a norm that challenges and confronts the narrow-minded obscurantism 
of the status quo.  This association of authenticity with narrow-mindedness is decidedly 
problematic, for what does Butler hope for in her critique of hegemonic discourses about 
desire but an opportunity for human beings to experience and express their desires in an 
authentic manner.  As such, perhaps it would be more intelligible to someone who shares 
Butler’s view to speak of a desire for genuine integration that responds authentically to 
the further questions that arise in any attempt to integrate one’s own concrete 
experiences.   
Regarding the failure of philosophy to attend to concrete experience, Lonergan 
points out that there is an often misunderstood difference between the metaphysical and 
the logical or grammatical.  This confusion results in a false reification of the subject-
predicate structure of propositions.  As a result, logical analysis is mistakenly substituted 
for metaphysical analysis.   The result is that philosophers move away from concreteness 
towards generalities.  These generalities fail to take into account the demands that the 
concrete makes if it is to be genuinely understood.  Our cultural norms reflect this failure. 
A. N. Whitehead alludes to this difficulty in his notion of the “fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness” in which the subject-predicate structure of ordinary language 
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misleads us.  Lonergan suggests, similarly, that the abstractness of a proposition leads us 
away from the concreteness of being.  Language is abstract when conceived in terms of 
discrete subjects and predicates because the terms are cut off from their grounds within 
the constituency of proportionate being.  When one is engaged in the common-sensical 
act of understanding things as related to us, 459 the subjects and predicates of language 
make our understanding less concrete.  This problem is addressed in Lonergan’s 
discussion of metaphysical equivalence. 
 Lonergan’s notion of metaphysical equivalence regards the relationship between 
true propositions and metaphysical elements.  Both refer to being, but in different ways.  
He further distinguishes between propositional and metaphysical analysis.  In 
propositional analysis, true propositions can be (either grammatically or logically) 
analyzed.  Propositional analysis involves a consideration of the end product of 
cognitional process:  nouns/verbs, subjects/predicates, and terms/relations.  On the other 
hand, metaphysical analysis focuses not on the end product, but on the dynamic structure 
of cognitional process.  There is some correspondence between metaphysical elements 
and true propositions (as both refer to being) but that correspondence is not one-to-one, 
for these forms of analysis have very different bases.460   
Metaphysical analysis is also often confused with logical analysis.  More 
specifically, logical analysis is substituted for metaphysical analysis.  Consequently, 
metaphysical analysis is often mistakenly deemed abstract.  Lonergan argues that, in fact, 
metaphysical analysis is concrete because “there is nothing to a thing apart from its 
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potencies, forms, and acts.”461  Moreover, metaphysical elements are defined 
heuristically, which allows them to be general but not abstract.  Lonergan notes that  
while ‘potency’, ‘form’, and ‘act’ are general concepts and names, their reference 
is exclusively to concrete potencies, forms, and acts.  On the other hand, true 
propositions may be abstract in their meaning; and then to assign their 
metaphysical equivalent, they have to be transposed into concrete propositions.462 
 
As all metaphysical elements are concrete, they are also individual.  The problem of 
individuation arises only when beings are referred to grammatically or logically, not 
metaphysically.  This problem really refers to the kind of individuality that consists in 
merely empirical difference, so that there is no intelligible distinction between beings, but 
rather merely material difference.  The metaphysical ground of such empirical difference 
is potency.463 
Moreover, the metaphysical elements of potency, form, and act regard things as 
understood in their relations to one another.  Since most propositions are formulated 
mainly as descriptive, in order to assign metaphysical equivalents to propositions they 
must be transposed into explanatory form.  This transposition is necessary in order to 
determine the metaphysical grounds of the truth of true propositions.  It is also necessary 
in order to remove the unnoticed cultural and gender biases that would otherwise remain 
incorporated in the descriptive mentality that regards ‘things as related to us’ - which 
includes us concretely with our biases.  This process is what is designated by Lonergan as 
the rule of explanatory formulation.464   
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He argues that it is extremely dangerous philosophically to fail to observe this 
rule because the result of this failure to properly distinguish between the descriptive and 
the explanatory is the “substitution of a pseudo-metaphysical myth-making for scientific 
[and philosophical] inquiry.”465  In addition, this leads to the creation of “counter-
positions on reality, knowledge, and objectivity.”  As a result of the emergence of 
philosophical counter-positions 
there arises a demand for a metaphysics that is grounded, not in the impalpable 
potentiality of explanation, but in the manifest truth of description.  The correct 
ground of metaphysics is rejected and instead there is erected a pseudo-
metaphysics whose elements stand in a happy, if ultimately incoherent, 
conjunction with sensitive presentations and imaginative representations.  Then 
the real is the ‘already out there now’, knowing is taking a good look, and 
objectivity begins from the obviousness of extroversion to end in the despair of 
solipsism.466    
 
While they do not identify it as such, it is this sort of metaphysical counter-position that 
Butler and other feminist critics of the Western metaphysical tradition are reacting 
against, as well as unwittingly perpetuating.  
 In order for the goals of feminism to become fully realized, feminist philosophy 
must embrace a critical metaphysics.  As Lonergan notes,  
Only a critical metaphysics that envisages at once positions and counter-positions 
can hope to present successfully the complex alternatives that arise in the pursuit 
of the human sciences in which both the men under inquiry and the men that are 
inquiring may or may not be involved in the ever possible and ever varied 
aberrations of polymorphic consciousness.467  
 
It is only through the practice of a critical metaphysics that the notion of sex and, 
correspondingly, gender as static and determined can be countered, and the emergence of 
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human embodiment as multiplicity framed by contingency can be understood.  Butler’s 
philosophy lacks the metaphysical tools to conceive of a universe that is at once ordered 
and contingent, and is therefore drawn into a social constructionism that understands the 
notion of gender as a performativity that is metaphysically arbitrary.   
 
V.  Moira Gatens 
 Moira Gatens rejects the capriciousness that Butler associates with the human 
performance of gender. Instead, Gatens argues for a contingent relation between sex and 
gender.  Even though Gatens’ understanding of metaphysics remains ultimately counter-
positional, still her argument for contingency is more consistent with a positional 
metaphysics than the arguments developed by Irigaray, Grosz, or Butler.   
Gatens accuses Anglo-American feminists of overusing “gender” as a central 
organizing/explanatory category.  She argues that this overuse comes about as a result of 
considering body and psyche as tabula rasa, with a view of the mind as a neutral and 
passive entity upon which we inscribe social lessons.  In this view, the body serves 
merely as a passive mediator of these social lessons.  Gatens’ own claim is that the body 
and psyche (consciousness) are not neutral entities that can be socialized arbitrarily.  
Rather, Gatens claims that the subject is always sexed, always sexually specified as either 
male or female.468  So, patriarchy is not only about gender, but about sexual difference 
and sexual specification.  
                                                 
468 Indeed, there are additional sexual specifications such as “hemaphrodite” or “natural eunuch.”  In 
particular, the term ‘natural eunuch’ was applied variously, both to males who were physically ‘normal’ 
and chose to be celibate, as well as to males who were born physically or genetically ‘defective’.  
Historically, both in Western and Eastern cultures, natural eunuchs were distinguished from created 
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Gatens has a different approach to articulating what Lonergan would understand 
as the plurality of potentiality.  For Gatens, plurality is not biologically determined, not 
caused, but rather sets the conditions for the possibility of emergence.  This is the notion 
of “contingency” that Gatens articulates.  Her argument is that the relation between sex 
and gender is contingent, as opposed to arbitrary, meaning that the facticity of biology 
conditions the possibility for the emergence of societal notions and norms of gender.   
 Gatens rejects a behaviorist conception of the subject, focusing on bodily 
experiences as sites of significance rather than products of social conditioning.  This 
notion of sites of significance is a very concrete way to conceive of embodiment, for in a 
Lonerganian sense, the totality of our bodily experiences (depending on what we take 
“bodily” to mean) invite understanding and decision.   
 What might we take “bodily” to mean?  For Gatens, this refers not merely to the 
physical body, but the body as lived or situated.  Following Lacan, Gatens names this 
phenomenon the ‘imaginary body.’  For Gatens, the imaginary body is both socially and 
historically constructed, but not in an arbitrary manner.  Gatens argues that there exists a 
complex, concrete network of signification that applies to the body, which is manifested 
historically, psychologically and culturally.  This process of signification is reflected in 
Lonergan’s philosophy by the patterns of experience:  biological, artistic, intellectual, 
dramatic, mystical, and practical.  While patterning is not limited to the body, these 
elements of experience have a bodily basis and are functionally linked to bodily 
                                                                                                                                                 
eunuchs, who were variously castrated or whose sexual organs were injured in some was as to prevent 
procreation.  See Kathryn M. Ringrose.  “Eunuchs in Historical Perspective” History Compass, (2007), 
(5)2, 495–506.  In addition, contemporary scholarship and activism in the area of transsexualism promises 
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movements and experiences.  This patterning occurs at both the individual and social 
level.   
 The cultural, ethical, and political significances that emerge surrounding sex and 
gender differences are more important to Gatens than the fact of gender socialization per 
se.  Her point is that rather than simply acknowledging sex differences as biological, 
culture assigns the facts of these differences more complex meaning.  Thus, sex and 
gender differences are never left to stand on their own, but become incorrectly, 
dangerously characterized and appropriated within hierarchical relations of superiority 
and inferiority.  For Lonergan, these characterizations have no metaphysical basis 
whatsoever, but are the result of bias that ensues from our inability or refusal to ask and 
answer all of the relevant questions about the meanings of sex and gender differences. 
 Reflecting her concern with problems of metaphysical dualism and hierarchy, 
Gatens’ later writings469 engage with the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (and 
his collaborator Felix Guattari), and espouse a version of metaphysical monism.  She 
reads Deleuze through the influence of Spinoza, whose philosophy deeply influences 
Deleuze’s thinking.  Gatens is interested in critiquing the dualism between nature and 
culture, which she identifies with a juridical viewpoint developed by humanist 
philosophers (such as Hobbes) which “posits a dual ontology consisting of two distinct 
planes:  first, a plane of immanence (nature itself); second, a transcendent plane which 
functions to organize and socialize the first.”470  Gatens, following Deleuze, is highly 
                                                 
469  See for example, Moira Gatens “Feminism as ‘Password’:  Re-thinking the ‘Possible’ with Spinoza and 
Deleuze” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, (2000), 15(2), 59-75. 
470  Ibid., 60.   
 171
complementary of Spinoza’s monistic ontology, arguing that when Spinoza discusses 
‘god or nature’ [Deus sive Natura] the ‘or’/‘sive’ is meant to be inclusive rather than 
disjunctive, so that god and nature are not thought in opposition to each other.   This 
notion of inclusivity becomes increasingly clear as Gatens argues that the idea of god in 
Spinoza’s Ethics is not traditionally mono-theistic, but rather “refers to the creative and 
entirely immanent power of active nature.”471 
 It is through this focus on immanence that Gatens aims to remedy mind/body 
dualism and the discursive, normative stratifications of embodiment and subjectivity (sex, 
gender, race, class) engendered by such dualism.472  The metaphysical and ontological 
position articulated by Gatens differs from Lonergan’s philosophy insofar as she “rejects 
any notion of essence or finality.”473  Gatens’ philosophy also lacks a Lonerganian notion 
of finality as dynamic emergence.  Rather, she rejects a juridical humanism that 
associates finality with a transcendent power to organize and regulate (static and fixed) 
human nature and behavior.474 
 Similar to Lonergan, however, Gatens reveals that bodies possess a kind of 
potency that cannot be merely arbitrarily integrated.  Her difficulty in developing this 
insight is likely a result of her commitment to a monism which seems incompatible with 
the notion of a higher integration which emerges out of a lower potency.  The result is 
that her metaphysical position (her monism) is at odds with her concrete claims about the 
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body, sex, and gender.  As a result, her position is ultimately at odds with Lonergan’s 
notions of emergence, as well as his understanding of finality. 
 
VI.  Lonergan’s Anti-Essentialism 
 While Lonergan and Gatens differ in their notions of finality, they both reject 
metaphysical essentialism.  In his critique of essentialism, Lonergan discusses the ideal of 
pure reason, noting that this ideal “resulted from the transference of mathematics to 
philosophy of the ideal of a set of fundamental, analytic, self-evident, necessary, 
universal propositions from which, by deduction, we reach equally necessary and 
universal conclusions.”  Lonergan critiques this ideal, claiming that it is “a deductivist 
ideal proceeding from analytic propositions to universal and necessary conclusions … In 
fact, the ideal of pure reason is the Euclidean ideal.  It is what in contemporary scholastic 
circles is called essentialism.”475  While both Lonergan and Kant put forward a critique of 
the ideal of pure reason and its resulting essentialism, Lonergan disagrees with Kant’s 
strategy of eliminating essentialism by abolishing any knowledge of noumenal reality. 
 Rather surprisingly, Lonergan’s rejection of essentialism arises from his Thomist 
roots.  He comments that Aquinas’ notion of actus perfecti (act of a complete being) “is a 
brilliant and penetrating negation of essentialism.” 476  In order to understand the reason 
for this comment, it helps to understand Lonergan’s notion of ‘essence.’  For Lonergan, 
essences are elements in reality that correspond to what one comes to know through the 
                                                 
475 Bernard Lonergan.  Understanding and Being.  Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 5.  
(Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1990), 11. 
476 Bernard Lonergan.  “Procession and Related Notions” in Verbum:  Word and Idea in Aquinas.  
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activity of defining.  These elements, however, do not capture the whole of reality.  In 
fact, Lonergan names three elements of reality.  He calls the elements of reality that are 
less than essences ‘essences on the way’ which he describes further as “movements, acts 
that actualize incompletely, acts intrinsically in anticipation of completion and so 
intrinsically in time.”477  In addition, Lonergan describes the relation between essences 
and ‘more-than-essences,’ which he calls ‘acts.’  To illustrate this relation Lonergan uses 
the example of sight and seeing.  While sight is an essence (an element in reality that can 
be defined), seeing is act.  Seeing cannot be considered to be a different essence, for 
seeing and sight share the same definition.  So then how do sight and seeing differ?  
According to Lonergan, sight is potency while seeing is act.  Sight is potentially, while 
seeing is actually.  Lonergan describes act as “that [which] does not need or anticipate 
something further to become what it is to be … [which] intrinsically stands outside 
time.”478 
Lonergan points to the influence of essentialism (as a form of rationalism) within 
the history of philosophy, which restricted philosophy to the study of the per se (for 
example the per se of human nature) to the exclusion of the study of concrete existence.  
It cannot be overstressed that for Lonergan, metaphysics is in opposition to essentialism.  
He views the role of metaphysicians as disablers, rather than practitioners, of 
essentialism, noting that “Insofar as metaphysicians say, ‘Well, your study of being is not 
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a study of essences, it is the study of concrete existence,’ you’ve pulled one of the pegs 
from underneath that other [essentialist] conception of philosophy.”479 
 So how does Lonergan’s notion of act help to clarify the question of the relation 
of sex and gender?  Lonergan’s unmistakably clear rejection of essentialism supports the 
repudiation of the idea that human natures are fixed and determined by biological sex.  
To understand the relationship between biology and subjectivity we return to the notion 
of ‘system on the move’ which expresses the becoming of the gendered individual as well 
as the universe as a whole, a dynamic and open universe in which “what is to be known 
becomes determinate only through knowing, so what is to be becomes determinate only 
through its own becoming.”480 
 As the investigation of concrete existence requires empirical investigation, we 
will return briefly to Lonergan’s discussion of empirical method in order to elucidate the 
heuristic structures that govern the development of sex and gender.  The heuristic 
structure of the development of sex and gender relates to the distinction between classical 
and statistical science.  Specifically, the question arises of whether the study of the nature 
of the sex/gender divide is a study of classical laws, for example the nature of biological 
sex, or statistical processes and probabilities, such as the development of gender through 
psycho-social realities?   This question is complicated by the consideration of the role of 
the patterning of concrete human experience, and the finalistic orientation of human 
development, as well as by manifestations of human frailty and bias.   
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VII.  Classical and Statistical Heuristic Structures 
 Lonergan claims that there are two types of heuristic structures, the classical and 
the statistical.  In and of themselves, heuristic structures are empty, they “anticipate a 
form that is to be filled.”481  As questioners and knowers, we can anticipate the general 
process of filling the form.  In the case of classical heuristic structure, this involves 
“intelligent anticipation of the systematic-and-abstract on which the concrete 
converges.”482  Here, Lonergan suggests that classical science is interested in the 
intelligible structure of systematic process.  For example, the classical inquirer might 
examine the systematic process by which a tornado is formed.  The same basic process is 
at work whenever a tornado occurs.  In order to understand the formation of the tornado, 
the classical scientist must study the systematic process.  The classical scientist is neither 
interested in the frequency of the occurrence of tornadoes, nor the empirically residual 
aspects of tornadoes.  She seeks only insights into the intelligible structure of the tornado 
itself.  Such insights, if confirmed, yield knowledge of classical laws. 
 Lonergan defines a systematic process as follows: 
1.  The whole of a systematic process and its every event possess but a single 
intelligibility that corresponds to a single insight or single set of unified insights, 
2.  Any situation can be deduced from any other without an explicit consideration 
of intervening situations, and  
3.  The empirical investigation of such process is marked not only by a notable 
facility in ascertaining and checking abundant and significant data but also by a 
supreme moment when all data fall into a single perspective, sweeping deductions 
become possible, and subsequent exact predictions regularly are filled.483 
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Systematic processes occur in and around us every day.  They are ordinary events.  Some 
examples of systematic processes are photosynthesis, the cycle of precipitation, and 
digestion.  These processes are systematic, for they are “little more than a perpetual 
repetition of the essentially the same story.”484 
 Conversely, statistical heuristic structure is an “intelligent anticipation of the 
systematic-and-abstract setting a boundary or norm from which the concrete cannot 
systematically diverge.”485  Statistical science seeks insight into frequency and 
probability, and if confirmed, such insight yields knowledge of non-systematic 
probabilities.  Non-systematic processes lack “the intelligibility that characterizes 
systematic process.”486  They are not characterized by any “single insight, [nor] single set 
of unified insights, that masters at once the whole process and all its events.”487  In 
addition, “there can be no single combination of selected laws that holds for the whole 
process.  On the contrary, for every different insight or different set of unified insights 
there will be a different combination and perhaps even a different selection of laws … 
The different selections and combinations will not satisfy any orderly series or 
progression or grouping whatever.”488  Lastly, non-systematic processes exhibit 
coincidental aggregates.  An aggregate is defined as coincidental if:  “(1) The members of 
the aggregate have some unity based on spatial juxtaposition or temporal succession or 
both, and (2) there is no corresponding unity on the level of insight and intelligible 
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relation.”489  Non-systematic process as a whole shares these characteristics.  Like 
systematic processes, non-systematic processes are ordinary events that happen every 
day.  The following are examples of` non-systematic process:  A set of winners of three 
horse races, for example, The Triple Crown; precipitation or lack thereof in Boston on 
seven consecutive days, the number of lilac buds in my garden that will flower on May 
first, and automobile accidents that occur on the highway.  The Triple Crown, for 
example, is a non-systematic process because the members of the aggregate (the three 
races) are unified not by a single intelligibility based upon a single insight, but by 
temporal succession.  Also, there exists no corresponding unity on the level of any 
intelligible relation.  In other words, the races are related by their situatedness in time 
rather than a single unified perspective.  The outcomes of the races can vary based upon 
the concrete particularities of the situation, whereas conversely, in a systematic process 
“exact predictions regularly are filled.”490  The outcomes of a horserace are not so easily 
deduced, because they are dependent upon many contingent variables, such as the 
conditions of the track on race day, the health of the horses, or the skills and preparedness 
of the jockeys.                
 
VIII. A.    Cynthia Crysdale:  The Metaphysical and Ethical Significance of 
Classical and Statistical Law                                     
 Perhaps the most important point that Lonergan makes in his discussion of 
classical and statistical knowledge is that these two different types of investigation of the 
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universe are not competing with one another, but rather are complementary types of 
knowledge.491  Highlighting this fact, Cynthia Crysdale explores the relationship between 
classical and statistical “law” in her article, “Revisioning Natural Law:  From the 
Classicist Paradigm to Emergent Probability.”492  She notes that classical inquiry focuses 
on one-to-one causality, for example the chemical processes that occur after fertilization 
of an egg, whereas statistical inquiry aims to “explain the ideal frequencies that indicate 
when an event (such as fertilization) is likely to occur.”493  Crysdale focuses on the 
significance for moral theory of the distinction between classical and statistical inquiry.  
However, she must elaborate Lonergan’s metaphysics as a prelude to her ethical analysis, 
and as such her analysis complements my own.  In addition, Crysdale’s article highlights 
ways in which my own metaphysical project leads to concomitant ethical questions and 
concerns.   
 Crysdale argues that the classicist world view presumes that all of the created 
order is governed by classical laws.  If this were the case, “natural moral law would 
involve determining how not to disrupt the given one-to-one causality.”494  Lonergan’s 
view is not classicist, and so he takes seriously the notion that probability is an important 
factor in world process.  Hence, non-systematic disruption of one-to-one causality by 
many-to-many causality is totally natural. 
 Crysdale’s examination of a Lonerganian approach to natural law is significant 
for our discussion of sex and gender, in light of the fact that many arguments about sex 
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and gender norms, particularly arguments that appeal to biological and historical 
essentialism, arise out of natural law theory.  Such positions are widely criticized by 
feminists and gender scholars, Crysdale included.  Crysdale’s argument, primarily 
focused on questions of moral norms, also has relevance for metaphysical questions 
about sex and gender.  She claims that under the rubric of the relationship between 
classical and statistical inquiry, moral questions change from focusing on the disruption 
of natural causality to changing the probabilities.  For example, Crysdale asks:  “How and 
under what conditions is it legitimate to affect the probabilities of various ‘natural’ events 
(such as conception)?”495  We could enlarge this point to examine the question of the 
development of a gendered persona of a human person with a sexed body. 
 Crysdale points out that natural law theories come in two varieties.496  The first, 
natural law according to nature, is focused on cycles of biology and sensitivity which 
humans share with other animals.  The second variety, natural law according to reason, is 
concerned with the orders of will and intellect which are distinctive to the human 
species.497  Crysdale argues that “the rise of modern science and historical consciousness 
has meant that our cultural conceptions of both nature and reason have undergone a 
radical shift.”498  By ‘historical consciousness,’ Crysdale refers to the notion that “human 
knowledge and meaning itself involves a dynamism that yields different truths at 
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different times and places.”499  From the worldview of historical consciousness “both 
nature and reason are conceived as dynamic and developing” as opposed to the static 
view of the world and of reason held by the classicist view.  From the point of view of 
historical consciousness one cannot ignore the significance of modern science, for it 
“uncovered the processes of the created order by empirical observation rather than by 
logical deduction” and as a result “revealed both nature and reason to be dynamic.”500  
As a thinker who embraces the viewpoint of historical consciousness, Lonergan 
places significant emphasis on his theory of emergent probability.  Crysdale highlights 
that Lonergan’s account of emergent probability “seeks to explain both the regularities of 
systems and the probabilities arising from non-systematic aspects of the world.”501  
Classical laws abstract from the temporal and concrete to verify an invariant principle 
which expresses a relationship that holds consistently across space and time; conversely, 
when conditions are met, statistical science accounts for that which classical science 
passes over – a “coincidental aggregate of events that defy intelligible explanation.”502  
Statistical inquiry focuses on the concrete, specifically the frequency with which events 
occur in a given concrete situation.  It generally focuses on two questions – ‘how likely’ 
(ideal frequencies) and ‘how often’?  (actual frequencies). 
 This type of inquiry, however, is “subject to ongoing changes in coincidental 
manifolds of events.”503  As such, statistical science aims not at the “nature” of 
phenomena, but at “the state of” certain concrete events.  So, what is the relationship 
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between classical and statistical inquiry?  In Insight, Lonergan claims that there is an 
inverse relationship between the two: “classical formulations regard conjugates, which 
are verified only in events.  And statistical formulations regard events, which are defined 
only by conjugates.”504  So, to summarize, both classical and statistical scientific 
inquiries yield insights into the intelligibility of events in the world.  While both 
approaches seek intelligibility, they seek different types of intelligibility, and as a result 
classical and statistical explanations for world events differ, yet do not compete.  
Ultimately, if such explanations are correct, they will yield complementary results.505   
 
 
VIII. B.  Emergent Probability and Natural Law: Exploring the Relationship 
Between Metaphysics and Ethics 
 
Crysdale concludes that nature does not have a fixed intentionality of its own.  In 
fact, she believes that danger exists in the tendency to mystify nature.  This mystification 
of nature leads to the idea that we should “let nature take its course” as that course is 
guided or even determined by a statistical world order fixed or determined by an 
omnipotent deity.  The fact of the matter, she claims, is that world order is conditioned by 
probability, not fixed and static.  In addition, humans – as autonomous and rational 
beings – affect these probabilities.  As intelligent beings, we can envision possibilities 
and use them to bring about our purposes.  Consequently, metaphysical realities lead to 
ethical concerns.   
                                                 
504  As quoted by Crysdale, Ibid., 470. 
505  Ibid., 472. 
 182
 Crysdale points to debates over human intervention in the natural world – for 
example the question of whether we should control fires in Yellowstone National Park or 
let them burn as they will – to argue that nature does not have a will of its own that stands 
over and against human action.  She complains that the belief that we as humans have a 
responsibility to sit back and ‘let nature take its course’ is both a false moral ideal and 
impossible proposition.  She argues that this is impossible because there is a reciprocal 
relationship between natural cycles and human intervention.  She claims that   
The created order … is a complex system of cycles of recurrence, some of 
which involve human action.  And just as there are schedules of probability 
within natural cycles, which set the conditions for other natural occurrences, 
so natural cycles set conditions for human choices, and human actions, or lack 
thereof, set conditions for the emergence of natural phenomena.506   
 
Ultimately she argues that “recognizing and predicting probabilities of the emergence, 
survival, or demise of cycles of recurrence is necessarily a part of ethical analysis.”507  
Crysdale notes here that, from the ethical perspective, choosing not to intervene is as 
much of an intervention (of sorts) as direct intervention itself, insofar as both action and 
inaction affect the probabilities of a situation.  She points out that this is especially true in 
regard to difficult questions of medical ethics. 
 Her argument about ‘natural law’ here is that we must recognize that statistical 
laws are constitutive of world order – that the world is not solidified in some already 
established pattern, but is conditioned by probabilities, and thus conditional.  Our ethical 
task then becomes to discern how our actions and choices might affect the probabilities 
which emerge in the universe.  She states it clearly from a theological point of view, 
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“God’s will, rather than being a matter of conforming to an already established pattern in 
the world, involves creating patterns as part of a web of conditioning probabilities.  The 
moral task involves not conforming to nature but transforming it.”508 
 Crysdale is not claiming that we have unlimited license to transform nature in any 
way we wish.  This is not even possible, for we cannot have complete control over the 
nonsystematic aspects of world process, although many human interventions attempt to 
do so.  She claims that “no intervention that seeks to affect probabilities will ever 
ultimately shift the conditioned nature of existence.”509  The autonomy of human reason 
is not absolute.  
   Crysdale is deeply critical here of both the classicist approach to natural law, and 
the view that there are no limits to human intervention in nature.  She states that 
 To admonish people to conform to a given created order, when their 
constitution is such as to orient them toward the transforming of 
themselves and their worlds, is to stifle human flourishing and overlook 
the role of human value and action in history.  On the other hand, to 
promote unreflective intervention in the created world as if there were no 
conditions limiting such intervention is to sabotage, as we now realize, the 
very existence of the species itself.510 
 
She argues that Lonergan’s explanation of the role of conditioned schemes of recurrence 
in the emergence of the universe provides a way to avoid a dualistic view of the human 
person.  In Crysdale’s assessment, Lonergan’s analysis of world process provides a 
complex view of the human person.  She notes that from Lonergan’s discussion of the 
‘unity of man’ in Insight it can be surmised that “human living involves a higher 
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integration of the lower orders of physical, chemical, organic, and sensitive processes.  
Far from implying a dualism of mind and body, this view asserts an intrinsic 
interdependency among many layers of the created order.”511 
This interdependency is complex in the human being, because intelligent 
consciousness, which is the core of human existence, is a higher integration that is 
dependent upon lower schemes which are beyond our control.  Human existence is 
embodied existence, and neither human intelligence nor morality can function properly 
without the complex underlying support of properly functioning “physical, chemical, 
organic, and psychic processes.”512  We can influence these processes to a degree, but if 
we effect too much change we will destroy the process altogether.   
 Crysdale’s conclusion about the implications for ethics of her revised view of 
‘natural law’ is two-fold.  First, she claims that “The underlying manifolds of nature 
cannot be translated into moral norms.”513   This means that ethical questions are 
questions of intelligence.  The only genuine way to address ethical questions is through 
Lonergan’s transcendental precepts, through being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and 
responsible.  This means that our understanding of natural law must be grounded in the 
rational structure of human consciousness as opposed to “natural” animal or biological 
processes, even when those processes serve to underlie human rationality.  Human reason 
is capable of understanding the complex relationship between classical and statistical 
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inquiry, and must apply that understanding to our grasp of the unfolding natural world 
order.   
Second, she notes that “human intelligence and moral agency are only relatively 
free.”  Human existence is conditioned by the physiological, the ecological, etc.  
Therefore we must attend to the “complex interrelations among non-intelligent schemes 
of recurrence.”  She deduces that the fundamental premise of theories of “natural law” is 
that “principles of natural law, while they cannot be directly derived from knowledge of 
natural, non-intelligent processes, must take such knowledge into account or risk 
violating the very premise of natural law itself – that of attending to the created order.”514  
  As unified combinations of animal sensitivities and intelligent consciousness, 
humans are defined by our intelligence and capacity for deliberation.  The normative 
constitution of human consciousness thus grounds natural law, as opposed to mere animal 
sensitivities, or biological processes.  Human existence and intelligence is conditioned by 
the created order, and thus we must be attentive to and develop understanding of the 
natural world in order to act in an ethical manner.   Hence, Crysdale argues that a revised 
view of natural law “must further locate itself in an analysis of history that is critical and 
normative, but that grounds its critical stance in the norms constitutive of human 
intelligence … It will take as an important task, not defining ways in which persons 
should conform to nature, but clarifying the values implicit in interventions in nature, and 
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stipulating which transformations are ultimately conducive to human flourishing and 
which are not.”515   
 
VIII. C.  Emergent Probability, World Process, and Human Living 
 As discussed in Chapter Four, emergent probability is the concrete manifestation 
and structure of finality within the universe.  Lonergan concludes that emergent 
probability constitutes the order or design of world process, by which he means a “spatio-
temporal manifold of events” which is governed by classical and statistical laws.516  
Crysdale affirms Lonergan’s position, and claims that the notion of emergent probability 
“contradicts a determinism by which all of world process is considered intelligible 
according to classical laws.”517   
 Crysdale is particularly interested in the ways in which “emergent probability is 
operative in human living.”518  She reasons that human schemes emerge, stabilize and 
function automatically, for example in the cultivation of habits.  However, as human 
living develops we supplant ‘natural’ (i.e. physical, chemical, biological) schemes with 
our own intelligence and will.  Our cognitive and intellectual development leads to 
autonomy.  As this process continues “freedom and choice become ever more 
constitutive” of the individual as such.  Crysdale notes that “Rather than being merely 
‘conditioned by’ their environment, humans are ‘conditioners of’ their environments, 
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and, hence, of themselves.”519  We could also say that while humans are part of the 
created order, we also constitute a creative order.  As the feminist authors discussed 
previously have argued, our personal and cultural expressions of sex and gender are 
manifestations of the human creative order.  However, as feminist theories have widely 
demonstrated, it is clear that such expressions are not always in service to the human 
good. 
 Crysdale argues that human communities are just as subject to emergent 
probability as individuals, in particular “schemes of recurrence in a community set the 
conditions for individual development.”520  Such schemes include but are not limited to 
the economy, polity, discipline, patterns of affection, and human systems.  These 
communal schemes are not entirely or purely subject to human willing, however, as they 
are subject to the probabilities which condition our universe.   
This existence of emergent probability in human affairs thrusts us into the “arena 
of history” which is “neither automatic progression nor complete chaos.”521  According to 
Crysdale, history is composed of “… a series of increasingly complex, increasingly more 
systematized integrations of meaning and practice which are, nevertheless, subject to 
probabilities of emergence and survival.”522  Human action is not neutral, however, and 
so in considering the meaning of history in human living we are also called to consider 
questions of ethics.  Crysdale concludes that “human living and the history that emerges 
from it are to be understood under the rubric of emergent probability:  they are subject to 
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both classical laws that explain recurrent schemes and the statistical laws that explain the 
emergence and survival of these schemes.”523  Human living, though, is not always 
oriented toward the good.   Lonergan argues that “The challenge of history is for man 
progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to 
enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.”524  Feminism argues that the 
‘fate’ or ‘destiny’ of women ought not be oppression and brutality at the hand of 
patriarchal power.  Emergent schemes of recurrence are not always examples of progress; 
evident throughout human history, even in historical realities such as the systematic 
oppression of women and non-dominant males through the emergence and expansion of 
patriarchal values, are both short and long cycles of human decline.525  The destructive 
effects of the abuse of patriarchal power, and its manifestations of violence and 
oppression, are among the longest cycles of decline in human history. 
 History and human science are not merely descriptive.  In becoming explanatory, 
both elucidate norms.  This fact connects with Crysdale’s original questions regarding 
natural law:  What is the source of such norms?  What comprises world order (Crysdale 
would say world process as expressed in emergent probability)?  Are there any norms 
implicit within world order?  In particular, our concern here regards norms relating to the 
expression of sex and gender within human living, and thus necessarily within human 
history. 
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Conclusion 
 While the phenomenon of gender has become more highly diverse, especially 
during the twentieth century, there remains a deep and abiding commitment within 
Western culture to a binary and hierarchical gender norm.  Gender is enacted through the 
dramatic pattern of experience, and as such it is vulnerable to bias.  Generally, the source 
of bias is our failure to ask and answer all of the questions relevant to our concrete 
situation.  In particular, our understanding of biological sex is likely very limited.  There 
are numerous questions about the facts of biology and biological sex that have yet to be 
asked, let alone answered.526  As such, our actualization of gender within the dramatic 
sphere is a manifestation of our limited understanding of the facts and meanings of sexual 
biology.  This leads to the emergence of humanly created schemes of recurrence that are 
likewise vulnerable to biases. 
 From a Lonerganian point of view, sexual biology is about potency.  Conversely, 
within the history of biology, sexual biology has not been interpreted primarily in terms 
of potency as finality, but in terms of potency as limit.  Of course there is a corresponding 
relationship between potency as finality and potency as limit, but if one is overly focused 
on limitation, the meaning and significance of potency tends to be ignored.   
 One goal of feminisms – as varied as they are – is to disprove the deterministic, 
essentialistic association between the facts of female biology and the supposed inherent 
limitedness (social, intellectual, personal, moral, physical, etc.) of the lives of women.  
The orientation of this project has been to demonstrate how a dynamic metaphysics can 
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address the rightful feminist philosophical skepticism about the tendency of the Western 
metaphysical tradition to construct and support hierarchies that bolster patriarchy.  I have 
shown how Lonergan’s dynamic conception of a metaphysics addresses the problem of 
binary dualism that has plagued the Western philosophical tradition.  Such dualism led to 
the construction of binary hierarchies which validate hegemonic masculinity, associated 
with male biology as manifested by certain privileged male persons, as superior to forms 
of femininity ascribed to persons whose bodies manifest female biology. 
 The feminist authors considered in this work all variously articulate strongly 
positional insights about how the Western metaphysical tradition has supported the 
hegemonic masculinity associated with critiques of patriarchy.  However, each of these 
feminist thinkers are limited in their analyses by counter-positional claims.  For example, 
Luce Irigaray correctly insists upon reviving a notion of fluidity and movement within 
the Western metaphysical framework.  She is also correct in her assertion that an 
inappropriately tellic notion of desire leads to a metaphysical framework that is static, 
solipsistic and biased.  In addition she is right to reject the privileging of presence within 
the Western metaphysical tradition, as well as the notion of absolute space as a container.  
Yet, in her discussion of the morphology of the masculine body she seems to suggest that 
such an orientation is necessarily the result of, and perhaps a primary feature of, 
masculine embodiment.  While she is correct to attend to the concreteness of 
embodiment, she insists upon a notion of sexual difference as ontologically fundamental, 
but overlooks the fact that there is an unrestricted human desire for the universe of being 
that is metaphysically fundamental. 
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 Elizabeth Grosz is correct in her interpretation of embodiment with her insistence 
on attending to the concreteness, potentiality, and movement of the body and a wariness 
of the disordered ways in which the body is formed and viewed within culture.  However, 
she is counter-positional in her failure to seriously address the question of whether there 
can be authentic or inauthentic emergences and integrations of materiality.  This problem 
arises as a result of her lack, or rejection, of a notion of finality. 
 Judith Butler is correct to identify traditional Western metaphysics as a primary 
source for the problem of binary dualism and hierarchy, as well as the static view of 
reality which she rejects.  In addition, she is correct to insist upon the unrestrictedness of 
human desire and potentiality.  However, she is incorrect to assume that all systems are 
static, an assumption which results from her lack of a notion of emergence and 
development.  In addition, like Grosz, Butler is without a notion of finality which leads 
her to understand potency as unrestricted sexual and interpersonal desire.  This leaves her 
without a framework to meaningfully address the ethical concerns that seem to underlie 
her opposition to the normalization of heterosexism. 
 Moira Gatens is insightful in pointing toward a contingent relation between sex 
and gender, as well as in her rejection of a dualistic conception of the subject.  In addition 
she is correct to reject a behaviorist conception of the subject, associated with a naïve and 
limited account of social construction.  As a result she correctly rejects the radical 
arbitrariness of the relation between the sex and gender suggested by Butler’s account of 
social construction.  While Gatens’ account of the contingent relation between sex and 
gender is in many ways the most positional argument made by the feminist authors 
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considered here, ultimately Gatens’ commitment to monism is incompatible with the 
fully positional notion of higher integrations, as well as an account of finality which is 
central to a dynamic metaphysics. 
In the view of dynamic metaphysics, the construction of gender is far more 
complex than the organic development of sexual biology.  Lonergan argues that organic 
sexual development is rather restricted in its potencies, while I argue that the dramatic 
emergence of the gendered subject is more dynamic.  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
human beings shape their lives through a dramatic sort of social artistry which is “limited 
by biological exigence, inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and 
approval, sustained by respect and affection.”527  We shape our behavior and interactions 
with others within a dynamic intersubjective context, and our gendered subjectivity arises 
out of this dynamic context. 
 Yet, as Moira Gatens and Cynthia Crysdale both convincingly argue, the 
relationship between sex and gender is not arbitrary.  The dynamic patterning of human 
living occurs in concert with the other patterns, including the biological.  As a result, the 
manifestation of gendered subjectivity is circumscribed by the realities of our 
embodiment.  While we must respect these organic realities, an even greater respect is 
due to the most primordial norm of human experience, which Lonergan calls the ‘pure 
desire to know.’  Like gender, the pure desire to know is always manifest in a particular 
person under particular social, historical, and material conditions.  Respect for the pure 
desire requires an authentic fidelity to the demands of one’s intelligence.  As noted 
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previously, human beings condition and create our environments, our social realities, and 
our cultural values.  Our molding and fashioning of our gendered selves are 
manifestations of this creativity.  The challenge is to understand and implement gender 
norms which reflect the exigencies of our intelligence.  As Lonergan comments 
while one’s choices can be reasonable or not, while they can be more reasonable 
or less, still one’s own rational consciousness is an accomplished fact in the field 
of knowing and it demands in the name of its own consistency its extension into 
the field of doing.  Such is the dynamic exigence, the operative, moral imperative 
… It demands, not consistency in the abstract, but consistency in my 
consciousness, not the superficial consistency purchased by the flight from self-
consciousness nor the illusory consistency obtained by self-deception and 
rationalization nor the inadequate consistency that is content to be no worse than 
the next fellow, but the penetrating, honest, complete consistency that alone meets 
the requirements of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.528 
 
So, as with all other human choices and creative acts, we must strive for the creation of 
gender by the individual, as well as the construction of gender norms by communities and 
cultures, to be governed by honest, intelligent, and self-conscious acting.  This aim is 
perhaps best expressed in Crysdale’s prescription for ‘revisioning natural law’:  “not [by] 
defining ways in which persons should conform to nature, but clarifying the values 
implicit in interventions in nature, and stipulating which transformations are ultimately 
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